PUBLIC HEALTH (MINIMUM PRICE FOR ALCOHOL) (WALES) BILL

Explanatory Memorandum
incorporating the
Regulatory Impact Assessment and Explanatory Notes

OCTOBER 2017
PUBLIC HEALTH (MINIMUM PRICE FOR ALCOHOL) (WALES) BILL

Explanatory Memorandum to the Public Health (Minimum Price for Alcohol) (Wales) Bill.

This Explanatory Memorandum has been prepared by the Department for Health and Social Services of the Welsh Government and is laid before the National Assembly for Wales.

Member's Declaration

In my view the provisions of the Public Health (Minimum Price for Alcohol) (Wales) Bill, introduced by me on the 23 October would be within the legislative competence of the National Assembly for Wales.

Rebecca Evans AM

Minister for Social Services and Public Health.
Assembly Member in charge of the Bill.

23 October 2017.
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1. Description

1. The Public Health (Minimum Price for Alcohol) (Wales) Bill (the Bill) gives effect to the Welsh Government’s determination to provide a legislative basis for addressing some of the longstanding and specific health concerns around the effect of excess alcohol consumption in Wales. It signifies a firm commitment to further improving and protecting the health of the population of Wales and forms part of a wider and continuing programme of work to tackle alcohol-related harm. The Bill is targeted at protecting the health of harmful and hazardous drinkers who tend to consume greater amounts of low-cost and high-alcohol content products.

2. Evidence demonstrates there is a link between drinking at harmful levels and the availability of cheap alcohol. Legislation is an essential component of the Welsh Government’s wider strategy to reduce alcohol-related harm. We will therefore introduce legislation to enable us to specify a minimum unit price (MUP) for alcohol in Wales.

3. Consultation on a draft Public Health (Minimum Price for Alcohol) (Wales) Bill (the draft Bill) in 2015 found considerable support for the introduction of an MUP for alcohol, with the majority of stakeholders recognising the crucial impact it could have on reducing existing levels of harmful and hazardous drinking in Wales and the associated health gains and impact on health inequalities this would bring.

4. The Bill provides for a minimum price for the sale and supply of alcohol in Wales by certain persons and makes it an offence for alcohol to be sold or supplied below that price.

5. The Bill proposes:

- The formula for calculating the applicable minimum price for alcohol by multiplying the percentage strength of the alcohol, its volume and the MUP;
- Powers for Welsh Ministers to make subordinate legislation to specify the MUP;
- To establish a local authority-led enforcement regime with powers to bring prosecutions;
- Powers of entry for authorised officers of a local authority, an offence of obstructing an authorised officer and the power to issue fixed penalty notices (FPNs).
6. The Bill proposes the MUP would be specified in regulations. However, for the purpose of assessing impacts and the associated costs and benefits, this explanatory memorandum uses a 50p MUP as an example. Where research or analysis has used an alternative MUP (for example, 45p), this is highlighted. The specified MUP may be higher or lower than these amounts.

7. This explanatory memorandum contains references to the Public Health (Wales) Act 2017 where this provides helpful contextual information.
2. Legislative Competence

8. The National Assembly for Wales (the National Assembly) has the legislative competence to make the provisions in the Bill pursuant to Part 4 of the Government of Wales Act 2006 (GOWA 2006). The relevant provisions of GOWA 2006 are set out in section 108 and Schedule 7.

9. Paragraphs 9, 12 and 15 of Schedule 7 of GOWA 2006 set out the following subjects in relation to which the Assembly may legislate:

Paragraph 9 Health and health services:


Paragraph 12 Local government:

...Powers and duties of local authorities and their members and officers...

Paragraph 15 Social welfare:

...Protection and well-being of children (including adoption and fostering) and of young adults...
3. Purpose and intended effect of the legislation

Context

10. The Welsh Government’s ambitions are to accelerate the pace of improvement in the health and wellbeing of people in Wales and for those improvements to be shared more equally. In realising these ambitions, the Welsh Government has signalled its ongoing commitment to take action in a range of ways, including through targeted legislation, to help further improve and protect the health of the people of Wales. This includes using all available policy levers and legislation to achieve these objectives to reduce harmful and hazardous drinking, where the Welsh Government has the power to do so.

11. Legislation has historically played an important role in helping to tackle public health issues and has proven to be one of the most powerful tools available to governments when responding to the big health challenges. Legislation has been used in Wales to respond to a number of public health challenges, including the introduction of restriction on smoking in enclosed public places in Wales in 2007; and the Food Hygiene Rating (Wales) Act 2013 – Wales was the first country in the UK to introduce a mandatory food hygiene rating scheme.

12. This Bill, in common with the Public Health (Wales) Act 2017, seeks to build on commitments in the Welsh Government’s Programme for Government Taking Wales Forward and responds to important public health challenges in Wales. The approach taken in the Bill complements the approach outlined in the Wellbeing of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015, which positions principles such as sustainability, prevention and early intervention at the centre of public services in Wales.

13. In bringing forward this Bill, in addition to the Public Health (Wales) Act 2017 and a number of continued non-legislative initiatives, the focus of the Welsh Government is on seeking to shape the social, economic and environmental conditions that are conducive to good health; promote health protection; and prevent health harms which can be avoided. Another feature of this approach is encouraging individuals to take responsibility for their own health and to act in ways which promote their own physical and mental wellbeing. Such increased emphasis on personal responsibility is at the forefront of a prudent healthcare approach to the long-term sustainability of the NHS.
14. The ultimate objective of the Bill is to tackle alcohol-related harm, including alcohol- attributable hospital admissions and alcohol-related deaths in Wales, by reducing alcohol consumption in harmful and hazardous drinkers. In particular, the Bill is targeted at protecting the health of harmful and hazardous drinkers (including young people) who tend to consume greater quantities of low-cost and high-alcohol content products.

15. The Bill seeks to provide for the introduction of a minimum price for the supply of alcohol in Wales, calculated according to the MUP, the percentage strength of the alcohol and its volume. It would not increase the price of every alcoholic drink, only those currently sold below that price. The proposals will put in place a series of offences and penalties relating to the new system. The Bill also proposes to provide additional powers and duties for local authorities to enable them to enforce the proposed system.

16. While it is anticipated that minimum pricing will mean people will consume less alcohol, they will pay more for products previously sold at below the applicable minimum price. Revenue will go to drinks producers and retailers, not the Welsh Government. Both off-trade and on-trade retail sectors are estimated to see increased revenues, as a result of the introduction of a minimum price for alcohol. Others in the supply chain, including producers, may also see increased revenues.

17. The Welsh Government commissioned the Sheffield Alcohol Research Group at the University of Sheffield to model the potential impact to Wales of a range of alcohol pricing policies. On 8 December 2014 the report Model-Based Appraisal of Minimum Unit Pricing for Alcohol in Wales was published. The model is currently being updated with the most recent alcohol consumption data. Revised estimates of the impact of the range of pricing policies will be available in early 2018.

18. The Sheffield model estimates the overall societal cost of alcohol misuse in Wales to be £15.3bn over 20 years. This includes direct health costs, a financial valuation of the health costs measure in terms of quality adjusted life years, costs associated with crime and the cost of workplace absenteeism.

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2 Valued at £60,000 in line with Home Office Guidelines.

19. The 2014 analysis by the Sheffield Alcohol Research Group\(^4\) concluded that there are a number of key benefits to introducing an MUP for alcohol in Wales, including:

- **MUP policies would be effective in reducing alcohol consumption, alcohol-related harm (including alcohol-related deaths, hospitalisation, crimes and workplace absences) and the costs associated with those harms.**

- **MUP policies would only have a small impact on moderate drinkers,\(^5\) larger impacts would be experienced by increasing-risk drinkers (also referred to as hazardous drinkers)\(^6\), with the most substantial effects being experienced by high-risk drinkers (also referred to as harmful drinkers).\(^7\) These drinkers are more likely to consume the types of alcohol affected by an MUP.**

- **Introducing an MUP of 50p for alcohol, for example, is estimated to be worth £882m to the Welsh economy, in terms of reductions in illness, crime and workplace absence over a 20-year period. This is an aggregate effect, driven by the greater effect on those drinking at harmful and hazardous levels, whose consumption will fall the most in absolute terms.**

20. A more detailed discussion about the impact of excessive alcohol consumption on health and wellbeing in Wales, including the findings of the University of Sheffield study and other evidence, can be found in Part 2 of the Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA).

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\(^4\) It should be noted that the model assumes the MUP threshold is updated annually in line with inflation.

\(^5\) Moderate drinkers are those who drink less than 21 units per week for men and 14 for women. As defined in the Meng et al. (2014) report: Model-based appraisal of minimum unit pricing for alcohol in Wales.

\(^6\) Hazardous / Increasing-risk drinkers – men who regularly drink more than three to four units a day but less than the higher risk levels. Women who regularly drink more than two to three units a day but less than the higher risk levels. As defined in the Meng et al. (2014) report: Model-based appraisal of minimum unit pricing for alcohol in Wales.

\(^7\) Harmful / High-risk drinkers – men who regularly drink more than eight units a day or more than 50 units of alcohol per week. Women who regularly drink more than six units a day or more than 35 units of alcohol per week. As defined in the Meng et al. (2014) report: Model-based appraisal of minimum unit pricing for alcohol in Wales.
21. The Welsh Government’s expert Advisory Panel on Substance Misuse has considered the academic literature on MUP and looked at the key peer-reviewed papers in this field, as well as some non-peer-reviewed publications. The panel’s report, published in July 2014, concluded the evidence base is extensive and reliable. The panel specifically advised: “the effects of MUP would be different for different subgroups of the population... MUP enables those drinking alcohol more harmfully or hazardously to be targeted, with smaller effects on moderate drinkers, particularly those with low incomes. Taking into account all the circumstances and evidence before the panel, minimum unit pricing is an effective mechanism through which alcohol-related harm can be addressed.”

22. In summary, the price and affordability of alcohol are critical to reducing levels of excess alcohol consumption in Wales. As this explanatory memorandum sets out, there is strong evidence that varying the affordability of alcohol is a legitimate means to address alcohol-related harm. Even the most conservative estimates suggest price policy will have an effect on improving a range of health and social outcomes.

23. Although it is not within the National Assembly’s competence (and legislative powers in this area are not being sought), the Welsh Government has considered whether the Bill’s objective could be achieved by raising the level of tax on alcohol. However, evidence suggests that taxation alone would not target harmful and hazardous drinking in the same way – and as effectively – as an MUP.

24. The Welsh Government considers the evidence on the extent to which MUP will have an impact on reducing harmful and hazardous drinking is as comprehensive and persuasive as it can be in relation to the UK and Wales – with anticipated impacts estimated through modelling undertaken by the University of Sheffield. However, the Welsh Government acknowledges that the actual impacts of an MUP in Wales will only be known by implementing the policy, together with a full evaluation and review. The Bill therefore proposes that a report on the operation and effect of the legislation will be published at the end of a five-year review period, beginning with the day on which the offence of supplying alcohol at a selling price below the applicable minimum price, comes into force.

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Background to the Bill

25. Although progress is being made to reduce levels of alcohol consumption in Wales (based on self-reported data from the National Survey for Wales), levels of alcohol-related harm and hazardous drinking remain an issue. A key component missing from the Welsh Government’s approach to reducing alcohol-related harm to date has been intervention to address the low price of alcohol. The introduction of a minimum price for alcohol through this Bill will address this gap and help to protect the health and wellbeing of harmful and hazardous drinkers who tend to consume low-cost and high-strength alcohol products.

26. The need to target alcohol pricing is a view shared by other executives and legislatures. The Scottish Parliament for example has passed and the Scottish Government has sought to implement similar legislation about the price at which alcohol may be sold from certain premises in Scotland. This legislation has been the subject of a legal challenge by the Scotch Whisky Association and others on the grounds that it was incompatible with EU law and so has yet to be implemented. Most recently, the Court of Session in Edinburgh found that the legislation was compatible with EU law. The Scottish Government is currently awaiting the outcome of an appeal of this decision by the Scotch Whisky Association to the Supreme Court. The Welsh Government will be monitoring the outcome of this appeal carefully.

27. The current law governing the licensing of alcohol in England and Wales is set out in the Licensing Act 2003 (the 2003 Act). This regulates the licensing of premises in England and Wales which sell alcoholic drinks such as nightclubs, bars, restaurants and shops.

28. The 2003 Act provides that the licensing regime is enforced by licensing authorities. In Wales, a licensing authority is the council of a county or county borough.

29. The 2003 Act provides that when a licensing authority is carrying out its functions under the Act, it must do so with a view to promoting the following four objectives (the licensing objectives):

- The prevention of crime and disorder
- Public safety
- The prevention of public nuisance
- The protection of children from harm.
30. In addition, licence holders have to meet the compulsory licensing conditions that are set out at section 19 of the 2003 Act plus any further conditions which may be specified by the Secretary of State by Order under section 19A of the 2003 Act.

31. The Licensing Act 2003 (Mandatory Licensing Conditions) Order 2010 (as amended) and the Licensing Act 2003 (Mandatory Conditions) Order 2014 provide numerous mandatory licensing conditions. These include conditions relating to irresponsible drinks promotions, the availability of free tap water and, most recently, the restriction on alcohol being sold at a price below alcohol duty plus VAT.

32. This ban on selling alcohol below the cost of duty plus VAT has been in place since 28 May 2014 and was introduced through the Licensing Act 2003 (Mandatory Conditions) Order 2014.

33. The Welsh Government welcomed this ban on below-cost selling but believes that further measures, such as the introduction of an MUP, are needed in Wales. The Sheffield Alcohol Research Group believes the below-cost selling policy only affects the very cheapest drinks. It has concluded that the average price of alcohol sold by supermarkets would be expected to rise by 0.1% under the ban on below-cost selling policy. In particular, it states: “The ban on below cost selling...is estimated to have small effects on consumption and health harm...a minimum unit price, if set at between 40p and 50p per unit, is estimated to have an approximately 40-50 times greater effect.” The proportion of the market affected by below cost selling is a key driver of impact, with just 0.7% of all units estimated to be sold below the duty plus tax threshold implied by a ban on below cost selling, compared with 23.2% of units for a 45p minimum unit price.

34. Furthermore, the ban on below cost selling is likely to only have a small effect on population health, saving an estimated 14 deaths and 500 hospital admissions per annum in England. This is considerably lower than the anticipated impacts of introducing a 45p MUP, which is estimated to save 624 deaths and 23,700 hospital admissions in England. It is also


11 In the report by Brennan et al. (2014), an MUP of 45p was used as the reference example.
important to note that most of the harm reductions (an estimated 89% of deaths saved per annum) are estimated to occur in the 5.3% of people who are harmful drinkers.

35. The ban on below-cost selling is predicted to have a minimal impact on alcohol consumption and related harms, with a 0.1% reduction in deaths and a total saving of £9m a year on societal costs (out of a total of £15.3bn over 20 years).

Provisions in the Bill

36. The Bill provides for a minimum price for alcohol supplied in Wales to a person in Wales. It sets out a formula for calculating the relevant minimum price, consisting of the MUP, the percentage strength of the alcohol and its volume in litres (section 1). The MUP for this purpose will be specified by Welsh Ministers in secondary legislation. It will be an offence for an alcohol retailer to supply alcohol, or to authorise the supply alcohol, at a selling price below the applicable minimum price (section 2).

37. The requirement for a minimum price will apply to all retail sales of alcohol to a person in Wales from a qualifying premises and similarly to the supply of alcohol by, or on behalf of, a club to a member of the club who is in Wales, where such premises are qualifying premises (section 3). Qualifying premises are defined by reference to the 2003 Act. The requirement for a minimum price will also apply to retail sales of alcohol (supplied to a person in Wales) from qualifying premises in Wales which offer online or telephone delivery (sections 2 and 3).

38. The Bill also sets out how the applicable minimum price should be determined when alcohol is supplied in a multi-buy alcohol transaction (section 5), where alcohol is supplied together with goods, other than alcohol or with services (section 6) and where some of the alcohol supplied in a special offer is of a different strength (section 7).

Intended effect of the provisions in the Bill

Enforcement action by local authorities

39. The Bill will establish a local authority-led enforcement regime. It will provide local authorities with the power to bring prosecutions in respect of offences in its area under the Bill; investigate complaints in respect of alleged offences in its area; and take any other steps with a view to reducing the occurrence of such offences (section 10).
40. It will also place a duty on local authorities to consider, at least once every 12 months, the extent to which it is appropriate for it to carry out a programme of enforcement in its area, and if considered appropriate, to carry out such a programme. When it does so, it must have regard to the objectives of improving public health and protecting children from harm (section 10).

41. The Bill also provides that authorised officers may give a person a fixed penalty notice, offering that person the opportunity to discharge any liability to conviction for an offence under section 2 of the Bill by paying the fixed penalty (section 9).

42. When an alcohol retailer (as defined in section 4 of the Bill) is found to be selling alcohol at less than the applicable minimum price, local authority authorised officers will have the discretion to prosecute as they currently do within their other enforcement policies. Local authority authorised officers are encouraged to promote compliance by raising awareness of relevant standards and legal requirements in a variety of ways, including by means of face-to-face contact. The local authority could also provide information and guidance to businesses on how to calculate the applicable minimum price for alcohol, building on guidance, which will be published by the Welsh Government.

43. The Welsh Government will produce guidance to help support the introduction of a minimum price for alcohol and will work closely with the Welsh Heads of Trading Standards around resourcing and implementation of this aspect.

44. The Welsh Government anticipates that local authorities may, in appropriate cases, wish to exercise their discretion and work with retailers to resolve issues voluntarily.

*Fixed penalty notices (FPNs)*

45. Any fixed penalty notice served in relation to an MUP offence will set out the particulars of the alleged offence. It will also inform the person to whom it is given of his or her right to attend court in relation to the alleged offence and explain how that right may be exercised (section 9 and Schedule 1).

46. The Bill provides the FPN amount will be £200 if payment is made within 29 days or £150 if payment is made within 15 days. An alcohol retailer
who does not pay the FPN within 29 days may then be liable to prosecution. Local authorities will be able to retain the FPN receipts and use the amounts received to exercise their functions under the Bill.

47. The Bill permits authorised officers to withdraw an FPN which has been issued. If an alcohol retailer is issued an FPN and does not agree with its issue, it is proposed that he or she will be able to request the local authority consider its withdrawal. A local authority will be able to withdraw an FPN if it is clear that it should not have been issued, for example if it was issued to the wrong person; issued in error or the circumstances of the case warrant its withdrawal. This should be a relatively straightforward judgement based on the calculation of the minimum price for the product in question i.e. M x S x V (MUP x strength of alcohol x volume – see section 1 of the Bill).

48. If the FPN is not withdrawn and the applicable penalty is not paid, then in line with the provision made by the Public Health (Wales) Act 2017, after the 29-day period has expired the local authority may bring a prosecution for the offence (unless a person to whom the FPN was given asked to be tried for the alleged offence).

49. It is anticipated there will be general compliance in the industry. Based on the evidence of implementation of previous measures and legislation, such as charging for carrier bags, it is envisaged a relatively small number of FPNs will be issued and the total receipts are likely to be small.

50. Arrangements for payments will be detailed on the FPN along with details of where representations relating to the notice may be made.

**Offences**

51. A person found guilty of the offence of supplying alcohol in Wales below the applicable minimum price will be liable to a fine of up to Level 3 (currently £1,000) on the standard scale of fines for summary offences under the Criminal Justice Act 1982 (section 8).

52. It will be a defence for a person charged with an offence of selling alcohol below the applicable minimum price if that person demonstrates that reasonable steps were taken and due diligence exercised to avoid committing it (section 2).

53. It will also be an offence to intentionally obstruct an authorised officer from exercising their enforcement functions under the Bill. A person guilty of such an offence will also be liable to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the
standard scale of fines for summary offences under the Criminal Justice Act 1982 (section 18).

54. An offence under the Bill will be included as a relevant offence in Schedule 4 to the 2003 Licensing Act (personal licences: relevant offences) – see section 2(6). A relevant offence is an offence which can be taken into consideration by a licensing authority when making decisions on granting/renewing personal licences. A licence holder is under a duty to notify their licensing authority of convictions for relevant offences as soon as reasonably practicable (and commits an offence if they fail to do so without reasonable excuse). The court is also under a duty to notify licensing authorities of convictions for relevant offences.

Appeals

55. A prosecution brought by the local authority will be to the magistrates’ court where both the local authority and the alcohol retailer will have an opportunity to present their arguments to the court if they wish.

56. The system of enforcement proposed by the Bill may lead to some cases being brought before the court. However, it is anticipated the possibility of criminal prosecution will serve as a strong deterrent and consequently there will not be significant numbers of new cases brought before the court.

57. If the magistrates’ court finds an alcohol retailer guilty of the offence of selling or supplying alcohol below the applicable minimum price in Wales, the retailer will have a right to appeal through the court system. An appeal must be made within 21 days of the date being sentenced. A magistrates’ court appeal notice form must be sent to the magistrates’ court where the case was heard.

Current position – how big a problem is alcohol harm in Wales?

2 diabetes, there is compelling evidence, collected over many decades, that excessive intake of alcohol causes harm and the likelihood of harm is proportionate to the amount of alcohol consumed.  

59. The level of alcohol consumption in Wales has led (and continues to lead) to a range of health and social harms, particularly for those people who drink excessively. In 2015, there were 463 alcohol-specific deaths registered in Wales, the majority among men (286 males and 177 females). The figures were broadly similar to that in 2014. In Wales (as in the UK), rates of alcohol-specific deaths peaked in 2008 and have since fallen back slightly, with little change for the past few years.

60. Using the wider definition of alcohol-related deaths, the Linked Environment for Alcohol Deaths Research (carried out by Public Health Wales), identified 4,732 cases in which death resulted from an alcohol-related underlying cause, with a further 3,169 cases in which alcohol was listed as a contributory cause between 2005 to 2014. According to this work, for the 10-year period there were 7,901 alcohol-related deaths.

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15 Consumption over the recommended limits of 21 units per week for men or 14 units per week for women is normally considered to be excessive.


20 Every death record includes an “underlying” cause of death, which is “the disease or injury which initiated the train of morbid events leading directly to death, or the circumstances of the accident or violence which produced the fatal injury”. The record will also contain “contributory” causes which were associated with the death. The ONS routinely reports cases in which an alcohol related condition was listed as the underlying cause of death. The figures most commonly used to report alcohol related deaths are those produced by the Office for
61. It is also important to highlight other key indicators of alcohol-related harm. In 2015-16, there were just under 54,000 alcohol-attributable hospital admissions in Wales\(^1\) and 9,699 alcohol treatment assessments.\(^2\) The 9,699 assessments made up just over half of all substance misuse service assessments in 2015-16.

62. The excessive consumption of alcohol contributes to a number of different health conditions and illnesses. Alcohol-related liver disease accounts for more than a third of liver disease deaths in Wales. In 2015, 807 people died from liver disease in Wales, an increase of 131 deaths (19.4\%) over the past five years. Admissions to Welsh hospitals for liver-related conditions have been relatively static over the last five years at around 3,200 people (with some in-year fluctuations). Just over 30\% of hospital admissions for liver disease are related to alcoholic liver disease (1,024). The liver disease mortality rate (per 100,000) for those aged under 75 was above that in England for 2013-15 – with a rate of 21.1 in Wales, compared to 18.0 in England.\(^3\)

63. The impact of alcohol on the health of the nation and the pressure this places on our health system has been highlighted in the Public Health Wales Observatory report, Alcohol in Wales 2014, which states:\(^4\) “Every week our hospitals handle as many as 1,000 admissions related to alcohol, increasing strains on already stretched services. Such admissions are only the tip of an iceberg which includes many more presentations at emergency departments, ambulance requests and GP appointments, all resulting from alcohol.” Overall, we know that alcohol misuse in Wales is estimated to cost the health service around £120m every year in hospital admissions alone.\(^5\)

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\(^3\) Liver Disease: Annual Statement of Progress (June 2017). Welsh Government: NHS Wales.


\(^5\) Please see explanation for this figure in paragraph 202.
64. While we are making progress to reduce levels of alcohol consumption, much more needs to be done if we are to reduce the avoidable harms that alcohol causes families, business and communities across Wales. Although there have been declines in alcohol consumption, the National Survey for Wales 2016-17 show that one in five adults (20%) report drinking above weekly guidelines.

65. In particular, the 2016-17 National Survey for Wales (published in June 2017) showed:

- 20% of all adults reported drinking above the recommended weekly guidelines. 31% of adults drank more than the former daily guidelines on at least one day the previous week.

- Overall, men were more likely than women to report drinking above the recommended weekly guidelines (27% of men compared with 14% of women). Drinking above guidelines was less common in the oldest age group.

- Alcohol consumption decreased as deprivation increased with 23% of people in the least deprived communities drinking above weekly guidelines, compared with 14% for the most deprived.

66. In terms of alcohol consumption among children and young people, the children’s rights impact assessment for this Bill shows that whilst some progress is being made to reduce levels of consumption, as with adults, there is still a great deal of work to be done.

67. The 2013-14 Health Behaviour in School-aged Children data shows drinking among young people remains a concern, with 7% of boys and 5% of girls aged 11 to 16 in Wales drinking alcohol at least once a week. The proportions are higher among the older age groups in the survey, in 2013-14 (most recent data available). Although decreasing, Wales also has the

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26 Trend data on levels of alcohol consumption in Wales can be found in the Public Health Wales Report (2016) Piecing the Puzzle – The Annual Profile for Substance Misuse Public Health Wales (October 2016).

27 Public Health Wales Observatory (2014) Alcohol and Health in Wales.


highest alcohol consumption among 11 and 13-year-olds in the UK. Drinking among 15-year olds in Wales is higher than in England.  

68. Alcohol misuse among parents and associated impacts on children and young people is a particular issue. In 2012, the Children’s Commissioner for England published a rapid evidence assessment which focused on the impacts on children who live with parental substance misuse and, in particular, the number of children affected by alcohol misuse in the family. The assessment found that parental alcohol misuse is a sizeable problem (far greater than parental drug misuse) but “greater attention has been given to the latter despite many more children being affected by parental alcohol misuse”.  

69. Alcohol and substance misuse can be a contributing factor in relation to children and young people entering care. As at 31 March 2016, there were 5,660 looked-after children in Wales and 18,990 identified as children in need. Parental substance or alcohol misuse, domestic abuse and parental mental ill health capacity factors were each recorded for about a quarter of all children in need. The Wales Children in Need Census 2016 shows that 19% of referrals made to local authority children’s services were as a result of parental substance or alcohol misuse.  

70. There is a growing body of evidence and research that shows a strong link between adverse childhood experiences and links with poor physical and mental health, chronic disease, lower educational achievement and lower economic success in adulthood. Adults in Wales who were brought up in households where there was domestic violence, alcohol or drug abuse are more likely to adopt health-harming and anti-social behaviours in adult life.  

71. Young people, especially those who drink heavily or frequently, have been shown to be especially sensitive to price changes. In particular, there is evidence which demonstrates a relationship between drink prices, the prevalence of heavy drinkers and pre-drinking.

72. A more detailed analysis of alcohol consumption in Wales can be found in Part 2, the RIA.

Existing Policy Actions

73. The introduction of a minimum price for alcohol will form part of the Welsh Government’s wider strategic approach to promote a healthier relationship with alcohol.

74. MUP is specifically targeted at reducing harmful and hazardous drinking. However, it is not the only policy approach needed to reduce levels of alcohol consumption in Wales – particularly in relation to improving the health outcomes of those groups who are most vulnerable. For example, the impacts of MUP on dependant vulnerable street drinkers and how changes in alcohol price will affect this group, are less well known. As a result, alcohol policy in Wales requires a variety of approaches, which taken together, can generate change.

75. Taking Wales Forward re-emphasised the Welsh Government’s commitment to reducing the prevalence of problematic alcohol misuse and the number of alcohol-related deaths. It includes a specific commitment to continue to reduce excessive alcohol consumption. The introduction of a minimum price for alcohol will sit alongside other key commitments to deliver a healthier and more prosperous Wales.

76. The Welsh Government is already undertaking a broad range of non-legislative actions to deal with the problems and harms associated with alcohol misuse. These actions form part of the Welsh Government’s 10-year substance misuse strategy for tackling the harms associated with the

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misuse of alcohol, drugs and other substances – *Working Together to Reduce Harm*. The strategy sets out four action areas:

- Preventing harm;
- Support for substance misusers to improve their health and maintain recovery;
- Supporting and protecting families;
- Tackling availability and protecting individuals and communities via enforcement activity.

77. Further actions to reduce excessive alcohol consumption were set out in the *Working Together to Reduce Harm (Substance Misuse) Delivery Plan 2016-18*, which was published in September 2016.

**Preventing harm**

78. Preventing harm associated with alcohol misuse continues to be a major focus of action. This is in line with the prudent healthcare principles, which underpin NHS delivery and which state that early intervention can lead to the minimum appropriate intervention and improve the life chances of individuals. Examples of work being taken forward include:

*Sponsoring Alcohol Concern Cymru*

79. The Welsh Government continues to support Alcohol Concern Cymru to raise awareness and to campaign for effective preventative measures and improved services for people whose lives are affected by alcohol-related problems. Its role also includes monitoring and reporting on questionable alcohol labelling, promotions and information campaigns, issuing good practice guidance, undertaking research and raising awareness in the media. Alcohol Concern Cymru’s advice on sensible drinking, including discussing alcohol with children, is communicated through its Drink Wise Wales website.37

**DAN 24/7**

80. DAN 24/738 is a free bilingual telephone helpline providing a single point of contact for anyone in Wales who needs further information or help about drugs or alcohol. It helps individuals, their families, carers and support

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37 [www.drinkwisewales.org.uk](http://www.drinkwisewales.org.uk)

workers within the drug and alcohol field to access appropriate local and regional services. The service is developing into a multi-channel contact centre where people can access information, advice and support via telephone, text, the internet and social media. Further developments have been made to the DAN 24/7 service for 2017-18 in order to help target groups and areas where there may be particular substance misuse problems.

**Working with schools**

81. Alcohol consumption by young people continues to be a challenge in Wales and the Welsh Government is addressing this through its *Working Together to Reduce Harms (Substance Misuse) Delivery Plan*. The Welsh Government recognises the role schools and education can play in dealing with substance misuse, including alcohol and problems associated with personal safety.

82. In July 2013, the Welsh Government published *Guidance for Substance Misuse Education*, which is aimed at all organisations in the statutory, voluntary and independent sectors which offer educational opportunities to children and young people under 19. The guidance provides detailed information relating to the delivery of appropriate substance misuse education according to curriculum requirements and specific need and substance misuse incident management including support, legislation and good practice.

**Working with employers**

83. Reducing alcohol-related harm through effective policies and support can improve business performance and reduce workplace absence. The Welsh Government is supporting employers to manage alcohol-related harm issues in the workplace through its Healthy Working Wales programme, which is delivered by Public Health Wales.

**Review of alcohol-related deaths**

84. The Linked Environment for Alcohol Deaths Research (LEADR), which was set up in 2015, has been developed by Public Health Wales to support identification of factors that may reduce future non-communicable disease and mortality related to alcohol use in Wales. The LEADR project

39 [http://www.healthyworkingwales.wales.nhs.uk/home](http://www.healthyworkingwales.wales.nhs.uk/home)
has linked data from core healthcare datasets, including specialist substance misuse treatment, hospital admissions, emergency care, critical care and outpatients to alcohol related death data for the 10-year period 2005 to 2014. Further work to bring additional healthcare datasets (including primary care and records) and datasets from non-healthcare organisations (e.g. employment and welfare data) is ongoing.

85. Findings from the initial analysis by Public Health Wales indicate that over the 10-year period, there were 7,901 alcohol-related deaths, with the majority (67%) amongst men. Almost a third, (31%) of the deaths were in those under 50. Overall, only 24.8% of those who died from an alcohol-related death (underlying or contributory cause) had ever contacted specialist substance misuse services for assessment and treatment.

**UK Chief Medical Officer low-risk alcohol guidelines**

86. In January 2016, the UK Chief Medical Officers published revised low-risk guidelines for alcohol consumption. The new guidelines follow a detailed review of previous advice published in 1995 and were informed by the latest scientific evidence. Work on the review was led by a panel of experts in public health and behavioural science. The revised low-risk drinking guidelines are designed for people to make informed decisions about their drinking, to make it as easy as possible to make healthy choices and to keep the risk of cancer and liver disease low.

87. The low-risk guidelines include:

- A single guideline for men and women – 14 units a week for both men and women;
- A recommendation not to save up 14 units for one or two days, but instead to spread them over three or more days;
- There is no safe level of alcohol to drink during pregnancy; and
- Advice on single episodes of drinking.

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88. Further information about the low risk guidelines is included on the Public Health Wales website.42

**Support for people who misuse alcohol**

89. Supporting people who misuse alcohol to reduce the harm they are causing themselves, their families and communities, and ultimately enabling them to return to a life free from dependent or harmful use of alcohol, is a key aim of the Welsh Government. Examples of work to address this include:

**Funding**

90. The Welsh Government provides nearly £50m a year to tackle substance misuse. This includes £17.1m allocated to health boards for substance misuse services and the Substance Misuse Action Fund (SMAF) revenue and capital allocations of more than £27m to the seven area planning boards to commission and deliver substance misuse services and other policy interventions. The revenue funding includes specific ring-fenced amounts of £2.75m for children and young people services; £1m for tier 4 treatment services and £300,000 for counselling services.

**Making Every Contact Count programme**

91. The Making Every Contact Count (MECC) approach, led and developed by Public Health Wales, aims to empower staff working particularly in health services, but also partner organisations, to recognise the role they have in promoting healthy lifestyles, supporting behaviour change and contributing to reducing the risk of chronic disease.

92. MECC involves using every opportunity to deliver brief advice to improve health and wellbeing, through the delivery of consistent and concise healthy lifestyle information to encourage people to stop smoking; eat a healthy diet; maintain a healthy weight; drink alcohol within the revised guidelines; undertake the recommended amount of physical activity; and improve their mental health and wellbeing.

**Tackling availability and protecting individuals and communities via enforcement activity**

93. Tackling availability and protecting individuals and communities via enforcement activity is a way to reduce the harms caused by alcohol.

related crime and anti social behaviour. Examples of work taken to address this action include:

Local alcohol action areas (LAAAs)

94. In February 2014, 20 local alcohol action areas (LAAAs) were set up across the UK, including Pembrokeshire and Swansea, to combat the effects of irresponsible drinking by tackling alcohol-related crime and disorder, reducing the harmful impacts of alcohol on health and promoting diverse night-time economies. Actions include working with industry to resolve issues associated with problem licensed premises and individuals and implementing street drinking controls. Swansea has set up a permanent alcohol treatment centre in the city centre called Help Point, providing first aid, drug and alcohol information and intervention and support for vulnerable or distressed individuals. This builds upon the work already undertaken in Cardiff and demonstrates Wales’ commitment, through partnership working, to provide prevention, education and treatment for the worst abuses of alcohol.43

95. A second phase of LAAAs was started in 2017 with 33 areas in place, including two in Wales – Swansea and Wrexham. Swansea will build on the work of the Help Point. Wrexham’s focus is on improving data sharing between A&E departments, local authorities and the police; how councils, police and businesses can ensure the safe movement of people during nights out; preventing the sale of alcohol to persistent offenders; and considering the re-design of public spaces to make crime more difficult.

96. In addition to the LAAAs, strong partnerships between the police, local authorities and Public Health Wales are helping to improve the quality and frequency of health and crime data reporting and investigate possibilities for using this in licensing decisions and police zoning.44 These pilots will be able to share best practice with other locations in Wales and contribute to the better use of evidence to promote public health through licensing.


Community Alcohol Partnerships

97. The Welsh Government supports community alcohol partnerships. The most recent are in Newtown, Pontardawe and Porth. The aim of these is to tackle underage drinking through co-operation between local stakeholders, such as trading standards, the police, licensing, schools and health networks, and alcohol retailers. They support communities in developing their own capacity to deliver a co-ordinated, localised response to underage alcohol misuse. Evaluation of this work is mandatory, allowing the partnerships to continuously review and improve the model whilst at the same time providing evidence of effectiveness.

Responsibility deal

98. The Welsh Government has supported UK Government initiatives to work with the alcohol industry to reduce the strength of alcoholic drinks; improve labelling information and fund public awareness campaigns and information through Drinkaware.

Evidence relating to alcohol and price

99. The demand for goods and services is strongly influenced by price. This is a relationship which extends to alcohol. The majority of research and analysis about alcohol and price suggests there is a causal relationship between the price of alcohol, the quantity of alcohol consumed and adverse health outcomes. Increasing the price of alcohol provides a mechanism through which health improvement can be achieved.  

100. The concept of price elasticity describes the relationship between changes in price of a good or service and the demand for that good or service. A good shows negative elasticity if demand decreases as price increases. However, the relationship between price and demand is not uniform across the population. Some groups are less affected by price change than others. The same is true for alcohol; there is evidence that


the extent an increase in alcohol price leads to a reduction in demand varies by age, sex, socio-economic status, beverage preference, beverage quality and patterns of drinking, for example, whether an individual is a heavy drinker.47

101. The Welsh Government’s Advisory Panel on Substance Misuse has estimated a price increase of 10% can result in a corresponding decrease in alcohol consumption of 5%.48

102. An independent study for the European Commission49 found that evidence in Europe supports the link between alcohol price, income, affordability and consumption and the direct link between alcohol price/income and harms. Furthermore, it demonstrated that alcohol became 50% more affordable in the UK between 1996 and 2004, largely as a result of a growth in disposable income.50 The report concludes that the use of alcohol pricing policies is a potentially effective measure to curb hazardous and harmful drinking in Europe.

103. The 2010 WHO Global Strategy specifically highlights that increasing the price of alcohol is one of the most effective ways to reduce harmful use. In particular, the 2010 Global Strategy recommends that to reduce the harmful use of alcohol, Member States establish a system for specific domestic taxation which may take into account the alcohol content of the beverage, accompanied by an effective enforcement system. It also encourages countries to review prices regularly in relation to inflation and income levels; ban or restrict sales below cost and other price promotions; and establish minimum prices for alcohol where applicable.51 Further consideration of the impacts of taxation is set out on page 39 of the explanatory memorandum.

104. A systematic review by Wagenaar et al. (2009) examined the relationship between measures of beverage alcohol tax or price levels,


49 Rabinovich, L et al. (2009) The affordability of alcoholic beverages in the European Union: Understanding the link between alcohol affordability, consumption and harms (conducted by RAND Europe).

50 Ibid, page 27.

and alcohol sales or self-reported drinking.\textsuperscript{52} This found a total of 112 studies demonstrating alcohol tax or price effects – and specifically highlighted that these effects are large compared to other prevention policies and programmes.

105. Another review of 50 studies by Wagenaar et al. (2010) considered the relationship between alcohol tax and alcohol-related disease and injury. This found that policies that increase the price of alcohol have a significant effect on reducing alcohol related mortality and morbidity.\textsuperscript{53}

106. Similarly, a systematic review carried out by Elder et al. (2010) showed that of 50 studies which assessed alcohol price and alcohol consumption, 38 of these reported price elasticities. Almost all of these 38 studies (95%) reported negative price elasticities – with higher prices associated with a lower prevalence of youth drinking; a lower prevalence of excessive alcohol consumption and related harms; lower deaths from liver cirrhosis and decreased levels of violence.\textsuperscript{54} Likewise, Meng et al. (2014) have noted that the majority of cheap alcohol sold in the UK is off-trade beer, cider, wine and spirits and that the “estimated own price elasticities indicate substantial decrease in demand for these beverage types if their prices are increased, for example, through minimum unit pricing and/or target excise duty increase”.\textsuperscript{55}

**Price and alcohol-related harms**

107. Increases in price are associated with decreases in demand – and as Meng et al. (2014) have highlighted “the decrease in demand is likely to


translate into reduced mortality, morbidity and wider social harms, such as crimes, absence from work and harms to family members.  

108. The relationship between alcohol pricing and impacts on consumption and reduced alcohol-related harm has been highlighted across a number of different studies. In particular, evidence from a range of different countries highlights the associated health gains that an increase in price will bring, as a result of its effect on reducing levels of consumption. This includes the USA, Canada, Finland, Australia and Sweden (see next section of the explanatory memorandum).

109. Evidence suggests that in addition to improving health outcomes, there are also wider social benefits. For example, in relation to crime-related outcomes and violence-related injury. One study examined the influence of on-trade and off-trade alcohol prices and socio-economic and environmental factors on rates of violence-related emergency department attendees in England and Wales over an eight-year period. The study found that there was a direct relationship between alcohol price and rates of violence-related emergency department attendance – and suggested that a 1% increase in both on-trade and off-trade alcohol prices above inflation would result in more than 6,000 fewer violence-related emergency department attendances in England and Wales, per year. In 2015, Saar studied the impact of alcohol excise taxes on traffic accidents and found a statistically significant strong negative relationship between the average alcohol excise tax rate and alcohol-related traffic accidents in Estonia, during the period 1999 to 2013.

110. In their review of policies aimed at reducing the harm from alcohol, Geisbrecht et al. (2016) found that precautionary alcohol prices can have substantial harm reduction potential, particularly among youth and high- 

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risk drinkers. The review also found that restrictions on outlet densities and hours/days of sale also impact on the drinking patterns of underage young people and can help to reduce high-risk drinking and alcohol-related harm. Conversely, a reduction in prices or an increase in alcohol availability are associated with an increase in high-risk drinking or alcohol-related harm.  

111. While pricing and taxation strategies are considered to have the strongest evidence base for reducing harmful consumption – evidence suggests an MUP is more targeted towards the heaviest drinkers who tend to consume the cheapest alcohol. In 2014, Casswell et al. highlighted that while heavy drinkers pay more for alcohol overall than the general population (because they consume more), they pay less for individual drinks as they buy disproportionate quantities of cheap, typically strong, alcohol.  

112. It is important to recognise, however, that not all research shows this direct link between price and consumption. Nelson and McNall (2017), for example, have reviewed a range of empirical studies of alcohol policy interventions in Denmark, Finland, Hong Kong, Sweden and Switzerland. Major policy interventions have included the removal of quotas on travellers’ tax-free imports and reductions in alcohol taxes. Nelson and McNall (2017) compared cross-country results for three specific outcomes: binge drinking, alcohol consumption by youth and young adults, and heavy consumption by older adults. Overall, the review found a lack of consistent results for consumption both within and across countries, with a general finding that alcohol tax interventions had selective, rather than broad, impacts on subpopulations and drinking patterns.  

113. There is also some disagreement over the extent to which harmful and hazardous drinkers are responsive to increases in the price of alcohol.

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Nelson (2013) for example, in a review of 114 studies highlights that “elasticity estimates exhibit substantial dispersion across drinking patterns, beverages, countries and econometrics models and methods, making precise estimates difficult to obtain”. In particular, Nelson (2013) found that “in models that correct for selection bias and heterogeneity, the average beer price elasticity is about -20, which is less elastic by 50% compared to values commonly used in alcohol tax policy simulations.”

114. One of the most recent systematic reviews of evidence on the effectiveness of minimum pricing has highlighted that there was “very little evidence that minimum alcohol prices are not associated with consumption or subsequent harms”. However, the review also notes that “the overall quality of the evidence was variable, a large proportion of the evidence base has been produced by a small number of research teams, and the quantitative uncertainty in many estimates or forecasts is often poorly communicated outside the academic literature”. Nonetheless, the authors conclude that “price-based alcohol policy interventions such as MUP are likely to reduce alcohol consumption, alcohol-related morbidity and mortality” (Boniface et al. 2017).

115. The evidence base on the impact of price on alcohol consumption and associated harm (particularly in terms of health outcomes) comes from several countries (including Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, Australia and Alaska and Florida in the USA). In the majority of cases, this evidence demonstrates that in response to an alcohol price increase, there is a decrease in alcohol consumption and – crucially – a decrease in alcohol-related harm and mortality. Likewise, when there is a decrease in price, alcohol-related harm increases.

**Alaska and Florida, USA**

116. Alcohol harm was shown to be related to alcohol price in Alaska in a time-series analysis of alcohol-related mortality between 1976 and 2004. Increases in alcohol tax rates were associated with immediate and sustained reductions in alcohol-related mortality in Alaska. Reductions in mortality occurred after two tax increases almost 20 years apart, with the authors of the study concluding that taxing alcoholic beverages is an

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An effective public health strategy for reducing the burden of alcohol-related disease – with cirrhosis mortality being particularly responsive to small changes in price.

117. Similarly, a time series analysis and study of the effects of alcohol taxes on alcohol-related mortality in Florida between 1969 and 2004 found that increases in alcohol taxes are associated with significant and sizeable reductions in alcohol-attributable mortality.68

**Switzerland**

118. There is evidence to show this effect also works in the opposite direction – a fall in price leads to an increase in consumption. In Switzerland, a 30% to 50% reduction in taxation on foreign spirits in 1999 led to a 28.6% increase in consumption of spirits. There was no significant change in the consumption of wine or beer, indicating that the price change had a direct effect on consumption levels.69

**Finland**

119. In Finland, a reduction of alcohol prices in 2004 led to a subsequent increase in alcohol-related mortality.70 In particular, studies have shown that reductions in alcohol taxation and the availability of cheaper alcohol in this country has led to marked and rapid increases in consumption and alcohol-related mortality.71 As price decreased, alcohol-related harm increased.

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120. In 2008, Finland introduced a ban on volume discounts. It is now forbidden to offer several packages or servings of alcoholic beverages at a reduced joint price. Mass media advertising for short-term discount prices or happy hours was also banned (the price may only be advertised if it stays the same for at least two months). Both bans apply to shops, markets and restaurants. Finland also raised alcohol excise duties four times in four years – all prices (both normal and discounted) have gone up; tax income has increased by €400m and the total consumption of alcohol has decreased by 8%.72

Australia

121. Research on changes in alcohol price and affordability has shown that alcohol consumption in Australia between 1974 and 2012 was negatively associated with alcohol price and positively associated with the affordability of alcohol. Specifically, analysis suggests that a 10% increase in the alcohol price was associated with a 2% decrease in population-level alcohol consumption in the following year, with further diminishing effects up to year eight, leading to an overall 6% reduction in total consumption. This research also found that pricing policies need to consider increases in income to ensure effectiveness and that alcohol policy “should only cautiously focus on individual beverage types, because increasing the price of one beverage generally leads to an increase in consumption of substitutes”.73

122. In a study about who purchases low-cost alcohol in Australia, Callinan et al. (2015) found that based on absolute units of alcohol, minimum unit pricing could be differentially effective for heavier drinkers compared to other drinkers, and particularly for young males.74

Sweden

123. Research using data from Sweden suggests that in response to alcohol price increases, consumers reduced their total consumption but also altered their brand choices. This meant that although there were significant

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reductions in sales in response to price increases, these effects were attenuated by substitution of different products.

124. Consumers who wish to drink heavily are able to substitute more expensive forms of alcohol with cheaper beverages that have higher alcohol content. In this way, “consumers are able to mitigate the effects of average price increases through quality substitutions” and change their beverage choice “in response to price increases to maintain consumption”.

125. Consumers of cheap alcohol were found to be more price sensitive than others as they were unable to substitute downwards to even cheaper drinks when prices went up and therefore their level of alcohol consumption reduced the most. There is an important link to other research here which has highlighted that “those who drink at levels which put them at high risk of short-term harms may be more likely to circumvent price increases by switching to a cheaper product”. Introducing an MUP prevents this shift, as cheaper products would not be available.

Minimum pricing – introduction elsewhere

126. Given the link between consumption and harm and the evidence that affordability is one of the drivers of increased consumption, the Welsh Government’s view is that introducing an MUP for alcohol is a key policy proposal for tackling the health harms associated with alcohol misuse. Specifically, introducing an MUP for alcohol will help to protect the health of harmful and hazardous drinkers, who tend to consume low-cost and high-alcohol content products.

127. The targeted approach of minimum pricing policies has been at the centre of the alcohol debate in several OECD countries, with specific evidence on the effect of minimum pricing coming from its implementation in Canada. Further detail is set out below.


78 Independent Review of the Effects of Alcohol Pricing and Promotion, Part A. [https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.95617!/file/PartA.pdf]
Scotland

128. In May 2012, the Scottish Parliament passed the Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Act 2012 making provision about the minimum price at which alcohol may be sold from licensed premises in Scotland. Subsequently, a draft order (the Alcohol (Minimum Price per Unit) (Scotland) Order 2013) was published, specifying the Scottish Government’s preferred MUP for this purpose.

129. Since 2012, the Scottish legislation has been referred and considered by the Scottish courts; by the European Court of Justice before returning to the Scottish courts. In October 2016, the Court of Session in Edinburgh ruled against a challenge by the Scotch Whisky Association. The Welsh Government is monitoring the appeal to the Supreme Court and will review the Court’s judgment carefully.

130. Modelling by the University of Sheffield on the impact of an MUP in Scotland suggests that it will be particularly effective in targeting harmful and hazardous drinking, with significant anticipated reductions in consumption and alcohol related harm. Other qualitative studies carried out in Scotland have similar findings. For example, the recent study by Alcohol Research UK which assessed the likely impact of the Scottish Government’s proposed MUP for alcohol policy on community off-sales outlets (convenience stores or corner shops) and on the local people who purchase drinks at such premises. The study found that shopkeepers were divided in their support for an MUP, although more were in favour than against.⁷⁹

Northern Ireland

131. In Northern Ireland, the former Health Minister announced in February 2017 she wanted to introduce minimum unit pricing for alcohol and that a full policy consultation will be brought forward as soon as possible. This consultation was not issued before the Assembly election in March 2017. It will now be for the incoming Minister and Northern Ireland Executive to agree a way forward when the power sharing agreement is resumed.

Ireland

132. The Public Health (Alcohol) Bill in Ireland contains a suite of measures to reduce the level of harmful consumption of alcohol in Ireland including minimum unit pricing for alcohol products. The Bill has completed the second stage in the Seanad Éireann (upper house of Parliament) and is expected to recommence committee stage in the Seanad during this session of the Parliament. The Bill will also have to go through all the stages in the Dail (lower house of Parliament).

133. The Public Health (Alcohol) Bill, in its current form, would make it illegal to sell or advertise alcohol products below a set minimum price (10 cent per gram of alcohol in product). This equates to a minimum price of €1 per standard drink. Ministers will have powers to increase the minimum price three years after commencement and every 18 months thereafter, following a review.

134. Like the Public Health (Minimum Price for Alcohol) (Wales) Bill, this is a targeted measure designed to prevent the sale of alcohol at very cheap prices. It is aimed at those who drink in a harmful and hazardous manner (the heaviest drinkers and young people).

Canada

135. In April 2010, Saskatchewan province, in Canada, introduced a comprehensive set of new and increased minimum prices on alcohol with higher-alcohol content beverages receiving a higher price. The effect of this increase was assessed using sales data (both off and on-sales). Research into its effects reported a 10% increase in the minimum price reduced consumption of alcoholic beverages by 8.43%, with larger effects in off-sales (the sale of alcoholic drink for consumption elsewhere) than on-sales (the sale of alcoholic drink for consumption on site). Sales of high-strength beer and wine declined the most.  

136. Furthermore, studies of the effect of minimum pricing on alcohol-related harm in British Columbia found that a 10% increase in average minimum alcohol prices was significantly associated with a 32% reduction in wholly alcohol-attributable deaths, a 20% reduction in partially alcohol-attributable deaths and a 9% reduction in alcohol-related hospital

admissions.\textsuperscript{81} The main conclusion of these studies in Canada was that increases in the minimum prices of alcohol beverages can substantially reduce alcohol consumption.\textsuperscript{82} One study also found that the 10% increase in provincial minimum alcohol prices was associated with an 18.1% reduction in alcohol-related traffic violations; a 9.17% reduction in crimes against persons and a 9.39% reduction in total rates of crime (Stockwell et al. 2015).\textsuperscript{83}

137. Similarly, Stockwell et al. (2016) reported that a 9.1% average minimum price increase in Saskatchewan was associated with “an abrupt decrease in night-time alcohol-related traffic offences for men… but not for women” and that “significant monthly lagged effects were observed for violent offences (-19.7% at month four to -18.2% at month six), which broadly corresponded to lagged effects in on-premise alcohol sales”.\textsuperscript{84} The authors attributed these observed lagged effects to a delay in bars passing on increased prices to their customers and inventory stockpiling.

138. It is also important to note that in relation to the introduction and implementation of minimum pricing in Canada, Thompson et al. (2017) have found that the full harm-reduction potential of minimum pricing is not being realised in some jurisdictions due to incomplete implementation, and in particular, the exclusion of minimum pricing for some beverages and the fact that prices are not regularly adjusted for inflation.\textsuperscript{85} Similarly Giesbrecht et al. (2015) found that while alcohol pricing is an effective prevention policy, there is significant “inter-provincial variation” which


“leaves substantial unrealised potential for further reducing alcohol-related harm and costs” in Canada.86

**Taxation**

139. Increasing the price of alcohol through taxation is not a policy option open to the Welsh Government. The taxation of alcohol is not devolved to the National Assembly and legislative powers in this area have not been sought. Considering the specific anticipated impacts of taxation is nonetheless useful as it demonstrates why an MUP is a more effective and proportionate policy approach to reducing harmful and hazardous drinking.

140. Evidence cited in this explanatory memorandum highlights the relationship between increasing the price of alcohol and reducing levels of consumption. Alcohol price can be increased in different ways, including through taxation and by setting an MUP.

141. However, in seeking to achieve the Bill’s objective, the Welsh Government has concluded that taxation is not an effective alternative to an MUP in Wales. Taxation alone will not target and reduce levels of harmful and hazardous drinking in the same way as introducing an MUP for alcohol. Minimum unit pricing aims to increase the price of very cheap alcohol, therefore limiting its affordability and hence consumption among harmful and hazardous drinkers, who tend to purchase the cheapest alcohol.87

142. While the ban on below cost selling provides a floor price, this varies across products and is relatively low. An MUP can be specified at a higher level, enabling and delivering change across a range of different health outcomes among harmful and hazardous drinkers. This includes reducing consumption, alcohol-related deaths and hospital admissions.


Why taxation can be important

143. Taxes on alcoholic beverages are based on influencing consumer demand by increasing the cost relative to incomes and alternative spending choices.\(^88\) A rapid review of the evidence, undertaken by Public Health Wales in 2014, specifically highlights the significant relationship between tax policies and a reduction in excessive alcohol consumption and related harms.\(^89\)

144. Tax increases for alcohol are similarly a recommended action by the World Health Organisation and the World Economic Forum in their joint report *From Burden to Best Buys* in the context of reducing premature mortality from non-communicable diseases.\(^90\)

145. It is acknowledged that taxation may also create an important source of public revenue that could be used to finance healthcare and other services which promote and protect health.\(^91\) This means that welfare could be increased overall, should the revenue be spent on either supporting activities or on other programmes which are focused on reducing alcohol consumption and addressing health inequalities.

146. The WHO suggests that elasticity and affordability data should guide the magnitude of tax increases. For taxation to be effective at reducing alcohol consumption, the policy would need to ensure that alcohol becomes less affordable, including regular tax adjustments to account for changes in income and the relative price of other goods.\(^92\)

147. The WHO, in its 2010 WHO Global Strategy, called on Member States to establish a system for specific domestic taxation which takes into account the alcohol content of the beverage, accompanied by an effective enforcement system. The WHO also encourages countries to review prices regularly in relation to inflation and income levels; ban or restrict

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sales below cost and other price promotions; and establish minimum prices for alcohol where applicable.\textsuperscript{93}

\textbf{Existing approaches to taxation}

148. In its 2016 evidence review on the \textit{Public Burden of Alcohol and the Effectiveness and Cost-Effectiveness of Alcohol Control Policies}, Public Health England set out that alcohol is subject to consumption taxes which fall broadly into three different categories:

1) Excise duties: taxes on specific goods and services;
2) Value added taxes (VAT): taxes on general consumption;
3) Custom taxes: taxes on imported goods.\textsuperscript{94}

149. The most common approach is based on a combination of excise duties and value added taxes. Excise duties are applied on alcoholic beverages in two main ways – either or both of which are used in different countries. The excise duty may be specific to the alcohol content (for example, percentage of alcohol in the drink) or volume of the product, or calculated as a proportion of the value of the product (\textit{ad valorem} excise).

150. Excise duties are regulated at the European Union level by EU Directives which detail the methods by which duty must be charged and define the minimum rates which member states must apply. Similarly, VAT is also regulated at the EU level and alcohol is among the products at which VAT is levied at standard rate. As a result, the Public Health England (2016) review notes that whilst member states have the freedom to set their own rates, provided these are higher than the minimum rates, they cannot change the structures of excise duties or change the type of VAT rate.\textsuperscript{95}

151. The Institute of Fiscal Studies (2013) has commented the existing structure of excise taxes is poorly designed to target stronger alcohol products and is therefore poorly targeted to address problem drinking

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{93} World Health Organisation (2010) Global Strategy to Reduce Harmful Use of Alcohol.}


\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{95} Public Health England (2016): The Public Health Burden of Alcohol and the Effectiveness and Cost-Effectiveness of Alcohol Control Policies: An Evidence Review.}
behaviour. In this regard, the IFS note the structure of alcohol excise taxes is partly restricted by the EU Directive that requires the tax for wine and cider to be calculated by the volume of the liquid, whereas the base for spirits and beer is the alcohol content. The IFS acknowledges that this acts as a legal constraint on the ability of governments to implement the sort of reform to excise taxes that are likely to make a difference to alcohol prices.  

152. In acknowledgement of this issue, HM Treasury recently conducted a consultation, further to the UK Government’s announcement at Spring Budget 2017 that it would consult on available options so that duty rates better correspond to alcoholic strength. The Welsh Government is monitoring developments in light of the potential impacts of any duty on alcohol sales and higher-strength alcohol products in Wales. This is currently seen as a complementary measure to the introduction of a minimum price for alcohol. A new duty band would only deal with a limited type of alcoholic beverage and would not guarantee a minimum price as retailers would not necessarily pass on the increase in tax to consumers.

**Taxation and pricing strategies and how they differ in their impact on health inequalities**

153. Heavy drinkers buy a different mix of products to lighter drinkers, with heavy drinkers preferring stronger alcohol products. That is, those with more ethanol per 100ml, measured as alcohol by volume (ABV). Griffith et al. (2017) have argued that this variation in consumers’ preferences for different products can be exploited – in order to improve the design of corrective taxes.

154. Meier et al. (2016) tested whether four common alcohol taxation and pricing strategies differ in their impact on health inequalities. These were: a current tax increase (a 13.4% all-product duty increase under the current UK system); a value-based tax (a 4.0% ad valorem tax based on product price); a strength-based tax (a volumetric tax of £0.22 per UK alcohol unit

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(= 8g of ethanol); and minimum unit pricing (a minimum price threshold of £0.50 per unit, below which alcohol cannot be sold). The study uses data from representative household surveys on alcohol purchasing and consumption, administrative and healthcare data on 43 alcohol-attributable diseases, and published price elasticities and relative risk functions to model associated impacts.

155. Meier et al. (2016) found that pricing strategies differ as to how effects are distributed across the population. The authors note that from a public health perspective, heavy drinkers in routine/manual occupations are a key group, as they are at greatest risk of health harm from their drinking. The study found that strength-based taxation and minimum unit pricing would have greater effects on mortality among drinkers in routine/manual occupations – especially for heavy drinkers, where the estimated policy effects on mortality rates are as follows: current tax increase (−3.2%); value-based tax (−2.9%); strength-based tax (−6.1%); and minimum unit pricing (−7.8%).

156. In particular, Meier et al. (2016) found that the impacts of price changes on moderate drinkers were small regardless of income or socioeconomic group and that “volumetric taxation and minimum unit pricing consistently outperform increasing the current tax or adding an ad valorem tax in terms of reducing mortality among the heaviest drinkers and reducing alcohol-related health inequalities”. The study specifically found that minimum unit pricing and strength-based taxation would have the largest impact on harmful drinking, with minimal effects on those drinking in moderation.

157. While volumetric tax systems have received a lot of attention in some places, a scheme of taxation that was levied on a unit of alcohol would not comply with the current system of excise duty required by EU law. EU directives limit the ability to align duty with alcoholic content. Directives 92/83/EEC and 92/84/EEC make provision for minimum rates of excise duty on alcohol and specify methods for calculating the rate of duty. As an example, under these EU directives, wines of strength 8.5% to 15% would attract the same duty rate.

158. Indeed, Meier et al. (2016) acknowledge that strength based taxation or “volumetric taxation is not currently possible in the EU as taxation of wine and cider by ethanol content is prohibited”.

159. Even if this were an option open to the UK Government, another study has found that “while both an MUP and a uniform volumetric tax have the potential to reduce heavy consumption of wine and beer without adversely affecting light and moderate consumers, an MUP offers the potential to achieve greater reductions in heavy consumption and a lower overall cost to consumers”. Meier et al. (2014) reached similar conclusions in their study of different alcohol pricing and taxation strategies, using the Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model.

**MUP versus Taxation**

160. While taxation does increase the price of alcohol, it does not therefore provide the same opportunity to reduce levels of harmful and hazardous drinking as an MUP.

161. Higher taxation alone will not necessarily achieve a minimum price for alcohol since retailers can absorb tax increases by off-setting them against the cost of other products. Increased taxes do not necessarily mean increased prices. Indeed, the situation where an increase in taxes does not necessarily result in an increase in prices has been specifically highlighted in a study by Ally et al. (2014) on alcohol tax “pass-through”.

162. An MUP, on the other hand, will guarantee that alcohol is not sold below a certain level. This is because: “A minimum price per unit (unlike a tax increase) would prevent retailers from passing on any increase to producers, or absorbing it themselves. It would also encourage producers to reduce the strength of products”.

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163. Taxation is also less targeted than MUP, in terms of a focus on harmful and hazardous drinkers. While overall alcohol consumption could be reduced by increasing taxation, a uniform tax would be less effective at targeting problem drinkers as the tax would apply across all products rather than those high-strength, cheap products.

164. Without an MUP for alcohol, consumers may make substitutions between purchases of different beverage types and brands in response to price increases. Consumers who wish to drink heavily could substitute more expensive forms of alcohol with cheaper beverages that have higher alcohol content. In this way “consumers are able to mitigate the effects of average price increases through quality substitutions” and change their beverage choice “in response to price increases to maintain consumption” (Gruenewald et al. 2006: page 96; see also Moore 2010).

165. It is also important to highlight that the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) has noted that “a large increase in duty would be needed to raise the price of the cheapest products to a level that would reduce alcohol harm” and that “unlike a minimum price per unit, this would affect all products equally rather than focusing on cheaper and stronger goods”.

166. In this regard, the University of Sheffield is currently updating the modelling on the impacts of an MUP in Wales and is also exploring the level of taxation needed in Wales to deliver the same level of change in consumption and alcohol related harm as an MUP. The modelling data currently available are based on Scotland. These data estimate the taxation level needed to deliver the same amount of change as an MUP – in consumption and alcohol-related harm. This suggests that a 28% tax increase would be needed to deliver the same reduction in alcohol related deaths as a 50p MUP. There are relatively few material differences between the Scottish and Welsh markets for alcohol (consumption, supply patterns, price) and as a result, estimates for taxation levels needed in Wales are likely to be similar.


167. The modelling also addresses the issues of the differential impact on tax take and retailers of introducing an MUP versus uniform tax. The Scottish modelling estimated the increase in total tax take for a 28% increase in alcohol taxes to be £209m per year. Assuming that Welsh and Scottish patterns of consumption and expenditure are broadly similar, this translates into a population-weighted figure for Wales of around £125m per year. For retailers, a 28% increase in tax would reduce revenue by £63m per year (approximately £38m for Wales on a population-weighted basis). It is also worth noting that given that the power to raise taxation on alcohol is not devolved to the National Assembly any revenues raised would accrue to the UK Government and so would not be directly available to the Welsh NHS to combat alcohol-related harm in Wales.

In conclusion

168. The power to increase or vary taxation on alcohol is not devolved to the National Assembly. Furthermore, taxation is not considered to be as effective a measure to target harmful and hazardous drinking in Wales as an MUP, which is specifically targeted at increasing the cost of low-cost and high-strength alcoholic products and also guarantees that any price increase is passed directly to the consumer.

169. Broadly, the analysis undertaken for Scotland demonstrated that a rise in alcohol taxation of 28% would be needed to bring about the same reduction in alcohol-related deaths. However, there is still no guarantee that any additional tax would be passed directly to the consumer.

170. If the Welsh Government lobbied the UK Government for an increase in alcohol duties, there would be an increase in cost to all consumers, whether moderate or heavy drinkers, as any price increase would affect all alcoholic drinks (both off and on-trade). The only exception would be if retailers chose to absorb the increased cost themselves rather than pass on to the consumer (as long as they could do so without violating the ban on below-cost sales). For retailers of higher-cost products, which would not be affected by the below-cost ban (for example, in the on-trade), or where alcohol is used as a loss-leader (for example in supermarkets), this could result in higher costs to retailers, without the desired impact on consumption levels.

108 The ban on below-cost selling prohibits the selling of alcohol at a price that is below the cost of the duty plus the VAT payable on that duty. For products where the total cost of the alcohol is higher than the tax element therefore, it is still possible to sell at a loss.
171. It is also important to acknowledge that the introduction of Welsh legislation on MUP will be achieved prior to the UK exiting the EU in 2019. Following this, powers to reform the alcohol duty regime will rest with the UK Government. At this point, it is not yet known whether the UK Government would reform alcohol tax and duty as a public health measure. Action must be taken now to address existing levels of harmful and hazardous drinking in Wales and reduce the number of preventable and avoidable deaths caused by the excessive consumption of alcohol.

Summary: Rationale for legislation on MUP

172. The Welsh Government continues to take extensive policy actions to address the problems associated with alcohol use in Wales and while there has been a small decline in alcohol consumption in recent years, the Welsh Government believes there is more to be done to reduce the avoidable harms alcohol causes individuals, their families and wider society. This legislation is particularly targeted at protecting the health of harmful and hazardous drinkers who tend to consume greater amounts of low cost and high alcohol content products.

173. In addressing these harms, there is clear evidence:

- The affordability of alcohol is a key driver in relation to the amount of alcohol consumed and alcohol harms. Although there has been a slight decline in affordability in the past five years, perhaps due to the effects of the recession, the affordability of alcohol has increased significantly in the past two decades.109

- One of the most effective means of impacting on alcohol harms is by increasing price. Price elasticity is a strong feature of consumer behaviour and there is evidence that alcohol is subject to this principle. There is also evidence that in Wales, alcohol price policy could substantially improve health outcomes.

- Most European countries routinely tax alcoholic drinks or use other means to discourage unhealthy drinking behaviours. While the revenue from raising taxes can be used to invest in services which support those with poorer health outcomes, there is no guarantee

that an increase in taxation will mean an automatic increase in price for consumers.\textsuperscript{110}

- Minimum prices have to be consistently applied by retailers in alcohol sales, while tax increases may not translate into higher prices at the point of consumption. This means that price promotions remain possible with taxation, while they are severely restricted by minimum prices.\textsuperscript{111}

- Whilst MUP operates at a population level to reduce the aggregate level of alcohol consumed and therefore lower the whole population's risk of alcohol-related harm,\textsuperscript{112} MUP specifically targets harmful and hazardous drinkers who are causing most harm to themselves and society, as they tend to consume alcohol products which are cheap relative to strength.

- The Scottish Parliament has legislated so as to introduce a minimum price for alcohol in relation to Scotland, and forms of minimum pricing have been successfully introduced in Canada. It is being adopted as a policy option in other countries and would, according to both the Advisory Panel on Substance Misuse and the modelling work of the Sheffield Alcohol Research Group, bring health benefits to Wales.

- The modelling of the impacts of an MUP in Wales are based on relatively small fluctuations in alcohol price and so there are some uncertainties about its potential effects (and also how the industry will respond). Nonetheless, even conservative estimates of the impacts of an MUP suggest a positive and worthwhile effect on reducing alcohol-related harm.

174. In light of the above, the Welsh Government views the introduction of a minimum price for alcohol as an essential component of its wider strategy to reduce alcohol-related harm because of its ability to target the habits of those individuals who are most likely to suffer illness and death –


\textsuperscript{112} NICE Public Health Guidance 24 (June 2010) Alcohol-use disorders: preventing harmful drinking.
hazardous and particularly harmful drinkers, including young people – while minimising the impact on moderate drinkers.
4. Consultation

175. The Welsh Government’s proposals for introducing a minimum price for alcohol were first consulted on as part of the Public Health White Paper *Listening to you: Your Health Matters* in April 2014. A total of 713 responses to the White Paper were received and a consultation summary report was published in November 2014. The consultation responses included 145 relating to MUP. These were received from a range of stakeholders and members of the public, with the vast majority in favour of introducing legislation. The MUP proposal attracted broad support from health organisations, local government and voluntary sector organisations, while respondents from the alcohol industry and representatives of retailers were generally opposed to the proposal.

176. A subsequent consultation exercise took place between July and December 2015 on the draft Public Health (Minimum Price for Alcohol) (Wales) Bill. This sought views about the Welsh Government’s proposal to reduce alcohol-related harm through the introduction of legislation for a minimum price for alcohol in Wales.

177. A total of 194 responses were received in 2015, with 68% in favour of the legislative proposal. A summary of these consultation responses was published on the Welsh Government website in March 2016.

178. The main reasons for supporting the proposal were as follows:

- 45% believed an MUP would help reduce the health harms associated with alcohol abuse;
- 40% felt an MUP would reduce the cost to the health service and society as a whole;
- 35% felt an MUP would help address the problem of anti-social behaviour;
- 23% felt there was a problem with increased availability and affordability of alcohol in recent years.

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179. 20% of respondents were against the proposal to introduce an MUP in Wales. These mostly came from the alcohol retail and manufacturing industry and members of the public.

180. Of the 12% of respondents that were neither supportive nor against, some felt that MUP could work in conjunction with other measures, but others felt that this area needed further research and analysis before any decision was made to legislate.

181. Welsh Government officials invited key stakeholders with a direct interest in the legislation to express their views on the proposal both prior to and during the consultation stage. This provided various stakeholder engagement opportunities, in particular with local government, the Welsh alcohol industry, retail and manufacturing networks, children and young people, and older people’s forums.

182. Table 4.1 sets out the changes made to the draft Bill following consultation, prior to its introduction to the National Assembly and the reasons for those changes. The section numbers below refer to the sections of the Bill as introduced, unless otherwise stated.

Table 4.1 – Issues raised during the consultation period and associated changes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change Made</th>
<th>Reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provision has been made in section 1 of the Bill to clarify that where the applicable minimum price for alcohol (as calculated according to the formula set out in the Bill) would not be a whole number of pennies, it is to be rounded to the nearest whole penny (taking half a penny as being nearest to the next whole penny above).</td>
<td>Identified during drafting process. To assist users of the legislation in calculating the applicable minimum price.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A minor amendment has been made to the order (but not the content) of the provision which was contained within the draft Bill. Namely, what was previously section 17 in the draft Bill (amendment to the Licensing Act 2003) is now found in section 2(6) of the Bill.</td>
<td>Identified during drafting process. To assist users of the legislation by grouping relevant provisions together.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Certain amendments have been made to what was section 5 (Supply of alcohol and other goods and services for a single price).

Provision concerning special offers involving multi-buys of alcohol are now found in section 5 of the Bill.

Special offers involving the supply of alcohol with other goods and services are now dealt with in section 6.

Finally, section 7 of the Bill contains some supplementary provision in relation to special offers to clarify the meaning of certain terms used in sections 5 and 6.

Identified during drafting process.
To assist users of the legislation.

Further detail has been provided in order to make the application of the minimum pricing regime to special offers easier to understand and apply. These changes include a change in terminology in that section 5 now deals with ‘multi-buy alcohol transactions’ as opposed to ‘composite alcohol transactions’.

They also and primarily include the use of additional examples in the Bill to illustrate how a selling price would be identified in different scenarios.

These have been made to assist users of the legislation in understanding its application.

Minor amendments have been made to the enforcement provisions in:

- section 14 (warrant to enter a dwelling);
- section 15 (warrant to enter other premises);
- section 16 (supplementary provision about powers of entry); and
- Section 17 (powers of inspection, etc.).

Identified during drafting process.

Certain amendments have been made to these enforcement provisions within the Bill to ensure consistency with the enforcement provisions in the Public Health (Wales) Act 2017.

A new section 19 (retained property: appeals) has been inserted into the Bill.

Identified during drafting process.

This section provides an additional safeguard relating to the powers of entry and inspection provisions within the Bill.

It enables a person with an interest in anything taken away from premises by an authorised officer under the Bill to apply to a magistrates’ court for an order requesting the release of the property. Depending on the court’s consideration of an application, it may
| Section 20 of the Bill (appropriated property: compensation) has been inserted into the Bill. | **Identified during drafting process.**

This section provides a right for a person affected by the taking possession of property under the Bill to apply to a magistrates' court for compensation.

Where the circumstances set out in subsection (2) are satisfied – that the person has suffered loss or damage as a consequence of the property being taken or retained where doing so was not necessary for ascertaining whether an offence had been committed and the loss or damage is not due to their neglect or failure to act – the court may order the local authority to pay compensation to the applicant.

The insertion of this provision is consistent with equivalent provision in the Public Health (Wales) Act 2017. |
| --- | --- |
| Section 21 of the Bill (report on operation and effect of this Act) now places a duty on the Welsh Ministers to lay before the National Assembly a report on the operation and effect of the Act during that period, as soon as practicable after the end of the period of five years beginning with the day on which section 2 comes into force. | **Raised during consultation.**

The consultation on the draft Bill asked respondents whether the Welsh Government should review the initial level of MUP set to maintain its effectiveness.

The vast majority of those who responded to this question, whether they supported or opposed the proposal, said that if legislation was introduced then the level of the MUP set should be reviewed.

A number of respondents both for and
against said that consideration should be given to an appropriate audit mechanism with clearly defined economic modelling to provide good data.

Respondents also commented on the importance of reviewing the impacts of the legislation – again particularly in relation to whether the MUP was set at the right level in order to have maximum affect on reducing harmful and hazardous drinking. Any review should not just take into account inflation and economic conditions, but also changes in consumption, attitudes and legislation.

A five-year review point is considered the earliest point which would allow the policy to embed itself and for there to be sufficient data to assess its effectiveness.

Laying a report before the National Assembly on the operation and effect of the Bill and consulting on the content of this report is therefore considered critical to demonstrating impacts and consequences of the legislation.

Section 22 (duration of minimum pricing provisions) now provides that the relevant provisions of the Act (and any consequential amendments made by it) will be repealed at the end of a six-year period, beginning with the day on which section 2 comes into force unless regulations are made by the Welsh Ministers providing for their continuation.

Raised in consultation.

One respondent to the consultation on the draft Bill noted that the Bill should include a 'sunset' clause to allow that after a period of time and following detailed evaluation, if the legislation was found to be ineffective or other methods found to be more effective, the legislation should cease to have effect.

Section 23 (crown application) now provides that the Crown is bound by

Identified during drafting process
the provisions of the Bill in the same way as it is bound under section 195 of the 2003 Act.

This means that the provisions of the Bill will apply to the Crown and to Crown property. They will also apply to land of the Duchies of Lancaster and Cornwall (except to the extent that they are occupied by the Queen or the Prince of Wales).
5. Power to make subordinate legislation

The Bill contains provisions to make subordinate legislation. Table 5.1 (Summary of powers to make subordinate legislation in the provisions of the Public Health (Minimum Price for Alcohol) (Wales) Bill sets out in relation to these:

(i). the person upon whom, or the body upon which, the power is conferred;

(ii). the form in which the power is to be exercised;

(iii). the appropriateness of the delegated power;

(iv). the applied procedure; that is, whether it is “affirmative”, “negative”, or “no procedure”, together with reasons why it is considered appropriate.

The Welsh Government will consult on the content of the subordinate legislation where it is considered appropriate to do so. The precise nature of consultation will be decided when the proposals have been formalised.
Table 5.1: Summary of powers to make subordinate legislation in the provisions of the Public Health (Minimum Price for Alcohol) (Wales) Bill

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Power conferred on</th>
<th>Form</th>
<th>Appropriateness of delegated power</th>
<th>Procedure</th>
<th>Reason for procedure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Section 1(1)(a)</td>
<td>Welsh Ministers</td>
<td>Regulations</td>
<td>It is considered appropriate to delegate the power to specify the MUP for which alcohol is to be supplied in Wales to the Welsh Ministers for reasons of flexibility, timeliness and accuracy. Doing so will ensure that Welsh Ministers are able to review and set the price considered most appropriate at the relevant time, subject to the approval of the National Assembly. The Welsh Government believes that this strikes a correct and proportionate balance between the acknowledged significance of the issue and the ability and flexibility to most effectively respond to any relevant change in economic and social circumstances.</td>
<td>Affirmative</td>
<td>Given its impact on stakeholders and the wider public, it is considered appropriate that the MUP for alcohol to be supplied in Wales will not be set or amended without full consideration and the opportunity for debate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Power conferred on</td>
<td>Form</td>
<td>Appropriateness of delegated power</td>
<td>Procedure</td>
<td>Reason for procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Section 22(1) and (2)</td>
<td>Welsh Ministers</td>
<td>Regulations</td>
<td>Section 22(1) of the Bill provides that the minimum pricing provisions will be repealed after a period of six years from the commencement of section 2 (which will introduce the offence of the sale and supply of alcohol below the applicable minimum price in Wales), unless regulations are made by the Welsh Ministers providing otherwise. If Welsh Ministers wish the minimum pricing provisions to continue, the power in section 22(1) and (2) enables them, with the Assembly’s approval to make regulations providing for their continuation.</td>
<td>Affirmative</td>
<td>The minimum pricing provisions will be introduced by an Assembly Act. For this reason as well as the significance of allowing them to continue, the affirmative procedure and the opportunity it provides for consideration and debate by the Assembly, is considered appropriate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 22(3)</td>
<td>Welsh Ministers</td>
<td>Regulations</td>
<td>If the minimum pricing provisions are repealed at the end of the six year period, Welsh Ministers may make provision which they consider to be necessary or expedient as a result of that repeal.</td>
<td>Affirmative</td>
<td>The affirmative procedure is considered appropriate because this power includes the power to amend enactments including Acts of Parliament and Measures or Acts of the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Power conferred on</td>
<td>Form</td>
<td>Appropriateness of delegated power</td>
<td>Procedure</td>
<td>Reason for procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Delegated powers are suitable for giving Welsh Ministers the flexibility of making any supplementary, incidental or consequential provision and any transitory, transitional or saving provision, if they consider it necessary or expedient in this context.</td>
<td>National Assembly.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 28(2)</td>
<td>Welsh Ministers</td>
<td>Order</td>
<td>The Bill provides that the majority of its provisions will come into force on a day appointed by Welsh Ministers in an order. This delegated power is both necessary and appropriate as it will ensure that commencement can align with the transition and implementation arrangements which will also be made by Welsh Ministers to accompany the Bill, and vice versa.</td>
<td>No procedure</td>
<td>An order made under this provision will be technical in nature.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 4 of</td>
<td>Welsh Ministers</td>
<td>Regulations</td>
<td>Provision as to what a fixed penalty notice must contain is set out on the</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Power conferred on</td>
<td>Form</td>
<td>Appropriateness of delegated power</td>
<td>Procedure</td>
<td>Reason for procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Schedule 1</td>
<td></td>
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<td>face of the Bill. However, Welsh Ministers may also make supplementary provision in relation to the content or form of a notice, by regulations. Changing circumstances or evidence based practice might mean that additional or different content or form of a notice is required. Therefore, supplementary delegated powers are appropriate.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Provides for ancillary provision or matters which may need to be updated from time to time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 5(2) of Schedule 1</td>
<td>Welsh Ministers</td>
<td>Regulations</td>
<td>The Bill specifies the amount of a fixed penalty which may be given in respect of an offence committed under section 2. It also provides that regulations may amend that amount. The penalty amount may need to be amended from time to time to reflect changing circumstances. It is, therefore, suitable for delegated powers.</td>
<td>Affirmative</td>
<td>Given the potential impact of fixed penalty notices on retailers, the amount set for these will require full consideration and the opportunity for debate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Power conferred on</td>
<td>Form</td>
<td>Appropriateness of delegated power</td>
<td>Procedure</td>
<td>Reason for procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph 9 of Schedule 1</td>
<td>Welsh Ministers</td>
<td>Regulations</td>
<td>The Bill specifies a discounted amount which is payable, instead of the full amount of the penalty if payment is made before the end of a specified period. Consistently with the provision made in relation to the full amount, it also provides that regulations may amend the discounted amount. This amount may need to be amended from time to time to reflect changing circumstances. It is, therefore, suitable for delegated powers.</td>
<td>Affirmative</td>
<td>Similarly, given the potential impact of FPNs on retailers the discounted amount set for fixed penalty notices will require full consideration and the opportunity for debate.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA)

A Regulatory Impact Assessment has been completed for the Bill and it follows below.

There are no specific provisions in the Bill which charge expenditure on the Welsh Consolidated Fund.
## PART 2 – REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT

Table A

### SUMMARY – REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT (RIA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Health (Minimum Price for Alcohol) (Wales) Bill</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preferred option: Option 3: Introduce a minimum price for alcohol in Wales (pages 98-119).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Cost</td>
<td>Total Benefits</td>
<td>Net Present Value (NPV): £880m (net benefit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total: £2.6m</td>
<td>Total: £NA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present value: £2.2m</td>
<td>Present value: £882m</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Administrative cost

**Costs:** Total Welsh Government costs (over a five year implementation period) include: £6,900 for developing guidance; £1,800 for the design of guidance; £100,000 for communications; £6,000 for training for enforcement officers; and £350,000 for the evaluation. Discussions are also taking place around funding for additional inspections and enforcement – over and above activity taking place under existing local government-led inspection regimes. Early estimates of anticipated costs are £150,000 in the first year of implementation, £100,000 in year 2 and £50,000 in year 3. See Option 3 in the RIA – pages 106 to 107 and Table 9, but these have not yet been confirmed and are therefore not currently included in the total administrative costs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transitional: £0.5m</th>
<th>Recurrent: £NA</th>
<th>Total: £0.5m</th>
<th>PV: £0.4m</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cost-savings: NA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transitional: £NA</th>
<th>Recurrent: £NA</th>
<th>Total: £NA</th>
<th>PV: £NA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Net administrative cost:** £0.5m
Compliance costs

Compliance costs for retailers include: £756,400 in the first year to fully familiarise with the requirements of the legislation and changing prices, plus £75,000 annually for ongoing compliance and familiarisation. Total costs are calculated over a twenty year period to be consistent with the timeframe taken for benefits. See pages 102 – 106 and Table 9.

| Transitional: £0.8m | Recurrent: £0.1m | Total: £2.2m | PV: £1.8m |

Other costs

UK reduction in alcohol duty revenue from fewer alcohol sales: Reduction of £5.8m per year (-£82.4m over twenty years), but this is a transfer payment. See Table 9.

Costs to consumers: £27m per year. This £27m is the gain to retailers caused by consumers paying more than they would have done without MUP. In terms of the calculation of net costs and benefits this transfer payment has no effect because it is a cost to consumers but a benefit to retailers. See page 116 and Table 9.

Enforcement costs – local authorities and courts. Anticipated to be low – however, these costs are unknown. Enforcing MUP is expected to be undertaken within existing inspection regimes. See pages 106 – 107.

| Transitional: £0 | Recurrent: £0 | Total: £0 | PV: £0 |

Unquantified costs and disbenefits

There is a possible reduction in consumer utility (consumer satisfaction) resulting from reduced consumption of alcohol. It is not possible to quantify this. It is assumed that it will be offset by an increase in utility (satisfaction) from the health benefits accruing as a result of lower consumption. See page 102.

All social benefits (relating to health gains, crime reduction and workplace absence) are all quantified, over a twenty year appraisal period. No unquantified environment benefits / disbenefits have been identified.
Benefits

Over a 20 year appraisal period: A 50p MUP is associated with a total societal reduction in health harms, crime and workplace absence estimated at £882m (in 2014 prices) over the 20-year period modelled. This figure includes reduced direct healthcare costs (£131m); savings from reduced crime (£248m); savings from reduced workplace absence (£14m); and a financial valuation of the health benefits (£489m), measured in terms of quality adjusted life years (QALYs), which are valued at £60,000 in line with Home Office guidelines. See page 110.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transitional: £NA</th>
<th>Recurrent: £NA</th>
<th>Total: £NA</th>
<th>PV: £882m</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Key Evidence, Assumptions and Uncertainties

- There is a strong evidence base about the link between the price of alcohol and consumption and about the link between alcohol price and health harms. As alcohol becomes more affordable, consumption increases; as consumption increases, harm increases.

- People who are drinking at potentially harmful levels are more likely to experience long-term health benefits from the effects of an MUP for alcohol, through anticipated reduced levels of consumption. The Bill introduces a minimum price for alcohol to deliver change and reduce harmful and hazardous drinking in Wales.

- The damage that alcohol can cause not only affects the individual but society as a whole. There are costs linked to increased pressure on health services and the criminal justice system. Introducing an MUP could help to reduce these costs, as well as support employers – who lose productivity due to the effects of alcohol on their employees.

- MUP policies would only have a small impact on moderate drinkers. Larger impacts would be experienced by those drinking at hazardous

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117 All costs and benefits in the Sheffield Model which relate to a 20 year period have been discounted at 3.5%.
levels, with the most substantial effects being experienced by high-risk (harmful) drinkers.

- People living in poverty who abstain from alcohol or who are moderate drinkers will be minimally affected. However, people living in poverty tend to have worse health outcomes than others, when alcohol consumption is the same – suffering a disproportionate amount of alcohol-related harm. For harmful and hazardous drinkers, research shows that people living in the most deprived areas are more likely to suffer from an alcohol-related long-term illness and are also more likely to die from an alcohol-related death, than those in the least deprived areas. Minimum pricing can potentially reduce levels of harmful and hazardous drinking in these groups, meaning the risk of alcohol-related harm would be reduced.
Alcohol Consumption in Wales

183. The level of alcohol use in a country is best estimated from national sales, as survey data is known to underestimate consumption in the population, usually capturing approximately 60% of the true figures. Sales data are derived from HM Revenue and Customs duty charged on alcohol produced or processed in the UK or brought into the UK for consumption but not necessarily consumed.

184. Sales data for the UK show that consumption has more than doubled since the 1950s. Figure 1 shows the population level of drinking in the UK since 1900. However, it has been reported that there has been a slight decline in consumption since 2004, which may be at least partially related to declining affordability. Figure two demonstrates the link between affordability and consumption (sometimes with a time lag) and shows in recent years how consumption has declined sharply, which the Institute for Alcohol Studies suggests could be related to the effects of the general economic climate.


120 Institute of Alcohol Studies (April 2014) Alcohol Pricing Factsheet.
185. Overall progress in reducing alcohol consumption over the past few years is likely to be driven by a number of causes, cultural and economic as well as political, including actions taken by the Welsh Government, the UK Government and the alcohol industry. For example, recent data indicates the responsibility deal between the UK Government and the

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122 Institute of Alcohol Studies (April 2014) Alcohol Pricing Factsheet.
alcohol industry has helped to reduce overall consumption of units of alcohol by decreasing the strength of drinks on the market, especially the average strength of beer. This has resulted in a 3.7% reduction in the number of units of alcohol released for consumption between 2011 and 2013.\footnote{Department of Health (December 2014) Responsibility Deal: Monitoring the Number of Units Sold 2013 Data.}

186. However, it is important to note that although progress has been made to reduce levels of alcohol consumption in Wales, there is still a need for policies to encourage behavioural change, as persistently high levels of drinking, and especially binge drinking, present an ongoing risk to health.

187. Overall, excessive consumption of alcohol persists in Wales across the age groups and the National Survey for Wales data show that in 2016, 20% of adults reported drinking above the weekly guidelines, with 31% reporting that they drank above the former daily guidelines on at least one day the previous week.\footnote{http://gov.wales/docs/statistics/2017/170629-national-survey-2016-17-population-health-lifestyle-en.pdf}

188. Drinking levels have recently fallen among young people. This is a positive sign and may be a result of a number of factors, including improved legal enforcement as well as cultural factors. However, Health Behaviour in School-aged Children (HBSC) data show that drinking among young people remains a concern, with 7% of boys and 5% of girls aged 11 to 16 in Wales drinking alcohol at least once a week in 2013-14 (the most recent data available). Although decreasing, Wales has the highest alcohol consumption among 11 and 13-year-olds in the UK. Drinking among 15-year olds in Wales is higher than in England.

189. Data across all participating HBSC countries in Europe and North America show that Welsh adolescents are in a cluster of countries where reported frequency of drunkenness is relatively high.\footnote{Inchley, J., Currie, D., Young, T., Samdal, O., Torsheim, T., Augustson, L., Mathison, L., Aleman-Diaz, A., Molcho, M., Weber, M. and Barnekow, V. (2016). Growing up unequal: gender and socioeconomic differences in young people’s health and well-being. Health Behaviour in School-aged Children (HBSC) study: International report from the 2013/14 survey. WHO Regional Office for Europe.} Drinking at a young age is associated with high risks of later alcohol misuse, as well as risky behaviour and impacts on brain and physical development.\footnote{UK Department of Health (2009). Guidance on the Consumption of Alcohol by Children and Young People. Chapter 5 reviews the evidence.} These
data therefore show that more needs to be done to accelerate the decline in consumption among children and young adults, as these levels of drinking still present a very significant risk to health.

**Patterns of harmful and hazardous drinking**

190. People who drink at harmful and hazardous levels in Wales make up just over a fifth of the population, as shown in table two below.\(^{127}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Proportion of population</th>
<th>Average consumption (units / week)</th>
<th>Average spend (£ / year)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstainers(^a)</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate drinkers</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
<td>5.5 units</td>
<td>£310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazardous drinkers (increasing risk)</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>27.8 units</td>
<td>£1,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harmful drinkers (high-risk)</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>78.1 units</td>
<td>£2,960</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table two: Average consumption and spend on alcohol in Wales*

\(^a\) In the National Survey for Wales 2016-17 17% of adults reported that they were non-drinkers.

191. An MUP would only have a small impact on moderate drinkers – those who drink less 14 units per week. Larger impacts would be experienced by ‘hazardous and harmful drinkers’. Hazardous drinkers (referred to as ‘increasing risk drinkers’ in the analysis undertaken by the University of Sheffield) are defined as men who regularly drink 3-4 units of alcohol per day (but less than high risk levels) and women who regularly drink 2-3 units of alcohol per day (but less than high risk drinkers). Harmful drinkers (referred to as ‘high risk drinkers’ in the analysis undertaken by the University of Sheffield) are defined as men who regularly drink more than 8 units of alcohol per day or more than 50 units per week and women who regularly drink more than 6 units per day or more than 35 units per week.

192. As illustrated in figure three, among the drinking population (excluding abstainers), harmful and hazardous drinkers combined make up 26%, but are responsible for 73% of all alcohol consumption and 65% of all spending on alcohol in Wales. Harmful drinkers alone (7% of the drinking population) are responsible for 37% of consumption and 31% of all spending in Wales.\(^{128}\)

\(^{127}\) Data taken from the Sheffield Model for Wales, (2014) page 13 - based on General Lifestyle Survey.

\(^{128}\) Meng, Y. et al. (2014); Sheffield: SchHARR, University of Sheffield. Page 21, Figure 4.10.
193. This demonstrates the importance of a policy which targets these groups, as drinking at these levels is strongly associated with the alcohol-related harms described below.

194. MUP better targets the alcohol consumed by harmful and hazardous drinkers as it is these groups which tend to purchase larger amounts of low-cost and high-strength alcohol. A study by Southampton University in 2014 looked at the amount, type and price of alcohol drunk by 404 people with a range of liver disease in a large teaching hospital. The study found that patients with alcohol-related cirrhosis drank on average the equivalent of four bottles of vodka each week and bought the cheapest alcohol that they could find, paying around 33p per unit, irrespective of their income. In contrast, low-risk moderate drinkers were paying on average £1.10 per unit.

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129 Meng, Y. et al. (2014); Sheffield: SchARR, University of Sheffield. Page 21, Figure 4.10.


By targeting harmful and hazardous drinking, an MUP would target those for whom the impact of alcohol-related liver disease is most devastating.\textsuperscript{132} Purshouse et al. (2010), in a study which looked at 18 different pricing policies to estimate the effects of policies on alcohol consumption, found that general price increases were effective for reduction of consumption, healthcare costs and health-related quality of life losses but that minimum pricing policies can “maintain this level of effectiveness for harmful drinkers while reducing effects on consumer spending for moderate drinkers”.\textsuperscript{133}

**Alcohol-related deaths**

The ONS definition of alcohol-related deaths includes underlying causes of death regarded as those being most directly due to alcohol consumption. The definition is primarily based on chronic conditions associated with long-term abuse of alcohol and to a lesser extent, acute conditions. Apart from poisoning with alcohol (accidental, intentional or undetermined), the definition excludes other external causes of death, such as road traffic and other accidents.\textsuperscript{134}

In Wales alcohol-related deaths are based on relatively small numbers and fluctuate from year-to-year, so trends must be interpreted with caution.\textsuperscript{135} As mentioned in Part 1, in 2015, there were 463 alcohol-specific\textsuperscript{136} deaths in Wales, the majority among men. The 2015 figures show alcohol-related death rates for males and females were higher in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{132} O'Dowd, A. (August 2014) Minimum unit price on alcohol would affect heavy drinkers 200 times more than moderate drinkers. British Medical Journal Research News.
\item \textsuperscript{133} Purshouse, R.C., Meier, P., Brennan, A., Taylor, K. and Rafia, R. (March 24, 2010) Estimated effect of alcohol pricing policies on health and health economic outcomes in England: an epidemiological model. Published online in the Lancet.
\item \textsuperscript{134} The ONS definition was developed for the purposes of monitoring alcohol-related deaths across all the constituent countries of the UK, using consistent methodology based solely on the information collected at death registration. The definition does not include diseases that are partially attributable to alcohol, such as cancers of the mouth, oesophagus and liver. However, all deaths from chronic liver disease and cirrhosis (excluding biliary cirrhosis) are included, even when alcohol is not specifically mentioned on the death certificate. Source: ONS Statistical Bulletin (February 2017) Alcohol-related deaths in the UK: registered in 2015.
\item \textsuperscript{136} This figure is reported as alcohol-specific deaths in the Piecing the Puzzle Report, using the ONS definition. For more detail see Appendix 2 in Public Health Wales (2016) Piecing the puzzle: The annual profile for substance misuse. http://www.wales.nhs.uk/sitesplus/documents/888/Piecing%20the%20Puzzle%20FINAL%2016%2C%20v2%2C%2025%20Oct%202016.pdf
\end{itemize}
Wales than in England (19.3 per 100,000 compared with 17.8 per 100,000 for men and 11.3 compared to 9.0 per 100,000 for women).\footnote{137}

198. Progress is being made to reduce levels of consumption in Wales.\footnote{138} A number of factors could be responsible for this but it suggests the actions of the Welsh Government and others are having an effect. However, all alcohol-attributable early mortality and morbidity deaths are avoidable deaths, demonstrating the urgency for further action and further progress.

**Hospital admissions**

199. Alcohol-specific hospital admission rates (those which are wholly-related to alcohol, such as alcohol-related liver disease, alcohol poisoning or alcohol overdose) generally increased from around 400 per 100,000 population in 2001-02 to around 460 per 100,000 population in 2006-2007 and have fluctuated around this level in recent years.\footnote{139} The rate in males has been consistently higher than the female rate. In 2013, there were 351 per 100,000 population alcohol-specific hospital admissions in Wales. The rate was higher among males (471 per 100,000 in 2013) than females (238 per 100,000).\footnote{140}

200. Analysis by the Public Health Wales Observatory showed that in Wales between 1999-2009 alcohol-attributed hospital admissions (which include both conditions entirely due to alcohol consumption and those conditions which are partially due to alcohol) rose from approximately 950 to approximately 1,400 per 100,000 population for males and from approximately 560 to more than 800 per 100,000 population for females – a rise of nearly 48% and 44% respectively.\footnote{141} In terms of young people

\footnote{137}{ONS Statistical Bulletin (07 Feb 2017) Alcohol-related Deaths in the United Kingdom, Registered in 2015.}

\footnote{138}{Trend data on levels of alcohol consumption in Wales can be found in the Public Health Wales Report (2016) Piecing the Puzzle – The Annual Profile for Substance Misuse. Data on alcohol consumption in Wales was previously collected using the Welsh Health Survey. It is now collected through the National Survey for Wales, using a different methodology. As a result, it is not possible to compare the two sets of data. The latest National Survey for Wales data on alcohol consumption was published in June: \url{http://gov.wales/docs/statistics/2017/170629-national-survey-2016-17-population-health-lifestyle-en.pdf}}

\footnote{139}{Public Health Wales Observatory (2014) Alcohol and Health in Wales.}

\footnote{140}{Public Health Wales Observatory (October 2015) Our Healthy Future Indicators, Summary of Charts. NHS Wales. \url{http://www.publichealthwalesobservatory.wales.nhs.uk/ohf-2015/}}

\footnote{141}{Public Health Wales Observatory (2014) Alcohol and Health in Wales.}
aged 18 and under (male and female), the rate per 100,000 of alcohol-specific hospital admissions has been falling in Wales over the past decade. In the three-year period 2005-06-2007-08, the admissions rate was 126 per 100,000 for females and 96 per 100,000 for males. This fell to 78 for females and 52 for males in the three-year period ending in 2012-13.  

Alcohol-related health costs

201. NICE classifies alcohol-related harms in three categories – healthcare costs; crime and anti-social behaviour costs; and employee absenteeism.  

143 It is difficult to estimate total healthcare costs (including, for example, A&E attendances and ambulance journeys) as reliable and complete data are not available. However, the number of admissions to hospital for conditions wholly or partially attributable to alcohol is calculated by Public Health Wales using alcohol-attributable fractions for a range of conditions, which describe the causative contribution by alcohol across the population (see table three). It is possible to estimate the cost to the health service in Wales from these hospital admissions based on NICE’s indicative unit costs per admission, which are £1,709 each for healthcare admissions wholly-attributable to alcohol (for example, severe intoxication) and £2,353 (uplifted to 2015-16 prices) for admissions partially-attributable to alcohol (for example, hypertensive disease).  

144 146

202. Data from Wales (set out in table three) indicate there were 53,957 alcohol-attributable hospital admissions in 2015-16. Using the above unit costs, this suggests that between £92.2m and £126.9m was spent in Wales on hospital admissions partially or wholly-attributable to alcohol in

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142 Public Health Wales Observatory (2014) Alcohol and Health in Wales.


144 Public Health Wales Observatory (2014) Alcohol and Health in Wales.


2015-16. It is assumed that the most likely figure is £120m\textsuperscript{147} and this has been used as the cost estimate.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol attributable admissions, broad measure, episode based</td>
<td>51,230</td>
<td>51,309</td>
<td>53,756</td>
<td>53,938</td>
<td>53,957</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Piecing the Puzzle – The Annual Profile for Substance Misuse Public Health Wales (October 2016)
Table three: Alcohol attributable admissions (episode based, broad measure)

Social and economic harms

203. Long-term excessive drinking can lead to an increase in physical harms, including accidents and assaults, which incur significant financial and emotional costs.

204. As well as the health-related harms to drinkers, which are illustrated above, people who consume excessive amounts of alcohol may cause harm to others. These indirect harms have costs not directly paid for or felt by the individual, but can impact on, for example, children of parents who are heavy drinkers or who have alcohol problems; family members; carers; passengers killed or injured by alcohol-impaired drivers; and healthcare professionals. The University of Sheffield model estimates the overall societal cost of alcohol consumption in Wales to be £15.3bn (in 2014 prices) over 20 years,\textsuperscript{148} which includes healthcare costs,\textsuperscript{149} costs associated with crime and the cost of workplace absenteeism. Examples of other indirect harms include:\textsuperscript{150}

\textsuperscript{147} For the purposes of calculating a most likely figure, it has been assumed that 80% of admissions are partially attributable and 20% wholly attributable.

\textsuperscript{148} Meng, Y. et al. (2014); Sheffield: ScHARR, University of Sheffield. Page 71, table 5.14. The study contains a methodology for the data that is used within these categories of costs.

\textsuperscript{149} Including QALYs valued at £60,000 in line with Home Office guidelines.

\textsuperscript{150} Advisory Panel on Substance Misuse (2014) Minimum Unit Pricing: A Review of its Potential in a Welsh Context (see for further references).
• Costs to institutions through poor health or criminality in their workforce;

• Unemployment or low employability of drinkers and the impact on their families and costs to the state;

• Risky sexual behaviour, potentially impacting on an individual and their partners’ sexual health, sometimes resulting in sexually-transmitted diseases and unplanned pregnancy;

• The consumption of relatively small amounts of alcohol by pregnant women is associated with low birth weight babies and with greater consumption there is an increased risk of foetal alcohol syndrome resulting in physical abnormalities and growth impairment.

Impacts on households living in poverty

205. People living in poverty who abstain from alcohol or who are moderate drinkers will be minimally affected by the introduction of an MUP. However, people living in poverty tend to have worse health outcomes than others, when alcohol consumption is the same. For harmful and hazardous drinkers, research shows that people living in the most deprived areas of England and Wales are more likely to suffer from a long-term alcohol-related illness and are also more likely to die from an alcohol-related death, than those in the least deprived areas.\(^{151}\)

206. There is also a clear gradient amongst patients resident in Wales and admitted to hospital in relation to alcohol. In 2015-16, the percentage of all patients admitted for alcohol specific conditions who lived in the 10% of most deprived areas in Wales was 17.5%. Only 4.5% of those admitted to hospital lived in the 10% least deprived areas (Public Health Wales, 2016).\(^{152}\)

207. It is anticipated that an MUP would reduce levels of harmful and hazardous drinking in these groups, meaning the risk of alcohol-related harm would be reduced.


208. The 2014 analysis by the University of Sheffield on the impact of an MUP specifically looked at impacts on households living in poverty.\textsuperscript{153} Households living in poverty are more likely to be abstinent or low-consumption drinkers. As a result, the amount they spend on alcohol is unlikely to be disproportionately affected by the introduction of a minimum price for alcohol. Nor is the policy estimated to be overly-burdensome on moderate drinkers in poverty. According to the Sheffield model, the impact on this group is an increase in spend of £2 per year, plus a reduction in consumption of 10 units per year.

209. At the same time, it is important to recognise that harmful drinkers living in poverty tend to purchase more alcohol at less than the MUP, than other groups.\textsuperscript{154} However, although the costs are higher for those in poverty who are harmful drinkers, the impact of MUP on consumption is also higher and so the benefit is significant.\textsuperscript{155}

210. The OECD report \textit{Tackling Harmful Alcohol Use – Economics and Public Health Policy} published on 12 May 2015\textsuperscript{156} included under \textit{Special Focus III}, an assessment on the experience of the Alcohol (Minimum Pricing (Scotland) Act 2012. The report stated that concerns over the potential impact on low income moderate drinkers across the income distribution with the introduction of MUP appear to be unfounded. It also concluded that high-income heavy drinkers may not be affected but the specifically-targeted group of low-income heavy drinkers appeared to be the most likely group affected by MUP.

211. When considering the effects of minimum pricing for alcohol on different income and socio-economic groups, Holmes et al. (2014) found that the estimated health benefits from the policy were higher for individuals in the lowest socio-economic group (living in routine or manual worker households), who would accrue 81.8\% of the reductions in premature deaths and 87.1\% of gains in terms of quality-adjusted life-

\textsuperscript{153} Households living in poverty are defined as having an equivalised household income below 60\% of the population median.


years. Holmes et al. (2013) reached similar conclusions when they undertook policy appraisals using the Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model to look at the effectiveness of minimum unit pricing on consumption. As low-income harmful drinkers purchase more below-MUP alcohol, low income harmful drinkers would be affected more than those with higher incomes.

212. Vandenberg and Sharma (2016) conclude: “MUP is more effective in reducing consumption than specific taxation, especially for consumers in the lowest-income quintile” and policies which increase the cost of the cheapest alcohol can be effective in reducing alcohol consumption, without having highly regressive effects.” Similarly, Callinan et al. (2015) highlight that a reduction in consumption of poorer (low income) drinkers is likely to have a greater positive effect on health, than a reduction among more affluent drinkers, which will add to the effect of “increasing health equity”.

Economic modelling

213. The evidence set out in Part 1 demonstrates that affordability is one of the drivers for increased consumption and highlights the main reasons to use a population-based policy measure. The Welsh Government’s view is that an MUP for alcohol is a key policy proposal for tackling the health harms associated with alcohol misuse. The University of Sheffield model shows a strong and consistent link between the price of alcohol and the demand for alcohol. The model also demonstrates a strong and consistent link between price increase, reduced consumption and subsequent reductions in chronic and acute health harms.

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214. Minimum unit pricing is a population measure, which will reduce the aggregate level of alcohol consumed and lower the whole population’s risk of alcohol-related harm.\(^{161}\) According to NICE Public Health Guidance (2010), population-level approaches are important because they can help those who are not in regular contact with the relevant services and those who have been specifically advised to reduce their alcohol intake, by creating an environment that supports lower-risk drinking. They can also help prevent people from drinking harmful or hazardous amounts in the first place.\(^{162}\)

215. In particular, MUP targets drinkers who are causing most harm to themselves and society by targeting cheap alcohol, which is bought more by harmful drinkers than moderate drinkers, as other studies have found.\(^{163}\) Evidence also indicates that cheaper alcohol is attractive to young people.\(^{164}\) The reduction in harm for harmful and hazardous drinkers (whether in contact with current services or not) is the objective of the policy underpinning the Bill. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the economy is likely to benefit through a reduction in sick days for all categories of drinker.

216. It is also anticipated the effect of the price increase could be positive to the alcohol industry as a whole, as it may offset the forecast decrease in sales volume, leading to an overall increase in revenue. However, there is a degree of uncertainty about the impact of an MUP on producers and retailers, particularly with regard to the revenue from MUP and how prices on products above an MUP will be affected.

217. The University of Sheffield model calculates the potential effect of MUP policies set at 35p to 70p, as well as making comparisons with the impact of a ban on below-cost price selling. For a 50p MUP, the estimated per person reduction in alcohol consumption for the overall population is 4%. In absolute terms, this equates to an annual reduction of 30.2 units per drinker per year. When the MUP is set at lower levels, modelling shows

\(^{161}\) NICE Public Health Guidance 24 (June 2010) Alcohol-use disorders: preventing harmful drinking.

\(^{162}\) NICE Public Health Guidance 24 (June 2010) Alcohol-use disorders: preventing harmful drinking.


that there are smaller impacts, with effectiveness increasing sharply above 45p per unit (45p = 2.6% drop in consumption; 50p = 4% drop; 55p = 5.6% drop).

218. There are substantial estimated reductions in alcohol-related harms from all modelled policies, with an estimated potential reduction of 53 deaths and 1,400 fewer hospital admissions per year for a 50p MUP.

219. All modelled policies are estimated to have a greater reduction in deaths and hospital admissions per 100,000 drinkers for those in poverty than those not in poverty. For example, five fewer deaths and 120 fewer hospital admissions per 100,000 drinkers for those in poverty for a 50p MUP compared to two fewer deaths and 50 fewer hospital admissions per 100,000 drinkers for those not in poverty.

220. Rice and Drummond note that much of the evidence in favour of setting an MUP for alcohol is based on complex econometric models rather than empirical data. While there is sufficient evidence to support the overall recommendations from the Sheffield model, the only way to test the model is to introduce an MUP for alcohol. Although there are some inherent limitations with modelling, which is necessarily based on estimates and predicted behaviour, the Sheffield model has been shown to be a robust process, using conservative assumptions. It uses Welsh-specific data and as part of a balanced approach, includes an assessment of the impact of reduced consumption on the protective effect of alcohol for a few specific conditions.

221. The University of Sheffield researchers have received support for their approach from leading health economists and experts in the field of alcohol, with peer-reviewed articles in a number of publications, including *Addiction*. It has also received support from others, who have argued it "provides evidence on which to base fair and effective health policy on

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166 Meng, Y. et al. (2014); Sheffield: SchARR, University of Sheffield. Page 83.

167 Meng, Y. et al. (2014); Sheffield: SchARR, University of Sheffield, table 4.6, page 32 and table 5.6, page 61.

alcohol pricing”. The Institute for Fiscal Studies has criticised some elements of MUP, primarily that increased revenues are kept by the industry, rather than tax revenues going to the government. However, it concluded that an MUP would “generate substantial reductions in alcohol purchases” and is “effective at targeting households that are most likely to suffer from (or cause) alcohol-related harms”.

222. In June 2009, the SABMiller brewing company commissioned the Centre for Economics and Business Research Ltd (CEBR) to produce the report Minimum Alcohol Pricing: A Targeted Measure? (updated in August 2010 following the second version of the Sheffield model). It contained no new evidence but reviewed the University of Sheffield’s work. The CEBR report does not dispute the link between the price of alcohol and consumption – nor between consumption and harm – but questions the University of Sheffield finding that harmful drinkers were more responsive to price change than moderate drinkers – a criticism also raised by the Adam Smith Institute.

223. The Sheffield team argue that CEBR’s use of alternative estimates of consumers’ responsiveness to price changes is overly simplistic as they do not include detailed breakdowns of product types or consumer behaviour, including heavier drinkers’ tendency to trade down to lower-cost products. In contrast, the University of Sheffield model relies on a complex matrix of own-price and cross-price elasticities (responsiveness to price increases of products and the impact of switching behaviour) for different categories of drinks, separated for moderate and harmful/hazardous drinkers. To counter arguments around the responsiveness of heavier drinkers the University of Sheffield team ran a sensitivity analysis that assumed harmful drinkers were a third less responsive than moderate drinkers (which is unlikely to be the case).


While this results in slightly reduced estimates of the effectiveness of an MUP of 50p, it shows a greater reduction in harmful drinkers’ consumption because they drink more of the type of alcohol affected by MUP policies. This question is considered in more detail in the competition assessment.

224. Other studies have also found that moderate drinkers, whether in lower or higher income groups, are predicted as the least likely to purchase cheap alcohol.\textsuperscript{174} It is heavier drinkers, rather than low income drinkers, who pay less per unit; therefore the risk an MUP would disadvantage moderate drinkers on lower incomes has been overstated.\textsuperscript{175}

225. There are a number of studies, which argue “the role of price and taxes as a significant deterrent to heavy drinking by adults is uncertain”.\textsuperscript{176} A review of 19 studies which examined price responses by heavy drinking adults, and nine studies of prices and cirrhosis mortality, found only two studies of heavy drinking which found a significant negative price response. Likewise, Kenkel (1996) found that better health information is an effective policy to reduce the health costs of heavy drinking, as the least informed drinkers have an inelastic demand for alcohol, whereas better informed heavy drinkers have demands which are more elastic than moderate drinkers.\textsuperscript{177}

226. It is also important to acknowledge the concerns raised that there may be other consequences of raising the price of alcohol through the introduction of an MUP. These have been summarised by Christopher Snowdon from the Institute of Economic Affairs.\textsuperscript{178} In particular, Snowdon (2014) suggests there may be costs in terms of health if people on low incomes maintain their level of alcohol consumption but spend less on food and heating for their family.


227. MUP is likely to affect dependent drinkers, some of whom may be unable to cut down on their alcohol consumption. There may be others who have to reduce their drinking drastically and within a short time period following the introduction of an MUP, which may lead to increased pressure on associated support services, at least initially.\textsuperscript{179}

228. Furthermore, low income households which consume low-cost alcohol will be unable to trade down and find alternative (cheaper) products. Snowdon (2014) and O’May et al. (2016) have highlighted that there may be substitution effects, such as the purchase of illicit alcohol or illegal drugs, which have health hazards associated with them.

229. The potential for an increase in sales of illicit alcohol has been highlighted by Katikireddi et al.\textsuperscript{180} It was also raised in a number of responses to the Public Health White Paper consultation, where stakeholders expressed concern regarding the risk of an increase in stolen or counterfeit alcohol. The Welsh Government does not consider the increase in price associated with an MUP is likely to be sufficient to incentivise these kinds of activity, which are not currently a significant problem in Wales. The risk of this is therefore considered to be low but will remain under review. As highlighted in the impact assessments for this Bill, we will ensure those affected by the impacts of alcohol are supported by other services being taken forward as part of the Welsh Government’s Substance Misuse Strategy.

230. O’May et al. (2016) note that a common criticism of increasing the price of alcohol is that if people with alcohol dependence can no longer afford their drink of choice, they will need to find a substitute, whether that be cheaper alcohol, counterfeit or illicit alcohol, or other substances. Alternatively, they may resort to theft. The authors go on to highlight that while a review by the Home Office (2011)\textsuperscript{181} suggests that increases in alcohol pricing tend to be associated with reductions in crime, there is currently insufficient evidence to determine the impact of alcohol prices.


and purchase of other licit and illicit substances (see Hunt et al. 2010).\(^{182}\) Moore (2010), however, found that while there is little evidence available, the evidence that does exist suggests those using illicit substances also drink heavily.\(^{183}\)

231. The Sheffield modelling suggests that while drinking levels will be reduced to levels that will bring health benefits, they are not likely to reduce drastically and lead to high numbers of people needing additional support services. At this stage, it is not possible to estimate the additional costs arising from MUP policies, in response to this issue. Ongoing review and monitoring of the implementation of the legislation will seek feedback on the impacts of the policy on other services.

232. The Welsh Government considers there is a robust evidence base for legislative change, based on the University of Sheffield model, supplemented with the analysis of the effect of pricing on consumption in other countries. Careful consideration will be given to the implementation of the Bill in order to mitigate against potential adverse impacts.

**Cross-border issues**

233. It is recognised that having different legislation in Wales and England, as a result of introducing minimum unit pricing, may have a small effect on purchasing behaviours. However, these changes are expected to be minimal.

234. Minimum unit pricing is a population measure, aimed at reducing alcohol-related harm, particularly amongst harmful and hazardous drinkers. Population measures are preferable because they help both those not in contact with specialist services and those who have been identified as needing to reduce their alcohol intake by creating an environment which supports lower-risk drinking.\(^{184}\) For the majority of the Welsh population, purchasing alcohol in England would incur a time and travel cost (for example fuel and vehicle value depreciation). This cost is likely to outweigh any savings on the price of alcohol which would be achieved. Minimum unit pricing also targets the proportion of drinkers who

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consume harmful or hazardous quantities of alcohol who may often be purchasing alcohol for immediate consumption, reducing the incentive to travel further than they would normally to avoid paying more for their alcohol as a result of an MUP.

235. However, there may be consequences for retailers in border areas of Wales where the general population may choose to travel a little further for their shopping to reap the benefit of English alcohol pricing. To monitor the possible effects of minimum unit pricing in these areas, we have analysed the amount spent on groceries, including alcohol in English border areas using debit or credit cards registered in Wales. This currently stands at £44.4m for grocery spending per year, 4.91% of the total in Wales\textsuperscript{185} (see the competition assessment for further discussion). Although this suggests a small proportion of people may not be affected by MUP as they may purchase alcohol in England, as this is a population measure this is not a risk to its efficacy as a whole. By tracking debit and credit card data in the future, we can compare the impact of introducing minimum unit pricing.

236. The cross-border issues are further mitigated by the fact the target population for minimum unit pricing mostly do not live close to the Wales-England border. Figure four shows few border areas have a high concentration of very heavy (binge) drinkers. According to 2011-12 figures, of all the local authority areas that border England, only Flintshire has a proportion of very heavy drinkers (15.9%) above the Welsh average (14.9%).\textsuperscript{186} Public Health Wales bases these proportions on lifestyle surveys which focus on the number of units consumed on the heaviest drinking day in the previous week. Although this differs from the definition used by the University of Sheffield model, and followed elsewhere in this regulatory impact assessment, binge drinking is associated with many alcohol-related harms.

\textsuperscript{185} Experian, Measuring Cross Border Grocery Spend Between Wales and England Using Anonymized Card Data, January 2015.

\textsuperscript{186} Public Health Wales Observatory (2014) Alcohol and Health in Wales, Betsi Cadwaladr UHB Summary. Pages 7-8.
Online and mobile businesses licensed in Wales will need to ensure they are charging in line with the MUP when supplying to customers in Wales.

Evidence shows that harmful and hazardous drinkers, who are the main targets of MUP, are more likely to buy alcohol in local supermarkets/grocers than online. Therefore the risk of drinkers purchasing from those areas in the UK that do not have minimum pricing

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in place impacting the overall objective of the policy is considered to be low at this time.

239. Although these cross-border issues may limit the impact on a few individuals, we do not anticipate any significant impact on the projected overall reduction in consumption or harm (health and cost).
7. Options, Costs and Benefits

240. Three options have been considered to achieve the Welsh Government’s stated objective to reduce alcohol related harm by reducing alcohol consumption, particularly amongst harmful and hazardous drinkers.

Option one – Do nothing;

Option two – Strengthen the current policy approach;

Option three – Introduce a minimum price for which alcohol can be sold or supplied in Wales.

Option one – Do Nothing

Description

241. Under this option, the intention would be to maintain the current approach to reducing the harms caused by alcohol misuse through implementing the actions set out in the Welsh Government’s substance misuse strategy Working Together to Reduce Harm and its supporting delivery plan 2016-18. This encompasses some existing non-legislative actions outlined in Part 1 to prevent harm, including an education programme; helpline and public information campaign; support for people who misuse alcohol, including treatment programmes, wraparound services and help finding work; actions to protect families, providing support to children, carers and parents. It also involves tackling unsuitable availability of alcohol and related crime and disorder by providing advice and support to a range of stakeholders and licensing authorities.

242. Option one is provided as a baseline for comparison with the potential benefits of strengthening the current approach or introducing a minimum price for alcohol.

243. Alcohol consumption in the UK has more than doubled since 1950.\(^{189}\) Although consumption has recently fallen, National Survey for Wales data show in 2016, 31% of adults reported drinking alcohol above the former daily guidelines on at least one day in the past week. As stated above, this is having a significant impact on health in Wales, resulting in a high number of avoidable deaths.

244. The UK Government introduced a ban on the sale and supply of alcohol in England and Wales below the level of alcohol duty for a product plus VAT on 28 May 2014. The ban is a new licensing condition accompanied by the mandatory code of practice and means that a can of average strength lager will cost no less than 40p and a standard bottle of vodka no less than £8.89.

245. The ban aims to prevent businesses from selling alcohol at heavily-discounted prices and aims to reduce excessive alcohol consumption and its associated impact on alcohol-related crime and health harms. It prevents retailers from selling alcohol cheaper than the cost of the tax payable on the product. Non-compliance with the ban could result in up to six months imprisonment and/or fine.

246. The Sheffield model suggested the ban on below-cost selling in England and Wales would have only a very small impact on alcohol consumption and related harms. According to the Sheffield model, when applied to Wales the policy affects only the very cheapest drink and the average price of alcohol sold by supermarkets will rise by 0.1%. The UK-wide estimate for the impact on alcohol-related harm is a reduction of approximately 15 alcohol-related deaths per year; 500 hospital admissions and 900 alcohol-related crimes. Given the low impact on price and consumption, the impact of this policy on health outcomes in Wales is predicted to be low, with 23 fewer hospital admissions in the 20th year.\textsuperscript{190}

\textbf{Costs}

247. The intention is to maintain the current Welsh Government budget for substance misuse programmes under this option. While there would be no new costs to the Welsh Government from this option initially, there will be increased costs over time if the harms resulting from excessive and avoidable alcohol misuse continue. The cost to the NHS in Wales was estimated to be around £120m in 2015-16, for alcohol-related hospital admissions alone, as well as economic and social costs to individuals, communities and families. Existing resources provided to substance misuse commissioners and providers would continue to be provided and may need to be increased to respond to these increased health costs.

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{190} Meng, Y. et al. (2014); Sheffield: ScHARR, University of Sheffield. Table 5.10, page 64.
\end{footnotesize}
248. Although evidence suggests that overall alcohol consumption is falling, hazardous and harmful drinking continues to pose a significant risk to health. Furthermore, the increasing affordability of alcohol could slow the trend of reducing consumption; doing nothing therefore may allow this inhibiting factor to continue. The University of Sheffield model estimates the overall societal cost of alcohol misuse to be £15.3bn over 20 years, of which £8.2bn falls to the government in health and crime-related costs and £7.1bn in health costs to consumers (quality adjusted life years). The ban on below-cost selling is anticipated to reduce this total by only 0.1%. The Welsh Government therefore considers the long-term costs of not taking further action to protect individuals from the preventable harm of alcohol-related deaths and disease are too high.

249. There would be no additional costs to local authorities or trading standards departments from this option.

250. There would be no additional costs to retailers from this option.

**Benefits**

251. The only potential additional benefit of doing nothing would be an initial cost saving, as all other options contain implementation costs to the taxpayer and retailers, as well as costs to consumers.

**Summary**

252. There will be no additional costs or benefits arising from this option, as set out in table four below. Policy actions currently undertaken as part of this option are assumed to continue for each of the other options. Therefore, the expenditure and current benefits form part of the baseline against which the remaining options are compared.

253. The ban on below-cost selling (implemented in May 2014 as a ban on selling alcohol for below the cost of duty plus the VAT payable on that duty) is predicted to have a minimal impact on alcohol consumption and related harms, with a 0.1% reduction in deaths and a total saving of £9m a year on societal costs (out of a total of £15.3bn over 20 years).

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192 Meng, Y. et al. (2014); Sheffield: ScHARR, University of Sheffield. Table 5.14, page 69.

193 Meng, Y. et al. (2014); Sheffield: ScHARR, University of Sheffield. Table 5.14, page 71.
Table four: Option one – Do nothing – Costs

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<th>Costs to Welsh Government</th>
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<td>There will be no additional costs or benefits arising from the continuation of current programmes through substance misuse funding of nearly £50m per annum. This includes the Substance Misuse Action Fund of £32m and £17.1m ring-fenced for services in health boards.</td>
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There will be no additional costs or benefits arising from the continuation of current programmes.

Option two – Strengthening the current policy approach

Description

254. This option continues the actions set out in the substance misuse strategy *Working Together to Reduce Harm* and supporting delivery plan (2016-18) but strengthens the focus on programmes to address alcohol misuse. This would require reassigning resources from other aspects of the substance misuse budget with an impact on programmes to tackle the misuse of legal and illegal drugs as a result of overall budget constraints. This could lead to an increase in waiting times for people accessing substitute opioid treatment and psychosocial interventions, both of which are crucial to preventing and reducing drug-related deaths. Transferring resources would also take time as any reassignment could not take place until existing commissioned cycles have concluded.

255. In this option, we would focus greater effort and resources towards reducing alcohol-related harm, through the Substance Misuse Action Fund. This would include extending actions in the current delivery plan, such as programmes to influence attitudes to alcohol, particularly with regard to drinking at home, pre-loading and education programmes for children and young people.

256. On 8 December 2016, the Welsh Government reissued its *Night Time Economy Framework*. The framework was developed through feedback from consultation with stakeholders including the police, the NHS, local authorities and the business community.\(^\text{194}\)

257. It is aimed at community safety managers and the police, among others, and seeks to encourage partners to ensure the full range of sanctions are brought to bear against those people who drink irresponsibly

and become involved in crime and anti-social behaviour and the licensees who continue to serve them regardless of their state of intoxication. The framework combines a national overview of best practice and suggested actions for a safer night time economy against the backdrop of the wider UK legislative context. A tool kit provides suggested activities that are evidence based and proven to improve the management of night-time economies.

258. We would seek to encourage further take up of licensing restrictions, such as early morning restriction orders and late night levies. These options tend to impact on the general population and all off-trade and on-trade premises, rather than targeting harmful and hazardous drinking and the off-trade associated with it. The Welsh Government would also seek to influence partners to make greater use of industry-led schemes, such as Reducing the Strength, although these schemes are voluntary and may have limited effectiveness in tackling more problematic premises.

259. Treatment services are targeted to tackle areas of greatest harm and likely health improvements. A re-prioritisation to ensure treatment services are available to those suffering harm as a result of hazardous drinking would support those suffering from alcohol use disorders. In the majority of referrals to treatment, alcohol is the main problematic substance already. Of the 23,980 referrals in 2015/16, 5,461 did not have an associated main problematic substance. Of the remaining 18,519 referrals, 52.1% of these were described as having alcohol as the main problematic substance.195

260. Any re-prioritisation could have a detrimental impact on treatment services for other substance misuse problems. Further developing the brief intervention service through which health professionals can offer support to people drinking alcohol at damaging levels but not requiring specialist treatment for addiction could also protect individuals from harm. This would target a relatively small group, as those referred for treatment (23,980 in 2015-16) are a small minority of those who consume alcohol at potentially harmful levels (26% of the Welsh population are harmful or hazardous drinkers).196

261. These actions could form an important part of the package of measures to reduce the harm caused by alcohol consumption but the evidence suggests there is a limit to the effectiveness of these on their

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195 Welsh National Database for Substance Misuse, Treatment Data 2015/16.

196 Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model.
own. The World Health Organisation has found it is difficult to measure the direct positive effect on drinking patterns from education in schools, public service announcements and voluntary regulation by the alcohol industry.

262. A 2013 overview of systematic reviews of population-level interventions to reduce alcohol-related harm found there is good evidence for policies and interventions to limit alcohol sale availability, to reduce drink driving and to increase alcohol price or taxation. However, there is mixed evidence about family and community-level interventions; school-based interventions and interventions in the alcohol server setting and the mass media. In particular, there is weak evidence for workplace interventions and for interventions targeting illicit alcohol sales and there is evidence of ineffectiveness of interventions in higher education settings. There are limited reviews of interventions in the alcohol server setting. One undertaken carried out by Brennan et al. in 2011 showed mixed results.

263. Holm et al. analysed the cost effectiveness of six interventions aimed at preventing alcohol abuse in the Danish population, which included increasing taxation, increasing the minimum legal drinking age, advertisement bans, limited hours of retail sales and brief and longer term individual interventions. This found interventions targeting the whole population were more effective than individual-focused interventions. A ban on alcohol advertising, limited hours of retail sale and increased taxation had the highest probability of being cost-saving.


Costs

264. There would be no new costs to the Welsh Government from this option initially, as constraints on government spending are likely to remain. It is envisaged that this may restrict the overall funding on substance misuse to nearly £50m. This includes £32m from the Welsh Government’s Substance Misuse Action Fund to tackle these harms, £22.6m of which goes to seven area planning boards, which commission substance misuse services for their region. A further £17.1m is ring-fenced for substance misuse services within the health boards’ discretionary allocation.

265. As a result of a re-alignment of resources to reflect a greater priority of alcohol-related education programmes and treatment services for people with alcohol use disorders, there is likely to be an impact on other services, particularly drug misuse programmes (as well as a potential for increased drug use if drug-related education programmes are cut back). Furthermore, as education programmes are considered to be of limited effectiveness at reducing overall consumption when used in isolation, we do not believe these actions alone will be sufficient to reduce excessive alcohol consumption and address the harm associated with alcohol misuse – there are likely to be increased costs over time as alcohol misuse continues despite recent evidence of some decline in consumption. Existing resources provided to substance misuse commissioners and providers would continue and eventually an increase in overall budgets may be needed, particularly for treatment services, if patterns of harmful and hazardous drinking continue and are not otherwise addressed.

266. While actions recommended by the Night Time Economy Framework may have some effect on consumption levels, they are not specifically targeted at harmful and hazardous drinkers and so the impact of falling consumption on harm may be smaller. As a result, the costs to the NHS in Wales are unlikely to fall significantly.

267. There would be no additional costs to local authorities from this option.

268. In order to strengthen the policy position on alcohol, the Welsh Government will continue to lobby the UK Government to use all available levers to reduce harmful and hazardous drinking. If the Welsh Government successfully lobbied the UK government for an increase in

alcohol duties, there would be an increase in cost to all consumers, whether moderate or heavy drinkers, as any price increase would affect all alcoholic drinks (both off and on-trade). The only exception would be if retailers chose to absorb the increased cost themselves rather than pass on to the consumer (as long as they could do so without violating the ban on below-cost sales). For retailers of higher-cost products, which would not be affected by the below-cost ban (for example, in the on-trade), or where alcohol is used as a loss-leader,\textsuperscript{204} for example in supermarkets, this could result in higher costs to retailers, without the desired impact on consumption levels.

**Benefits**

269. Further preventative measures, including increased education and public awareness campaigns may have a small, long-term impact on alcohol consumption and harm; increased measures should result in reductions in alcohol-related crime and disorder. Targeting treatment at people who misuse alcohol can produce results in reduced harm to individuals. These benefits are long-term and difficult to quantify or add a monetary value to at this stage.

**Summary**

270. The net effect on overall welfare, therefore, is likely to be minimal – resources would be switched between programmes and even if there were a reduction in alcohol related harm, it may be offset by deterioration in other substance misuse programmes. Table five provides a summary of all costs.

\textsuperscript{204} The ban on below cost selling bans the selling of alcohol at a price that is below the cost of the duty plus the VAT payable on that duty. For products where the total cost of the alcohol is higher than the tax element therefore, it is still possible to sell at a loss.
### Table five: Option two – Strengthen the current policy approach – Costs

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<th>Costs to Welsh Government</th>
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No additional costs as any increase in funding to address alcohol misuse will be off-set by losses from other programmes.

Substance Misuse Funding nearly £50m per annum. Includes Substance Misuse Action Fund of £32m and £17.1m ring-fenced for services in health boards.

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No additional costs.

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<th>Costs to retailers</th>
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No additional costs.
Option three – Introducing a minimum price for alcohol

Description

271. This option would involve the Welsh Government introducing a minimum price under which alcohol could not be sold or supplied to a person in Wales. This would not increase the price of every drink, only those which are sold at below the applicable minimum price.

272. Introducing an MUP provides a targeted approach to reduce harmful and hazardous drinking and address the health and societal problems associated with the supply and consumption of cheap, strong alcohol products – whist minimising the impact on moderate drinkers (see paragraph 275).

273. The formula for calculating the applicable minimum price for alcohol is set out on the face of the Bill and takes account of the percentage strength of the alcohol, its volume and the MUP. The MUP will be specified by Welsh Ministers in secondary legislation. The formula for calculating the minimum price of a product would apply to all products equally regardless of whether the products are domestically produced or imported.

The minimum sale price for a product is calculated as follows:

Minimum unit price \( \times S \) (percentage strength of alcohol) \( \times V \) (volume of alcohol)

An example of a £0.50 minimum unit price of alcohol (for a 0.75 litre bottle of wine with a strength of 12.5%) is calculated as follows:

\[ £0.50 \times 12.5 \times 0.75 = £4.69 \]

Costs

Consumers

274. Table 13 in the competition assessment illustrates the potential impact of a 50p MUP (as an example) on the price of a selection of specific products. The modelling work undertaken by the University of Sheffield estimates the impacts of these price changes on levels of consumption and associated harms.

275. Consumers who currently buy alcohol at less than the applicable minimum price will be directly affected. The Sheffield model estimates
costs will fall largely on hazardous and harmful drinkers who tend to favour cheaper alcohol which is most affected by an MUP – predominantly off-trade beer, cider and spirits – with, as an example, more than a third of their alcohol currently purchased at less than 50p per unit (compared with less than a quarter for moderate drinkers), as shown in figure five. A harmful or hazardous drinker will spend approximately £32 more per year, with the greater effect being the anticipated drop in consumption. In contrast, moderate drinkers will spend on average £2.37 more per year.\textsuperscript{205}

276. The costs of an MUP will be felt by consumers of alcohol at the cheaper end of the scale. However, this effect is small for moderate drinkers, with the most significant impact felt by the target group of harmful and hazardous drinkers (as highlighted in paragraph 275 above).

277. This is because harmful and hazardous drinkers currently purchase a higher proportion of drinks sold at below the illustrated MUP threshold, regardless of whether they are living in poverty or not (as illustrated in figure five). Another study has echoed this finding, agreeing that while people in poverty generally pay less per unit than people on higher incomes, this is seen in heavier, not lighter, drinkers.\textsuperscript{206}

\textsuperscript{205} Meng, Y. et al. (2014); Sheffield: ScHARR, University of Sheffield. Table 5.3, page 54.

Furthermore, as figure six shows, a greater proportion of those in poverty are abstainers or low-consumption drinkers (83%) compared to those not in poverty. This has been found in other studies using household survey data, with 50% of households in the poorest quintile buying no alcohol in a two week period compared to 15% of households in the richest quintile. Moderate drinkers in poverty also already tend to consume less, at 4.9 units per week, compared to 5.6 for moderate drinkers not in poverty.

Figure five: Number and proportion of units purchased at below 50p / unit by income and drinker group

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207 Meng, Y. et al. (2014); Sheffield: ScHARR, University of Sheffield. Figure 4.9, page 21.

279. UK household expenditure data\textsuperscript{210} shows that while the poorest 10% of the population (the bottom decile) spend the highest proportion of their total household expenditure on alcohol (1.9%), this then reduces through the deciles, with the third decile spending the lowest (1.3%). Most deciles spend a roughly similar proportion (1.4% to 1.5%). Given that these proportions of total expenditure are relatively low, for the majority of moderate drinkers, a small increase in expenditure (anticipated at £2.15 per year for moderate drinkers in poverty, or £2.44 per year for moderate drinkers not in poverty) is likely to have a limited impact on other household expenditure.

280. The increased costs of the policy are therefore focused on harmful and hazardous drinkers. For those not in poverty, the increased costs will be £35.88 per year for hazardous drinkers, and £38.52 for harmful drinkers, accompanied by a drop in consumption of 1.2% (17.7 units) and 5.8% (243 units) respectively. For those in poverty who are hazardous or harmful drinkers, the cost impact is lower (£17.74 and £8.50 respectively).\textsuperscript{211} Therefore, the more significant impact is the reduction in consumption (6.2%; 84.3 units and 13%; 487.3 units a year, respectively).\textsuperscript{212} It should be acknowledged, however, that this impact

\textsuperscript{209} Meng, Y. et al. (2014); Sheffield: ScHARR, University of Sheffield. Figure 4.4, page 16.

\textsuperscript{210} ONS, Family Spending in the UK: financial year ending March 2016 Edition Release (February 2017). Table 3.2E: Detailed household expenditure as a percentage of total expenditure by equivalised disposable income decile group 2016.

\textsuperscript{211} Meng, Y. et al. (2014); Sheffield: ScHARR, University of Sheffield. Table 5.4, page 55.

\textsuperscript{212} Meng, Y. et al. (2014); Sheffield: ScHARR, University of Sheffield. Table 5.2, page 51.
could be significant for some harmful drinkers, particularly those who find they are unable to restrict their consumption significantly, which could have a knock-on impact on family budgets and households may have less money to spend on other items, especially within the poorest 10% where spend on alcohol is relatively high compared to total household expenditure. It is difficult to predict what impact this may have on family spending if spend is transferred from a whole range of areas of household expenditure. It is not possible to provide estimates of any potential changes in the allocation of household expenditure. These are not yet known.

281. The small decline in consumption among moderate drinkers (a reduction of 2.2%) may lead to a cost to health services, resulting from a loss of the protective effect of alcohol for ischaemic heart disease, ischaemic stroke and type 2 diabetes. The University of Sheffield model estimates that over 20 years, one death and 23 hospital admissions may be attributable to this effect (balanced against the saving of 54 deaths and 1,445 hospital admissions).\textsuperscript{213} The impact is small because the protective effect is only evident for low levels of consumption, so the change would only affect those who are already moderate drinkers (who are predicted to change behaviour only slightly, reducing their consumption by 6.4 units per year).

282. An increase in the price of alcohol will also lead to a reduction in utility (consumer satisfaction) for those who reduce their consumption in response. It is not possible to estimate what these reductions will be and it is assumed that they will be outweighed by an increase in utility from the health benefits accruing as a result of lower consumption. It is not possible to estimate any associated monetary values – and so these are not yet known.

**Retailers**

283. Costs to on-sale retailers are anticipated to be largely unaffected, as prices will rarely change. Although on-sale drinks promotions are commonplace, they are unlikely to be selling alcohol below an MUP of (for example) 50p. A 50p MUP is estimated to lead to an overall increase in revenue for on-trade retailers of £2m (0.3% increase).\textsuperscript{214}

\textsuperscript{213} Meng, Y. et al. (2014); Sheffield: ScHARR, University of Sheffield. Table 5.6, page 59.

\textsuperscript{214} Meng, Y. et al. (2014); Sheffield: ScHARR, University of Sheffield. Page 10.
For off-sale retailers, the Sheffield model suggests that any reductions in sales will be compensated by higher prices, resulting in overall increases in revenue owing to the relative inelasticity of demand for alcohol, although the overall impact on revenues is uncertain. A 50p MUP is estimated to lead to an overall increase in revenue for off-trade retailers of £25m (12.2% increase). The implementation costs for retailers will however vary for smaller and larger businesses – although the extent to which these costs will vary is unknown.

Larger businesses which operate UK-wide may incur costs associated with a different pricing and promotion regime in Wales. The cost of re-pricing and labelling at the point of implementation is not considered to be excessive, as these stores regularly re-price their products, including in response to changes in alcohol duty at short notice. However, these costs are unknown.

MUP will apply to businesses licensed in Wales which operate an online or telephone delivery of alcohol when supplying to a person in Wales. The Welsh Government acknowledges that internet sales/click and collect/telephone orders may pose an implementation challenge for some retailers in Wales. As such, we specifically sought views on this matter in the consultation on the draft Bill. Most respondents in favour of the proposal said that legislation would have little effect on those buying or selling alcohol online, particularly as those products already exceed an MUP of 50p and are often specialised products – for example, fine wines or unique product brands. One respondent said that online retailers whose main business relies on the sale of cheap, strong alcohol may be adversely affected.

The Welsh Retail Consortium highlights a number of other costs, including the need to update in-store systems, which are currently used to block till-point sales of alcohol below the cost-price. These costs are unknown. One supermarket chain has estimated this could cost up to £1m and take between two and three years to implement and test. It also suggests there may be a cost for maintaining different pricing and compliance systems across the border. However, a significant number of these retailers (predominantly supermarket chains) already have

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215 Meng, Y. et al. (2014); Sheffield: ScHARR, University of Sheffield. Page 10.


217 In correspondence with the Welsh Government.
differential pricing across different types/sizes of store, as well as implementing different rules on alcohol price promotions in Scotland.

288. The Wine and Spirit Trade Association mentioned the cost of reviewing promotional material.\textsuperscript{218} There may also be costs associated with wastage since damaged products cannot be sold at less than the applicable minimum price (this was estimated at more than £2.5m for the ban on below-cost selling for one supermarket chain). These costs are unknown. Although we acknowledge there will be some costs associated with the change, larger retailers should be able to absorb facilitation and implementation costs, as they are likely to benefit from an increase in revenue as a result of MUP. Approximately 84% of alcohol off-sales are from large multiple retailers, according to Nielsen.\textsuperscript{219}

289. Where retailers are continuing to use heavy discounts on alcohol to encourage customers, they may lose some footfall as a result. However this is difficult to calculate and large retailers are likely to be competing with other large retailers, who will all be affected in the same way and they will continue to be able to compete with discounts on other products. Associated costs as a result of a loss in footfall are unknown.

290. Smaller businesses, particularly those without head office support, may face higher implementation costs. For example, independent retailers may need to allocate a member of staff to do this for one day, at a cost of approximately £64 per shop (based on a retail assistant working for eight hours on a salary of £7.99 per hour).\textsuperscript{220} Based on these figures, this would mean a total implementation cost of approximately £455,700 for all retailers, of which there are a total of 7,120 in Wales.\textsuperscript{221} Smaller retailers

\textsuperscript{218} WSTA Response to the Welsh Government Consultation on the Public Health White Paper, June 2014.


\textsuperscript{220} These figures are based on the 2016 Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings: https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/earningsandworkinghours/bulletins/annualsurveyofhoursandearnings/2016provisionalresults

\textsuperscript{221} Number of enterprise headquarters in Wales with the Retail Sector for 2016 = 7,120 (2013 = 7,095, 2014 = 7,030). Based on provisional figures for 2016: Retail assistant average hourly rate = £7.99. Retail managers average hourly rate = £10.56. The total number of retailers has been calculated using Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. These are based on the UK enterprises industrial classification. The following three digit SIC codes were used - 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477. The list of SIC codes can be found at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/standard-industrial-classification-of-economic-activities-sic
may find this cost is off-set not only by increased revenues but also by their improved ability to compete with large retailers and supermarkets. However, while an estimate has been included for implementation costs, specific costs (or increases in revenue) are unknown.

291. Retailers will also need to familiarise themselves with the requirements of minimum unit pricing to ensure they comply. This could take managers of stores approximately four hours to fully familiarise themselves with changes and brief staff as required. Based on the hourly rate of retail managers (£10.56),\textsuperscript{222} and assuming one member of staff at this level per store, costs for this would amount to approximately £300,700 in the year before implementation. It is assumed that retailers will have an ongoing system to ensure store managers have up-to-date knowledge of alcohol licensing standards. Including an MUP for alcohol as part of this may require an additional hour of familiarisation, at a cost of approximately £75,000 (for all 3,092 licensed retailers) in the future.

292. There is considerable uncertainty around retailers’ responses to the introduction of minimum unit pricing and the impact on the market as a whole. There is little consensus from the industry on whether MUP will affect sale prices which are above the minimum price – and whether premium brands will also raise prices in order to maintain the differential between these and value brands. The Welsh Retail Consortium argues it will disproportionately affect own-brand alcohol\textsuperscript{223} but this is not possible to predict at this stage and costs are unknown. The University of Sheffield model assumes the only change will be for prices to be raised to the MUP threshold since the effect on costs and revenues for different types of retailers and producers cannot be accurately modelled. It is predicted that the cost of a decline in consumption will be outweighed by the higher revenues resulting from higher prices.

293. Alcohol wholesalers will be indirectly affected as the volume of alcohol purchased at less than the applicable minimum price is expected to decline. The extent of the impact will depend on the quantity of alcohol sold to retailers which is then priced at less than the set minimum price for alcohol. They will not however be subject to any minimum pricing

\textsuperscript{220} 2016 Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings: \url{https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/earningsandworkinghours/bulletins/annualsurveyofhoursandearnings/2016provisionalresults}

\textsuperscript{223} Welsh Retail Consortium response to the Welsh Government Consultation on the Public Health White Paper, June 2014.
requirement due to their trade-to-trade sales. Wholesalers may choose to increase prices in the knowledge that retail prices of certain goods have increased but that will be for individual companies within the supply chain to determine. Similarly, the impact on producers is difficult to ascertain as the reaction on the supply side and where additional revenue will accrue in the supply chain is not known. Producers may choose, for example, to produce lower-strength products that will retail more cheaply or to focus on premium brands. The alcohol industry has already demonstrated innovation in this area, by removing more than a billion units from the UK alcohol market as part of the responsibility deal.

294. Retailers which do not comply with minimum pricing requirements may incur costs as a result of fixed penalty notices imposed and, where these are not paid, possible prosecution and further fines. These costs are unknown. However, learning from existing local authority enforcement policy, the Welsh Government anticipates that local authorities, may, wherever possible in appropriate cases, wish to exercise their discretion and work with retailers to resolve issues voluntarily.

Local authorities

295. The estimated costs of implementation for local authorities are outlined below.

296. It is anticipated compliance inspections for minimum pricing will become part of the current inspection regime for premises selling alcohol. Moore et al. estimated that the cost of an inspection visit (by an environmental health officer or licensing officer) is approximately £125. There may also be an additional cost for local authorities due to the need for longer or more frequent checks, particularly in the early days of the legislation. Similarly, although there may be some additional administration costs in issuing fixed penalty notices for non-compliance with minimum pricing, this will be off-set to some extent for local authorities which will

224 Where a retailer trades as a retail and wholesale business with both customer types shopping in the store, the retailer should ensure the MUP for alcohol is charged to individuals purchasing alcohol for their consumption and that wholesale prices are only offered to customers who hold a licence to resell the alcohol in their business.

225 Department of Health (December 2014) Responsibility Deal: Monitoring the number of units of alcohol sold – second interim report, 2013 data.

keep the fixed penalty notices paid. Overall – these compliance costs are unknown.

297. It is possible that some local authorities could jointly manage the enforcement of minimum unit pricing which could also offset overheads to the local authority. Discussions are ongoing with local authorities and the Wales Heads of Trading Standards on potentially funding additional inspection activity, particularly during the first year of implementing the legislation. Costs associated with this activity have not yet been confirmed, but early discussions suggest that £150,000 will need to be allocated by Welsh Government to cover additional inspection activity in the first year of implementation – followed by £100,000 in year 2 and £50,000 in year 3.

298. Where prosecutions are necessary, local authorities will face administrative and legal costs. The legal costs of bringing the prosecution are generally reclaimable against those being prosecuted if the case is successful, but there will be initial costs. Learning from the enforcement of carrier bag legislation suggests that overall costs for the enforcement of minimum pricing are likely to be low – however, these costs are unknown. Local authorities report that enforcement of the carrier bag legislation has mostly been effective through informal mechanisms (such as verbal warnings and repeat visits).

**Court costs**

299. While enforcement action will be taken by local authorities under the Bill, the Welsh Government does not anticipate that breaches of minimum pricing will result in many court cases due to the anticipated high levels of compliance. Further, as noted, local authorities may, wherever possible and in appropriate cases, wish to exercise their discretion and work with retailers to resolve issues voluntarily with enforcement officers working with alcohol retailers to avoid repeat offences. It is anticipated that such work will form part of the normal work of enforcement officers. Guidance will be issued to retailers to assist them in becoming compliant with the new legislation as it is implemented. In addition, there is provision for a fixed penalty notice to be issued before a prosecution is brought. Therefore, it is not anticipated that there will be a large number of court cases. However, associated costs are unknown ahead of the implementation of the legislation.
300. There will be a small implementation cost to the Welsh Government in developing guidance on minimum pricing. The development of guidance (based on an estimate of 6,000 words), including engaging stakeholders to ensure the guidance is fit for purpose, is anticipated to take approximately five weeks over a period of six months of a full time equivalent (FTE) higher executive officer (equating to £4,200), and five weeks over a six-month period of a FTE team support (equating to £2,700). These costs would be incurred in 2019-20. The total cost for preparing guidance would therefore be £6,900.\footnote{These are costs based on 2016/17 Welsh Government Pay Scales. Source: Updated Pay Band Costs and Revised Standardisation of DRC Forecasting Guidance.}

301. It is anticipated from previous guidance produced by the Welsh Government that design and translation would take approximately two months to complete. The design would require approximately a week of a FTE executive officer’s time over the two-month period, which would equate to £600. It is estimated that translation and proof reading would cost approximately £600.\footnote{Based on £75 per 1,000 words for translation, £21 per 1,000 words for proof reading.} In addition there would be administration and management costs, estimated at one week of a FTE executive officer – approximately £600. The guidance would be shared electronically with local authorities, avoiding the need for printing and distribution costs. The total cost for design and translation of the guidance would therefore be £1,800, based on 2016-17 Welsh Government pay scales.

302. The Welsh Government would, if the minimum pricing provisions are not repealed at the end of the 6 year period, update the guidance after the review period. It is envisaged that this update would require one week of a FTE higher executive officer’s time (equating to £840), and a week of a FTE executive officer (equating to £600 based on 2016-17 Welsh Government pay scales) to review the operation and mechanisms with all local authorities and evidence on their implementation. Design and translation costs would amount to half the original costs, a total of £900. It is proposed the review would then be repeated every four or five years. The total cost for a review of the guidance would therefore be £2,340 every five years.

303. The implementation costs to communicate the change and deliver training will also fall to the Welsh Government. There will be a need for a strong focus on communicating the requirements of the legislation, particularly during the first few months of implementation. This includes...
publicising the change to businesses, for example via direct mail, websites, social media and trade publications, at an estimated cost of £80,000, and to the public, for example via a PR campaign, launch event and web and social media, at an estimated cost of £20,000. This will ensure that there is no confusion for retailers about how to handle differing minimum price levels set by the UK Government (through the ban on below-cost sales) and by the Welsh Government (through MUP).

304. The Welsh Government will work closely with Welsh Heads of Trading Standards and local authority colleagues to consider the requirements across Wales for a publicity and/or education campaign to ensure stakeholders are aware of the changes within Wales. This will be in addition to the guidance that the Welsh Government would publish. Welsh Government publicity materials will be provided and these will remain available to local authorities following the initial implementation. This follows the model used by the single use carrier bags campaign where materials were provided on the internet and local authorities and stakeholders printed and disseminated these documents as required.

305. Enforcement staff from local authorities will need to be trained on the requirements of minimum pricing. It is anticipated that this will cost the Welsh Government £6,000 for training for 450 to 500 officers for half a day. This will not be a cost for local authorities, as this will form part of normal staff continual professional development training.

306. During the consultation period on the draft Bill, Directors of Public Protection Wales indicated support for the rationale to introduce minimum pricing. They highlighted concerns about additional burdens for local government associated with the implementation and local authority-led enforcement regime and the need for the Welsh Government to invest in enforcement. Initial discussions have highlighted that funding on a tapered basis would be beneficial as this would help a greater emphasis to be placed on compliance with the legislation in the early years. For example, early discussions suggest that £150,000 will need to be allocated by Welsh Government to cover additional inspection activity in the first year of implementation – followed by £100,000 in year 2 and £50,000 in year 3.

307. The Bill places a duty on Welsh Ministers, after five years from commencement of section 2 of the Bill, to publish a report on the operation and effect of the minimum pricing regime. It is intended that this review will include a specific focus on whether the MUP is set at the right level. Costing an evaluation without detail on scope and methods to be used is problematic. At this stage, based on costs associated with similar evaluations and reviews conducted previously – including the Human
Transplantation (Wales) Act 2013 – costs are estimated at £350,000, spread over five years. It is important to note the total cost of any evaluation will depend on the balance of using and analysing routinely-available and bespoke data, undertaking future modelling work, the potential purchase of commercial data and research about the implementation and enforcement of the legislation.

UK Government

308. The UK Government will be affected through a reduction in the level of the duty and VAT associated with any changes in the volume and pattern of the sale of alcohol products where minimum pricing successfully reduces alcohol consumption. There is an anticipated 1% overall decrease in revenue (amounting to £5.8m per year), largely resulting from the decrease in off-trade duty receipts resulting from the reduction in alcohol consumption.229

Benefits

Individuals and society

309. A 50p MUP is associated with a total societal reduction in health harms, crime and workplace absence estimated at £882m (in 2014 prices) over the 20-year period modelled.230 This figure includes reduced direct healthcare costs (£131m); savings from reduced crime (£248m); savings from reduced workplace absence (£14m); and a financial valuation of the health benefits (£489m), measured in terms of quality adjusted life years (QALYs, which are valued at £60,000 in line with Home Office guidelines).231 232

310. A particular benefit is the degree to which it is targeted at harmful and hazardous drinkers, with whom the costs of alcohol misuse are most

229 Meng Y. et al. (2014); Sheffield: ScHARR, University of Sheffield. Table 5.5, page 58.

230 All costs and benefits in the Sheffield Model which relate to a 20 year period have been discounted at 3.5%.

231 Meng Y. et al. (2014); Sheffield: ScHARR, University of Sheffield. Pages 71-72.

232 A value of £60,000 per QALY is used as the QALYs are being valued from a societal perspective. This is higher than the value per QALY used by NICE. The value used by NICE is the maximum that the NHS can justify spending on a QALY due to resource constraints. See Public Health England (2015) A Guide to Social Return on Investment for Alcohol and Drug Treatment Commissioners http://www.nta.nhs.uk/uploads/a-guide-to-social-return-on-investment-for-alcohol-and-drug-treatment-commissioners.pdf
strongly associated. There is a strong impact on the consumption levels of these drinkers because they tend to favour cheaper alcohol, which is most affected by the policy. A 50p MUP would reduce alcohol consumption by 7.2% for harmful drinkers, an absolute reduction of 293.2 units per year, compared to a reduction in alcohol consumption of 2.2%, which equates to 6.4 units per year, for moderate drinkers. Harmful drinkers contribute to 85% of the reduction in alcohol-related deaths and 64% of the reduction in hospital admissions.

311. Furthermore, as shown above, the patterns of drinking differ when examined by income group. The benefits for moderate drinkers, whether in poverty or not, are similar, with a small decline in consumption levels in absolute terms (10.1 units per year for moderate drinkers in poverty; 5.3 for moderate drinkers not in poverty). For harmful drinkers in poverty, since they tend to favour cheaper drinks, and drinks that have larger price elasticities, particularly off-trade beer and cider, minimum unit pricing has the largest effect and this effect is mainly reduced consumption (487.3 units per year) rather than increased spending (£8.50 per year).233

312. Minimum unit pricing is likely to have a beneficial effect even on the heaviest drinkers who have serious problems with alcohol. One study in Scotland found that since problem drinkers (drinking on average 198 units per week) were drinking as cheaply as they could already and lower unit prices were associated with increased consumption within this group, a minimum price is likely to have a “relatively large absolute effect on consumption”.234 As highlighted earlier, NICE guidance notes that an MUP can help problem drinkers – both those who are not in regular contact with the relevant services and those receiving treatment – by creating an environment that supports lower-risk drinking.235

313. The model suggests that an MUP of 50p will have a greater effect on the health of those in poverty, with an estimated five fewer deaths and 124 fewer hospital admissions per 100,000 drinkers for those in poverty compared to two fewer deaths and 53 fewer hospital admissions per 100,000 drinkers for those not in poverty as set out in table six below. Ludbrook et al. also consider that reduced consumption could be more

233 Meng Y. et al. (2014); Sheffield: ScHARR, University of Sheffield. Tables 5.2 and 5.4.


beneficial for those in poverty, since disadvantaged groups tend to have worse health outcomes than others, when alcohol consumption is the same.\textsuperscript{236}

314. The population benefits of minimum unit pricing in reducing alcohol-related health problems, crime and workplace absence are detailed below.

\textit{Health}

315. The University of Sheffield model estimates substantial reductions in alcohol-related harms from all modelled policies, with an estimated reduction of 53 deaths and 1,400 fewer hospital admissions per year for a 50p MUP.

316. Direct costs to healthcare services are estimated to reduce under all modelled policies, with savings of more than £130m over 20 years for an MUP threshold of 50p (table eight).

317. This is consistent with evidence from other countries, which have implemented similar policies. In Canada, a 10% increase in average minimum alcohol prices was associated with a 32% reduction in wholly alcohol-caused deaths.\textsuperscript{237}


Table six: Income-specific health outcomes – policy impacts on deaths and hospital admissions per year per 100,000 populations at full effect (in 20th year)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>In poverty</th>
<th>Not in poverty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deaths per 100,000 drinker</td>
<td>Hospital admission per 100,000 drinker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol-attributable harm (burden of disease)¹</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>1878.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Relative change (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>In poverty</th>
<th>Not in poverty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10% general price increase</td>
<td>-9.9%</td>
<td>-12.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban on below-cost selling</td>
<td>-0.2%</td>
<td>-0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35p MUP</td>
<td>-0.9%</td>
<td>-0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40p MUP</td>
<td>-3.0%</td>
<td>-2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45p MUP</td>
<td>-6.2%</td>
<td>-4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50p MUP</td>
<td>-9.9%</td>
<td>-6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55p MUP</td>
<td>-14.5%</td>
<td>-9.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60p MUP</td>
<td>-19.9%</td>
<td>-13.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65p MUP</td>
<td>-25.4%</td>
<td>-17.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70p MUP</td>
<td>-30.7%</td>
<td>-21.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Absolute change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>In poverty</th>
<th>Not in poverty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10% general price increase</td>
<td>-4.8</td>
<td>-4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban on below-cost selling</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35p MUP</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40p MUP</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45p MUP</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50p MUP</td>
<td>-4.8</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55p MUP</td>
<td>-7.1</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60p MUP</td>
<td>-9.7</td>
<td>-4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65p MUP</td>
<td>-12.4</td>
<td>-5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70p MUP</td>
<td>-15.0</td>
<td>-7.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Estimated by modelling a “counterfactual” scenario in which the entire population becomes abstainers, i.e. zero consumption.

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238 Meng, Y. et al. (2014); Sheffield: SchARR, University of Sheffield. Table 5.7, page 60.
Crime

318. Crime is expected to fall, with an estimated 3,684 fewer offences per year under an example 50p MUP policy. Harmful drinkers, who comprise 5.7% of the total population (including abstainers), account for 49% of this reduction. Costs of crime are estimated to reduce by £248m (in 2014 prices) over 20 years with a 50p MUP (as set out in table eight).\textsuperscript{239}

319. Specifically, the University of Sheffield estimates a 50p MUP will result in a 4.7% reduction in violent crimes, 4.6% reduction in criminal damage and 4.6% reduction in robbery, burglary and theft.\textsuperscript{240}

Workplace absence

320. Workplace absence is estimated to fall under all modelled policies (as set out in table seven), with a reduction of 10,000 days absent per year by year 20 for a 50p MUP. This has been valued at £14m over 20 years (as set out in table seven).

\textsuperscript{239} Some of these savings will be accrued by the UK Government given that policing is a devolved matter. However, data are only available on the total amount of savings – as opposed to being able to apportion these savings to the UK Government / Welsh Government.

\textsuperscript{240} Meng, Y. et al. (2014); Sheffield: SchARR, University of Sheffield. Table 5.12, page 66.
Table seven: Estimated changes in workplace absence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Change in days absence from work per year</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol-attributable absence ('000)(^1)</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative change (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10% general price increase</td>
<td>-6.2%</td>
<td>-8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban on below-cost selling</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35p MUP</td>
<td>-0.7%</td>
<td>-0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40p MUP</td>
<td>-1.6%</td>
<td>-1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45p MUP</td>
<td>-2.9%</td>
<td>-2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50p MUP</td>
<td>-4.6%</td>
<td>-3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55p MUP</td>
<td>-6.7%</td>
<td>-5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60p MUP</td>
<td>-9.2%</td>
<td>-8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65p MUP</td>
<td>-12.0%</td>
<td>-11.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70p MUP</td>
<td>-15.0%</td>
<td>-14.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Absolute change ('000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10% general price increase</td>
<td>-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban on below-cost selling</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35p MUP</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40p MUP</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45p MUP</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50p MUP</td>
<td>-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55p MUP</td>
<td>-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60p MUP</td>
<td>-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65p MUP</td>
<td>-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70p MUP</td>
<td>-34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) Estimated by modelling a "counterfactual" scenario in which the entire population becomes abstainers, i.e. zero consumption.

\(^{241}\) Meng, Y. et al. (2014); Sheffield: ScHARR, University of Sheffield. Table 5.13, page 67.
### Table eight: Summary of financial impact of modelled policies on health, crime and workplace related harm over 20 years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Cumulative value of harm reductions over 20 years (discounted)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Health direct costs</td>
<td>Health QALY costs (£60,000 per QALY)</td>
<td>Total health costs</td>
<td>Crime costs</td>
<td>Work absence costs</td>
<td>Total costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol-attributable cost (£million, discounted)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10% general price increase</td>
<td>-7.6%</td>
<td>-10.3%</td>
<td>-9.5%</td>
<td>-6.7%</td>
<td>-6.6%</td>
<td>-8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBCS</td>
<td>-0.1%</td>
<td>-0.1%</td>
<td>-0.1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>-0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35p MUP</td>
<td>-0.8%</td>
<td>-1.1%</td>
<td>-1.0%</td>
<td>-0.7%</td>
<td>-0.7%</td>
<td>-0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40p MUP</td>
<td>-1.7%</td>
<td>-2.5%</td>
<td>-2.3%</td>
<td>-1.6%</td>
<td>-1.6%</td>
<td>-2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45p MUP</td>
<td>-3.1%</td>
<td>-4.5%</td>
<td>-4.1%</td>
<td>-3.0%</td>
<td>-3.0%</td>
<td>-3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50p MUP</td>
<td>-4.8%</td>
<td>-6.9%</td>
<td>-6.3%</td>
<td>-4.7%</td>
<td>-4.7%</td>
<td>-5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55p MUP</td>
<td>-7.0%</td>
<td>-10.0%</td>
<td>-9.1%</td>
<td>-6.8%</td>
<td>-6.9%</td>
<td>-8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60p MUP</td>
<td>-9.5%</td>
<td>-13.7%</td>
<td>-12.6%</td>
<td>-9.2%</td>
<td>-9.3%</td>
<td>-11.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65p MUP</td>
<td>-12.5%</td>
<td>-17.9%</td>
<td>-16.4%</td>
<td>-12.1%</td>
<td>-12.4%</td>
<td>-14.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70p MUP</td>
<td>-15.8%</td>
<td>-22.4%</td>
<td>-20.6%</td>
<td>-15.0%</td>
<td>-15.5%</td>
<td>-18.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Absolute change (£million, discounted)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10% general price increase</td>
<td>-205</td>
<td>-725</td>
<td>-930</td>
<td>-351</td>
<td>-19</td>
<td>-1300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBCS</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35p MUP</td>
<td>-22</td>
<td>-78</td>
<td>-99</td>
<td>-36</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40p MUP</td>
<td>-47</td>
<td>-175</td>
<td>-222</td>
<td>-86</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45p MUP</td>
<td>-85</td>
<td>-315</td>
<td>-400</td>
<td>-158</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>-566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50p MUP</td>
<td>-131</td>
<td>-489</td>
<td>-620</td>
<td>-248</td>
<td>-14</td>
<td>-882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55p MUP</td>
<td>-188</td>
<td>-704</td>
<td>-892</td>
<td>-358</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>-1270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60p MUP</td>
<td>-257</td>
<td>-970</td>
<td>-1228</td>
<td>-480</td>
<td>-17</td>
<td>-1734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65p MUP</td>
<td>-340</td>
<td>-1267</td>
<td>-1606</td>
<td>-635</td>
<td>-36</td>
<td>-2277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70p MUP</td>
<td>-428</td>
<td>-1581</td>
<td>-2009</td>
<td>-788</td>
<td>-45</td>
<td>-2842</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Estimated by modelling a “counterfactual” scenario in which the entire population becomes abstainers, i.e. zero consumption.

**Retailers**

321. A 50p MUP is estimated to lead to an overall increase in revenue for retailers of £27m per year (3.3%) with increase in revenue for off-trade retailers of £25m (12.2%) and for on-trade retailers of £2m (0.3%).

It should be noted, however, that considerable uncertainty exists regarding retailers’ responses to the introduction of an MUP. Retailers and producers may make a range of additional changes to both prices and products which may impact on resulting revenue changes to the Exchequer and retailers and other modelled outcomes.

**Summary of costs and benefits**

322. The central scenario for modelling costs and benefits is based on an MUP of 50p per unit of alcohol. This assumption affects the benefits only as the costs are independent of the MUP chosen and relate predominantly

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242 Meng, Y. et al. (2014); Sheffield: SchHARR, University of Sheffield. Table 5.14, page 69.

243 Meng, Y. et al. (2014); Sheffield: SchHARR, University of Sheffield. Page 10.
to transition and administration costs. The benefits, however, vary according to the level at which the MUP is set. Table nine sets out the costs for introducing an MUP in Wales.

Table nine: Summary of costs for option three

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Year one costs £</th>
<th>Year two costs £</th>
<th>Year three costs £</th>
<th>Year four costs £</th>
<th>Year five costs £</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Welsh Government costs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guidance costs</td>
<td>8,700</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training for LA staff</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation and review</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Cost to Welsh Government</strong></td>
<td>184,700</td>
<td>BUT: Additional costs not yet known. Potential for additional £150,000 costs for inspection and enforcement</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>BUT: Additional costs not yet known. Potential for additional £100,000 costs for inspection and enforcement</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UK Government – lower alcohol duty revenue</strong></td>
<td>5,800,000</td>
<td>5,800,000</td>
<td>5,800,000</td>
<td>5,800,000</td>
<td>5,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local authorities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff costs for inspections and enforcement</td>
<td>Anticipated to be low, enforcing MUP is expected to be undertaken within the existing inspection regime. However, discussions are ongoing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
with local authorities and Trading Standards on the Welsh Government potentially funding additional inspection activity, particularly during the first year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total cost to local authorities</th>
<th>Not known.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Retailers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>300,700</th>
<th>75,000</th>
<th>75,000</th>
<th>75,000</th>
<th>75,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Staff costs for familiarisation with the new legislation</td>
<td>(four hours per license holder)</td>
<td>(one hour per license holder)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff costs to change prices</td>
<td>455,700</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total cost to retailers</strong>*</td>
<td>756,400</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>75,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Consumers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>£27m each year</th>
<th>£27m each year</th>
<th>£27m each year</th>
<th>£27m each year</th>
<th>£27m each year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

* This is an aggregate estimated cost. There may be other costs associated with implementation for larger stores, for example software updates, wastage, reviewing promotions; however, it is very difficult to estimate these at this stage. These costs should also be covered by the increased revenues resulting from higher prices.

** It should be noted that the £27m a year cost to consumers is a £27m a year gain to retailers and is therefore treated as a transfer payment – see paragraph 325 on page 119.

323. For comparison purposes, the costs should be discounted over a 20-year period to be consistent with the benefits. This translates into total Welsh Government costs of £0.438m and total retailer costs of £1.822m.244

324. One of the largest cost impacts of the policy would be the reduced revenue from alcohol duty as a result of lower consumption. This equates

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244 The total discounted retailer costs assume that the familiarisation costs of £75,000 occur every year over the twenty year period.
to £82.4m over the 20-year period. However, in terms of the calculation of net costs and benefits, taxation is normally treated as a transfer, which means there is no overall change.

325. In addition to the above, the policy would involve a substantial transfer from consumers to retailers. This is estimated to be of the order of £27m per annum. This £27m is the gain to retailers caused by consumers paying more than they would have done without MUP. In terms of the calculation of net costs and benefits this transfer payment has no effect because it is a cost to consumers but a benefit to retailers. This does not affect the overall cost/benefit directly but there may be distributional consequences.

Benefits

326. The introduction of an MUP at 50p is estimated to lead to a reduction in health costs of £620m; a reduction in crime costs of £248m; and a reduction in workplace absence costs of £14m over a 20-year period.

327. This results in a net benefit over 20 years of £880m compared to option one (do nothing).
Summary and preferred option

Table ten below summarises the costs and benefits for each of the three options.

Table ten: Summary of costs for all options

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Option one</th>
<th>Option two</th>
<th>Option three</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Costs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WG</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>£0.438m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retailers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>£1.822m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>£620m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>£248m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workplace absence</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>£14m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Benefit / (Cost)</td>
<td>Baseline no additional impacts. Assumed to be built into other options</td>
<td>Overall change likely to be zero as any gain here will be offset by losses in other programmes</td>
<td>£880m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>+/- retailers revenue</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK reduction in alcohol duty revenue from fewer alcohol sales</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-£82.4m based on a reduction of £5.8m per year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Objective Achieved</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

245 The figures for option three are discounted over a 20 year period at 3.5%. This is to make the calculations consistent with the modelling work undertaken by the University of Sheffield, which assessed a 20 year period. The 3.5% is standard discounting where costs/benefits occur over multiple time periods. A rate of 3.5% is used for government projects. We use a 20 year period here as this was the timeframe incorporated into the Sheffield modelling.
328. Option one does not meet the policy objective. It does not tackle the problem of very high alcohol consumption by some people in Wales. Doing nothing would allow retailers to continue to sell heavily-discounted alcohol, meaning ongoing costs resulting from avoidable alcohol-related health harms and wider societal harms identified by the University of Sheffield, such as crime and workplace absences. Continuing the actions in the substance misuse strategy and other non-legislative actions outlined in Part 1 to prevent harm will have some impact, but without a whole population measure, we will not achieve the pace of change we are seeking.

329. Option two does not meet the policy objective, as it does not target harmful and hazardous drinkers. Although the actions in option two may have some impact on consumption, and access to treatment, this could have a negative impact on drug-related educational campaigns and treatment programmes. If lobbying the UK Government to change alcohol duties were successful, this may reduce consumption but it would not be targeted specifically at low-cost, high-strength drinks which are most strongly associated with alcohol-related harm.

330. Option three is the preferred option. There is strong and consistent evidence linking the price of alcohol to consumption of alcohol and that increasing the price reduces consumption and therefore alcohol-related harm. The evidence supports the assertion that an MUP for alcohol will lead to improved health, reduced welfare inequality, less crime, greater workplace productivity and will therefore contribute to the Welsh economy.

331. Minimum unit pricing is both a whole-population and targeted approach. It applies to the whole population and may reduce consumption among all, but because it affects alcohol products which are cheap relative to their strength, it is specifically targeted towards harmful and hazardous drinkers and young drinkers. These are groups who are likely to be most affected in terms of how much they spend and the reduction in the amount they drink and therefore in how much they benefit from reductions in harm.

332. The increased costs to individuals (in light of increases in the cost of alcohol) are outweighed by the benefits in the reduction of societal harms. Similarly, implementation and administrative costs for the industry as a whole will be outweighed by the benefit from increased revenues.

333. Option three, which will operate in tandem with the existing range of measures undertaken as part of the Welsh Government’s Substance Misuse Strategy as described in Part 1 of the explanatory memorandum, will help to ensure that trends in alcohol consumption and harm reduction
are maintained and strengthened, protecting individuals, families, communities and the Welsh economy.
8. Competition Assessment

There are two stages to the Competition Assessment. The first is a filter test which assesses whether there is a risk of a significant detrimental effect on competition. The second stage provides a full assessment. Table eleven below summarises the competition filter results:

Table eleven: Competition Filter Test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer yes or no</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Q1</strong>: In the market(s) affected by the new regulation, does any firm have more than 10% market share?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Q2</strong>: In the market(s) affected by the new regulation, does any firm have more than 20% market share?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Q3</strong>: In the market(s) affected by the new regulation, do the largest three firms together have at least 50% market share?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Q4</strong>: Would the costs of the regulation affect some firms substantially more than others?</td>
<td>Potentially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Q5</strong>: Is the regulation likely to affect the market structure, changing the number or size of firms?</td>
<td>Potentially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Q6</strong>: Would the regulation lead to higher set-up costs for new or potential suppliers that existing suppliers do not have to meet?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Q7</strong>: Would the regulation lead to higher ongoing costs for new or potential suppliers that existing suppliers do not have to meet?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Q8</strong>: Is the sector categorised by rapid technological change?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Q9</strong>: Would the regulation restrict the ability of suppliers to choose the price, quality, range or location of their products?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

246 This table has been completed based on an analysis of business enterprises with the following Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code: 1101 (Distilling, rectifying and blending of spirits); 1105 (Manufacture of beer); 1103 (Manufacture of cider and other fruit wines); and 1106 (manufacture of malt).
335. In view of the answers above, the second stage of the competition assessment has also been completed.

**Second Stage Competition Assessment**

336. This competition assessment analyses the likely economic impact of introducing an example MUP for alcohol of 50p on the competitive ability of producers and retailers and the consequential impact on consumers.

*Definition of competition*\(^{247}\)

337. Competition is a process of rivalry between firms, and where it is effective, encourages firms to deliver benefits to customers in terms of lower prices, higher quality and more choice.

338. Competition between firms may focus on offering the lowest price, particularly where products are standardised. Most suppliers will try and compete in a number of ways in addition to price, for example by developing new improved products; by offering products of differing quality or characteristics; by branding and advertising the differences in their products relative to their competitors' or by using different sales channels.

*Objective of the policy*

339. The objective of the minimum pricing legislation is to tackle alcohol-related harm, including reducing alcohol-attributable hospital admissions and alcohol-related deaths, by reducing alcohol consumption among harmful and hazardous consumers, including among young people in Wales.

*Definition of markets*

340. Markets and sectors which could potentially be affected both directly and indirectly have been identified and are listed below.

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Directly affected markets/sectors:

- Sales of alcohol in off-licensed premises
- Sales of alcohol on licensed premises
- Market flows between on and off-licensed sales
- Sales of other products by retailers which sell alcohol, including footfall

Indirectly affected sectors:

- Drinks manufacturers
- Distributors/wholesalers

The status quo

341. Competition in the alcohol market in Wales is currently subject to a number of regulations and restrictions, particularly licensing regulations, which restrict availability by number, location and opening hours of retailers, among other factors. In addition, a price floor is already in operation in this market, in the form of the ban on sale of alcohol at below cost price – cost is the amount of duty plus VAT.

342. Nevertheless, the alcohol market in Wales is characterised by a high-level of competition. This is indicated by the large number of products and retailers and high degree of customer switching, as well as significant levels of innovation and ease of entry to the market at all levels, including new products, manufacturers and retailers.

Overview of the Welsh drinks industry

343. The alcohol retail sector (off-trade) consists of national supermarket chains, specialist retailers and a large number of other small grocers and corner stores. The hospitality sector (on-trade) consists of national chains and a large number of small pubs (a number of which are owned by large beer producers), clubs and restaurants. The retail sector and the hospitality sector sell products produced within and outside Wales.

344. The alcohol manufacturing sector in Wales had a turnover of £644m in 2016, an 11% rise on the previous year.\(^{248}\) It is a flourishing sector, with several large breweries and a rapidly growing number of smaller producers, as well as 10 distilleries and 17 vineyards.\(^{249}\) There are now...

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\(^{248}\) ONS, Inter-Departmental Business Register (excludes enterprises operating below the VAT threshold).

\(^{249}\) As at June 2017. According to Drinks Wales: [www.drinkswales.org](http://www.drinkswales.org)
about 70 businesses, a growth of 146% since 2007, employing around 690 people. Some alcoholic drinks produced in the Welsh manufacturing sector would not be directly affected by the applicable minimum price, as they are premium products sold at more, for example, than 50p per unit in the off-trade. Those produced by major producers may be affected.

345. In England and Wales, the total amount of pure alcohol sold per adult increased from 9L in 1994 to a peak of 10.5L in 2005, decreasing slightly each year thereafter to 9.1L in 2015, which equates to 17.4 units per adult per week. The distribution of sales across the on and off-trade has also changed. In 1994, 3.8L of pure alcohol were sold through the off-trade, compared with on-trade sales of 5.2L. By 2015, off-trade sales increased to 6.3L per adult, while on-trade sales decreased to 2.8L per adult. The off-trade market accounted for 69% of the total volume of alcohol sold in England and Wales in 2015, compared with 42% in 1994.

346. In 2012, beer accounted for 38% of the total market share, wine for 30%, spirits for 20% and cider for 8%. This is a shift towards a greater share of the market for spirits and, especially, wine. Beer sales have decreased between 1994 and 2015, from 5.3L to 3.4L per adult.

**Prices**

347. The majority of alcohol sold in the on-trade retails at above 50p per unit, whereas a majority (by volume) of all alcohol except wine is sold at less than 50p per unit in the off-trade (72% of off-trade beer sold at less than 50p per unit, 78% of cider, 42% of wine and 66% of spirits). The difference in price distributions across the on and off-trades can be seen in Figures seven and eight. As set out in Table 12, for spirits, and particularly wine, sales below 50p per unit are clustered not far below this threshold (with only 12.2% of wine below 40p per unit). As a result, only a small price rise will result in a significantly higher proportion selling at 50p per unit or above.

348. Furthermore, the average price paid differs for consumers, with moderate drinkers paying 54.2p per unit for off-trade alcohol, and 145.6p per unit for on-trade alcohol, compared with 50.3p per unit and 130.9p per

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250 ONS, Inter-Departmental Business Register.

251 MESAS alcohol sales and price update May 2016

252 Meng Y. et al. (2014); Sheffield: ScHARR, University of Sheffield. Pages 18-19.
unit for harmful drinkers, and 48.7p per unit and 130.20 per unit for hazardous drinkers.\textsuperscript{253}

\textit{Figure seven: Off-trade price distributions Wales}\textsuperscript{254}

\textit{Figure eight: On-trade price distributions Wales}\textsuperscript{255}

\textsuperscript{253} Living Costs and Food Survey, quoted in Welsh Adaption of the Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model: Summary of Relevant Data Sources for Wales. Unpublished.

\textsuperscript{254} Meng, Y. et al. (2014); Sheffield: ScHARR, University of Sheffield. Figure 4.8, page 20.

\textsuperscript{255} Meng, Y. et al. (2014); Sheffield: ScHARR, University of Sheffield. Figure 4.8, page 20.
**Table twelve: Proportion of alcohol sold in Wales below a range of MUP thresholds**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Proportions sold below thresholds (2014 prices)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40p</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off-trade beer</td>
<td>40.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off-trade cider</td>
<td>59.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off-trade wine</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off-trade spirits</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off-trade RTDs</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-trade beer</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-trade cider</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-trade wine</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-trade spirits</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-trade RTDs</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Geographical impact**

349. Since this legislation will apply only in relation to Wales, there is potentially an impact on retailers in the border region, as there is theoretically an incentive for some Welsh consumers who live close to the border to purchase alcohol in England, shifting market demand away from Welsh supply (the cross-border effect). It is recognised that different legislation in Wales and England may have a small effect on consumer behaviour, depending on willingness and ability to travel, and the price differential compared to the costs of transport. These changes are expected to be minimal.

350. The potential savings from purchasing high-strength, low-price products would be insignificant compared to the travel time and costs for the majority of the Welsh population. The exceptions to this may be towns very close to the border. Currently 4.91% of the total Welsh grocery spend is spent in England, and the map in Figure 9 shows how this is distributed across the border. This demonstrates that cross-border shopping already occurs, and it is not anticipated that this will increase dramatically as a result of minimum pricing. In conjunction with Figure 10, this suggests that cross-border shopping occurs most where there are a limited number of licensed retailers in Wales, indicating that the incentive is likely to be convenience in rural areas.

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256 Details of how these figures have been derived are available in the Sheffield Model (2014), table 4.2, page 21.

257 RTD: ready to drink beverages.
Furthermore, minimum pricing is targeted at the proportion of drinkers who consume harmful or hazardous quantities of alcohol, and price differentials will be mainly concentrated on high-strength, low-price products. Harmful drinkers, who tend to consume these cheaper and stronger products, may be more likely to purchase alcohol for immediate consumption, and data has demonstrated that only a small number live in border areas. Figure nine also demonstrates that cross-border shopping appears to occur more in rural areas in the central border region, rather than the urban areas in the north and south border regions, where drinking patterns are heavier.

Figure nine: Grocery Spend from Wales (Postal Sectors)²⁵⁸

Figure ten – Licensed off-trade premises and population densities, Wales and border regions
352. For grocery spend as a whole, there is a net gain per annum of £13m for Wales (with £44.4m flowing from Wales to England, and £57.4m from England to Wales). However, the map at Figure 11 demonstrates that this spend is spread across the whole of Wales, perhaps resulting from students, visitors or tourism and therefore shops close to the border are unlikely to be significantly affected by a decline in people currently crossing the border to purchase alcohol in Wales.

![Figure eleven: Grocery Spend from England (Postal Sectors)](image)

353. Research in Scandinavia has found that large tax differentials near borders induce tax avoidance behaviour, with reduced revenue for Norwegian retailers of alcohol and tobacco near the border with Sweden (where taxes are lower), despite consumers in those areas reporting high consumption. There is therefore a potential impact on some businesses, largely on low-price product lines in the border area, particularly in densely populated areas in North Wales. This will be monitored as part of the review process for the Bill.

354. Similarly, there is a potential impact on internet sales of high-strength, low-price products, as if the alcohol is despatched from a store or depot outside Wales, MUP would not apply. Where the price difference is

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greater, there will be a higher incentive to purchase from online retailers based in England. Consumers are generally not able to choose which particular store their shopping is despatched from. Currently, most of the alcohol purchased online is not the type targeted by the policy, and would mainly be unaffected, since it is sold above a 50p per unit price point. This market could however diversify or grow, partially as a result of this policy, and this effect will be monitored as part of a post-legislative review process.

**Impact on retailers, suppliers and wholesalers**

*a) Would the proposals directly limit the number or range of suppliers?*

355. Minimum pricing will not directly limit the number or range of suppliers, as it will not award exclusive rights to supply, restrict any procurement or establish a limitation or quota on the number of suppliers or retailers.

*b) Would the proposals indirectly limit the number or range of suppliers?*

356. An MUP will, in effect, establish a higher-price floor. This could potentially make it harder for firms to enter the market for retailing or manufacturing alcohol if the free market price for products lies below the price floor. New, small retailers would no longer be able to attract demand by challenging existing firms on the basis of price where these are lower than the set MUP. Price promotions would also need to be compatible with the applicable minimum price. At the lower end of the market, the ability to compete would be restricted to non-price factors, such as brand, quality and range.

357. Minimum pricing requires that only products which currently retail below the applicable minimum price raise their price to comply with the legislation. As this could lead to a number of brands of a similar product retailing at an identical price, such as supermarket own-label spirits, brands associated with a low retail price and those recognised as more premium brands, considerable uncertainty exists regarding manufacturers’ and retailers’ responses. If there was no price differential it may be that demand for the own-label product or value product diminishes, leading ultimately to a reduction in the number of suppliers.

358. However, minimum pricing may provide an incentive to innovate, particularly in relation to manufacturers producing alcohol products which are lower in strength. These could be sold at a relatively lower price, as they would contain fewer units of alcohol per litre.
c) Would the proposal limit the ability of suppliers to compete?

359. MUP will restrict the ability of off-trade retailers to compete on price. Since the limitation will act as a price floor, retailers will not be able to out-compete by undercutting one another on price across some or all of their product range or through loss-leading. This could have a weakening effect on competition between retailers.

360. Large and small retailers may be affected differently but it is difficult to predict how this may develop. Larger retailers sell large volumes of popular brands (often priced very competitively) but also a greater range of products. Smaller stores are often concerned with maintaining low prices to compete with supermarkets, particularly as supermarkets continue to develop their convenience store format, putting pressure on independent retailers to compete on price. However, the Federation of Small Businesses Wales has recognised that, where supermarkets are using alcohol products as loss leaders, smaller retailers have not been able to compete with very low prices and so may benefit from minimum unit pricing.

361. Where retailers do depend on alcohol sales for a significant proportion of their turnover, there could be some reduction in sales if consumption rates fall but this is likely to be balanced by the additional income predicted to be generated at any given level of MUP (although it is not possible to predict how increased revenues will be distributed across the supply chain, see below).

362. It is therefore very unlikely that the MUP legislation will force any small retailers out of the market. However, if this did happen, there would be a potential competition impact since it could lead to a more consolidated market and hence less competition between firms even on products where the minimum price floor does not have a direct effect, resulting in higher turnovers for these firms.

363. Table thirteen below illustrates the potential impact on the price of a selection of specific products, using an MUP of 50p as an example. These price examples are taken as a snapshot from a large retailer. The retailer chosen for illustrative purposes has the largest market share for groceries and the selection represents products at low and medium price range in different drinks categories (sample taken in June 2017). The table indicates the minimum retail price and those products for which there would be no change. (Please note that some of these prices may have been a special offer indicating a price reduction on that date.)
Table thirteen: Retail prices of a sample of products from online supermarket website (June 2017) and the impact of a 50p minimum price per unit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>ABV (%)</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Price (June 2017)</th>
<th>Per unit of alcohol</th>
<th>Minimum price at 50p/unit</th>
<th>Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cider</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crofters Apple Cider, 2L</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>£2.05</td>
<td>£0.21</td>
<td>£5.00</td>
<td>£2.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westons Old Rosie Cloudy Scrumpy 2L</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>£5.00</td>
<td>£0.34</td>
<td>£7.30</td>
<td>£2.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westons Wyld Wood Organic Cider, 3L</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>£7.35</td>
<td>£0.41</td>
<td>£9.00</td>
<td>£1.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongbow Cider, 4x440ml</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>£4.00</td>
<td>£0.45</td>
<td>£4.40</td>
<td>£0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carling Cider, 4x440ml</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>£3.50</td>
<td>£0.44</td>
<td>£4.00</td>
<td>£0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magners, 8x500ml</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>£9.00</td>
<td>£0.49</td>
<td>£9.20</td>
<td>£0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koppaberg Pear, 15x330ml</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>£13.00</td>
<td>£0.57</td>
<td>£11.25</td>
<td>Not affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Beer and lager</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Becks 20x275ml</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>£12.50</td>
<td>£0.48</td>
<td>£13.00</td>
<td>£0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McEwans Export Ale, 4x500ml</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>£4.00</td>
<td>£0.43</td>
<td>£4.60</td>
<td>£0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fosters Lager 20x440ml</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>£16.00</td>
<td>£0.44</td>
<td>£18.00</td>
<td>£2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carling, 18x440ml</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>£13.00</td>
<td>£0.40</td>
<td>£16.20</td>
<td>£3.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlsberg Lager, 4x440ml</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>£3.60</td>
<td>£0.53</td>
<td>£3.40</td>
<td>Not affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stella Artois, 4x440ml</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>£4.60</td>
<td>£0.55</td>
<td>£4.20</td>
<td>Not affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grolsh 6x330ml</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>£5.40</td>
<td>£0.55</td>
<td>£4.95</td>
<td>Not affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlsberg Special Brew, 4x440ml</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>£7.60</td>
<td>£0.54</td>
<td>£7.00</td>
<td>Not affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spirits</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windsor Castle London Dry Gin 70cl</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>£10.00</td>
<td>£0.38</td>
<td>£13.15</td>
<td>£3.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own brand Dry London Gin, 70cl</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>£11.00</td>
<td>£0.42</td>
<td>£13.15</td>
<td>£2.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gordon's Special London Gin, 70cl</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>£14.50</td>
<td>£0.55</td>
<td>£13.15</td>
<td>Not affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own brand Imperial Vodka, 70cl</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>£11.00</td>
<td>£0.42</td>
<td>£13.15</td>
<td>£2.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nikita Imperial Vodka, 70cl</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>£10.00</td>
<td>£0.38</td>
<td>£13.15</td>
<td>£3.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smirnoff Red Vodka, 70cl</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>£14.50</td>
<td>£0.55</td>
<td>£13.15</td>
<td>Not affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scots Club Blended Scotch Whisky, 70cl</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>£11.00</td>
<td>£0.39</td>
<td>£14.00</td>
<td>£3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Famous Grouse Whisky, 70cl</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>£15.00</td>
<td>£0.54</td>
<td>£14.00</td>
<td>Not affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jim Beam White Bourbon, 70cl</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>£17.50</td>
<td>£0.63</td>
<td>£14.00</td>
<td>Not affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wine</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own brand Spanish Red, 75cl</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>£3.50</td>
<td>£0.42</td>
<td>£4.15</td>
<td>£0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own brand Chilean Merlot, 75cl</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>£4.25</td>
<td>£0.47</td>
<td>£4.50</td>
<td>£0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own brand Pinot Grigio, 75cl</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>£4.36</td>
<td>£0.48</td>
<td>£4.50</td>
<td>£0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardys Stamp Cabernet Sauvignon Merlot, 75cl</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>£5.00</td>
<td>£0.50</td>
<td>£5.05</td>
<td>£0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Echo Falls Chardonnay, 75cl</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>£5.75</td>
<td>£0.64</td>
<td>£4.50</td>
<td>Not affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blossom Hill Californian Red, 750ml</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>£5.25</td>
<td>£0.58</td>
<td>£4.50</td>
<td>Not affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own brand Chilean Merlot - Boxed, 3L</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>£15.90</td>
<td>£0.44</td>
<td>£18.00</td>
<td>£2.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
364. The initial change in the market is likely to be in the quantities of a specific alcoholic product sold if the original price lies below the newly-set applicable minimum price. The change in revenue to retailers and wholesalers will be determined by consumers’ elasticity of demand for that product – the more inelastic the demand, the greater the increase in revenue. This leads to a transfer of rents (revenue that exceeds the normal profit in perfect competition) from consumers to retailers. In effect, retailers can charge higher prices for the same goods than they otherwise could under free and unrestricted competitive markets.

365. There could also be a risk of market distortion as a result of obligatory price increases in some of the low-price, high-strength products. Such an increase would reduce the price gap between lower-quality products and higher-quality or branded products. This could potentially lead to a commoditisation of the market, with consumers expected to switch to alternative, higher-quality, but now similarly priced products. Alternatively, there may be a proportionate increase in prices of higher-quality products to maintain the product differentiation, resulting in a higher level of prices throughout the alcohol product segment presented to the consumer. Evidence from British Columbia shows that when the minimum price for alcoholic drinks was raised, prices rose across all of the price distribution, including those well above the minimum price. The scale of price increases reduced the higher the original price of the product.\(^{261}\) The University of Sheffield report acknowledges the potential for this kind of effect,\(^{262}\) but as it is not possible to predict the degree to which this will happen, this is not included in modelled outcomes.

366. Nevertheless, the University of Sheffield model predicts that all MUP scenarios modelled will result in increased revenue for the alcohol industry overall, both off-trade and on-trade (excluding duty and VAT). Higher minimum prices lead to greater retail receipts, with increases in off-trade revenue of around £25m for a 50p MUP and £2m increase in revenue for the on-trade.\(^{263}\)

367. The likely distribution of these increased revenues for the industry across the supply chain is not known. If the majority of revenues are retained by retailers, those margins could be used to become more


\(^{262}\) Meng, Y. et al. (2014); Sheffield: ScHARR, University of Sheffield. Page 81.

\(^{263}\) Ibid.
competitive in other areas, for example using staples such as bread and milk as loss-leaders, in a reversal of previous approaches. This could put smaller retailers, who may not have the same flexibility of margins, at a competitive disadvantage. Alternatively, if producers raise their prices accordingly following the imposition of an MUP, this would negate any profit margin increase for retailers.

368. There is evidence to suggest that restrictions such as these may have some negative effects on competition. For example, Ireland's Groceries Act (1987) restricted retailers' pricing by outlawing below-cost selling in Ireland (until 2005). This influenced the behaviour of retailers, and was a significant variable in the explanation of retail gross margins. The banning of below-cost selling was positively related to retail gross margins, suggesting the law resulted in a reduction in price competition between retailers. A study by the Irish Competition Authority in 2005 estimated that removing the restriction on below-cost selling for groceries could save households nearly €500 a year. An Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) roundtable in 2005 on resale below cost further noted that restrictions on selling below cost are associated with slower economic growth and higher unemployment.

369. In some cases, there is a risk that government-imposed restrictions on pricing could encourage rent-seeking activity, for example lobbying by firms to maintain or increase restrictions. This could lead retailers to divert resources away from developing and improving their products and services. In the long-run this can result in higher costs. The diversity of the alcohol industry, however, means this kind of diversion is unlikely and would have a very limited effect.

d) Will the proposal limit the choices or information available to consumers?

370. It is not yet known whether the introduction of an MUP for alcohol will limit the choices available to consumers. The introduction of an MUP will impact on those products being sold below a specified price. Cheaper products (including some own brands) are likely to be affected most.

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However, it is not possible to say at this point whether this will limit the choices available to consumers in the short or longer term – for example, if retailers decide to no longer stock and sell certain brands and products.

**Specialists**

371. For specialists who sell alcohol products only there would not be the opportunity to use any increase in revenue to reduce prices of other products such as fruit and vegetables in order to enhance competitiveness. In terms of lower-priced products, an MUP may increase the ability of independent shops and smaller chains to compete in this market.

**Production methods and innovation**

372. The producers which will be most affected by an MUP are those whose products consist of a significant volume which currently sell below the minimum price threshold, predominantly those that focus on own-label products, as these generally sell at a lower price. It is not however easy to identify the producers of own-label alcohol. In general, where production of cheaper brands of beer and cider takes place in the UK, these tend to be owned by global companies. However, such companies are likely to be affected to a very minimal extent by an MUP in Wales.

373. Premium alcohol produced in Wales is unlikely to be affected as it is currently sold at more than 50p per unit in the off-trade.

374. There should also be minimal impact on innovation or the introduction of new products. New, high-strength products would have to comply with the MUP but would not be prevented from being introduced. There may even be an incentive to innovate, as described above, to introduce lower-strength alcohol products.

375. It is not anticipated that the proposals will limit suppliers' freedoms to organise their own production processes or their choice of organisational form.
International competition

376. As set out earlier in this Explanatory Memorandum, Scotland has sought to implement minimum pricing legislation, and the Welsh Government is monitoring developments in the litigation surrounding this legislation closely.

377. The impact of the Scottish minimum pricing legislation on international trade has been considered by the courts. During its consideration of the matter, the Court of Justice of the European Union (“the CJEU”) stated that as the Scottish minimum pricing legislation could prevent the lower cost price of imported products being reflected in the selling price to the consumer, it was capable of hindering the access to the UK market for alcoholic drinks that are marketed in Member States other than the UK. This therefore constituted a measure having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction within the meaning of Article 34 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“the TFEU”).

378. However, it went on to confirm that such a measure could nevertheless be justified, for example, on grounds of the protection of the health and life of humans, under Article 36 TFEU. It confirmed that it was for Member States to decide on the level of health protection it wishes to have, taking into consideration the requirement for the free movement of goods in the European Union. The CJEU stated that the final assessment of whether or not the individual measure in question was justified under Article 36 TFEU was a matter for the national court.

379. Consequently and most recently, the Scottish Court of Session found that the Scottish legislation was compatible with EU trade law. Specifically, the TFEU and Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products.

380. So, whilst the Welsh Government recognises that minimum pricing could, in some cases, prevent the lower cost of imported products being reflected in the selling price to the consumer, and that this could potentially hinder the access to the Welsh part of the UK market of alcoholic drinks that are lawfully marketed in Member States other than the UK, it considers that the impact on cross-border trade and competition is for reasons set out at length elsewhere in this Explanatory Memorandum, justified on the grounds of protecting life and public health.
Indeed, MUP is also under active consideration in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. In England it remains a policy under consideration. Given the very small export market of Welsh-owned producers, and their premium focus (most products exported sell for more than 50p per unit) it is unlikely to have a detrimental effect on this market, which is already subject to a number of duties and restrictions in other countries.

(e) Would the proposals reduce suppliers’ incentives to compete vigorously?

Since minimum unit pricing introduces a price floor, its effect will be to reduce the ability of retailers to compete on price grounds below this floor (price competition will still take place above 50p per unit). Retailers are therefore likely to compete on other grounds, such as quality, customer service, heritage, taste or origin. Some of this could be positive for consumers. Other forms of competition can however be less positive (for example, competition on advertising). One potential consequence of the legislation could be an increase in this type of non-price competition facilitated by the increase in revenue and any resultant impact on sales.

It will be important to ensure that the introduction of an MUP does not inadvertently allow or encourage competitors to share information on their commercial matters (for example future price or demand projections) during the process of setting their price according to the regulations. If this were the case, it could also lead to reduced incentives to compete.

The overall effect on suppliers’ incentives to compete is dependent on the impact on consumers, and particularly the choices they make in response to any price rises. These behavioural changes are modelled by the University of Sheffield– the analysis below demonstrates the potential effect on the consumption of various alcohol products.

Since the proposed effect of MUP is focused on harmful and hazardous drinkers, there will still be an incentive for suppliers to compete vigorously for customers among moderate drinkers. Several studies have found that even among lower income groups, moderate drinkers are more likely to purchase alcohol at a higher price point than heavier drinkers. This section details the evidence to show the relative responsiveness to price changes between moderate and heavier drinkers, which indicates that, since this is a targeted measure, the greatest impact of minimum pricing on competition among suppliers is likely to largely fall upon cheap alcohol.
A price floor will lead to compulsory price changes for affected products – though other products’ prices would not have to change, if their original price was already set above the MUP. Consumers can be expected to respond to these changes, either by reducing their consumption of an alcoholic product if the price increases or by switching to alternative products whose relative price has decreased. The extent to which this happens will depend on consumers’ price responsiveness – the own-price elasticity (PED) and cross-price elasticities (XED) of demand, which will determine change in consumption and switching behaviour.

- PED represents the percentage change in the demand for a type of alcohol due to a 1% change in the price of that same type of alcohol. It is a measure of how consumers react to a change in price.

- The demand for a good is inelastic when changes in price have a relatively small effect on the quantity of the good demanded – meaning the PED is less than one. The demand for a good is elastic when changes in price have a relatively larger effect on the quantity of good demanded – meaning that the PED is more than one.

A possible increase in the price of alcoholic products following the introduction of MUP could therefore have different effects on consumption depending on these elasticities. The effect for suppliers on purchasing and revenue and their ability to compete on price above the MUP level, will therefore vary depending on the type of alcohol.

These own-price elasticities do not take into account switching behaviour. Cross-price elasticities of demand (XED) measures the percentage change in demand for one good that occurs in response to a percentage change in the price of another good. If the XED between two alcohol products is high, this means that consumers would switch easily to an alternative if the price of one product increased.

Within a narrowly-defined market, there is greater flexibility to switch to alternative products. For any given brand of beer, there are many substitute beer products (that brand will have a relatively high own-price elasticity). However, for a broader market, such as off-trade beer, there will be lower cross-price elasticities depending on the willingness of consumers to switch to, for example, off-trade wine or on-trade beer. The University of Sheffield model considers a matrix of 10 beverage categories, and the table below indicates where these are substitutes (positive sign), meaning that consumers can be expected to switch between them. For example, the estimated cross-price elasticity of
demand for on-trade wine with regard to off-trade beer price is 0.25, indicating that the demand for on-trade wine increases by 2.5% when the price for off-trade beer is increased by 10%. Other products are complements (negative sign), meaning that price increases for these products may see a reduction in demand for the other product also.

390. It should be noted that the absolute figures are small, so the extent of the switching behaviour is likely to be minimal. Nevertheless, the inclusion of cross-price elasticities improves the reliability of own-price elasticities (by controlling for cross-price effects). Table fourteen does show some statistically significant joint effects, for example on-trade beer with on-trade wine and spirits.

Table fourteen: Estimated own and cross-price elasticities for off and on-trade beverages in the UK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Price</th>
<th>Off-beer</th>
<th>Off-elder</th>
<th>Off-wine</th>
<th>Off-spirits</th>
<th>Off-RTDs</th>
<th>On-beer</th>
<th>On-elder</th>
<th>On-wine</th>
<th>On-spirits</th>
<th>On-RTDs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Off-beer</td>
<td>-0.908*</td>
<td>-0.189</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>-0.368</td>
<td>-1.092</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>0.253</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off-elder</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>-1.285*</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>-0.122</td>
<td>-0.289</td>
<td>-0.053</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>-0.108</td>
<td>-0.194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off-wine</td>
<td>-0.040</td>
<td>0.735*</td>
<td>-0.384*</td>
<td>0.365</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>-0.245</td>
<td>-0.155</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>-0.156</td>
<td>0.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off-spirits</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td>-0.082</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>0.406</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off-RTDs</td>
<td>-0.047</td>
<td>-0.159</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>-0.585*</td>
<td>-0.061</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>-0.179*</td>
<td>0.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-beer</td>
<td>0.248</td>
<td>-0.265</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
<td>0.803</td>
<td>-0.785*</td>
<td>0.867</td>
<td>1.042*</td>
<td>1.169*</td>
<td>-0.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-elder</td>
<td>-0.100</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.365</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>-0.591*</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>0.237*</td>
<td>0.241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-wine</td>
<td>-0.197</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>-0.154</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>-0.276</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>-0.071*</td>
<td>0.363</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-spirits</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>-0.117</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
<td>-0.280</td>
<td>-0.145</td>
<td>-0.092</td>
<td>0.294</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>0.050*</td>
<td>0.809*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-RTDs</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>-0.085</td>
<td>-0.047</td>
<td>0.369</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>-0.594</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
<td>-0.071</td>
<td>-0.187</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NB: Equivalent tables of elasticities for moderate and non-moderate drinkers can be found in Meng et al. (2014), Appendix 7.

391. As alcohol is both mind-altering and addictive it might be reasonable to suggest alcohol has relatively few substitutes. The Welsh Government’s Advisory Panel on Substance Misuse (APoS) note that “some consumers may substitute other psycho-active products for alcohol”. APoS also state, however, that “evidence of the extent of such behaviour is scarce, although it suggests only a very small proportion of problematic

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267 Meng, Y. et al. (2014); Sheffield: SchHARR, University of Sheffield. Page 24.


drinkers, who already have other substance misuse issues, would respond in this way.\(^{271}\)

392. The risk that consumers could switch to illegal drugs or new psychoactive substances is considered very low, as an illegal or untested substance is clearly qualitatively different to the legal consumption of alcohol and most people would not consider them a valid substitute. The XED for alcoholic beverages as a whole is therefore likely to be inelastic.

393. Minimum pricing may impact on suppliers’ incentives to compete in certain sectors of the market, where it affects the demand for certain types of drinks. The estimated own-price elasticities indicate substantial decrease in demand for cheap off-trade beer, cider, wine and spirits if their prices rise. However, there will be some substitution effects, suggesting that demand may transfer to other parts of the alcohol market. In addition, the decline in demand does not exactly match the rise in price, meaning that spending overall will increase. Table fifteen summarises the Sheffield model’s findings on modelling consumers’ behaviour for different scenarios of varying MUP levels. The changes in consumption are then translated into changes in spending on alcohol products.

**Table fifteen: Impact of minimum price scenarios on consumption and total spending (all drinking)**\(^{272}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minimum price (£)</th>
<th>% change in consumption</th>
<th>Total spending change (£m)(calculated as change in revenue to retailers)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>-0.7%</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>-1.5%</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>-2.6%</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>-4.0%</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>-5.6%</td>
<td>41.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>-7.6%</td>
<td>57.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>-9.9%</td>
<td>73.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>-12.3%</td>
<td>88.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

394. Increasing levels of MUP show increasing impacts on consumption and, similarly, increases in overall spending. The increases in consumer


\(^{272}\) Based on Sheffield Model (2014). Meng, Y. et al. (2014); Sheffield: ScHARR, University of Sheffield. Tables 5.1 and 5.3.
spending at all levels of MUP mean that consumption decreases do not keep pace with price increases and so overall spending rises.

395. The University of Sheffield report breaks down the extra spending per drinker per year into moderate, hazardous and harmful drinkers. These estimates take into account any changes in consumption that occur due to the price changes at different MUP levels. Harmful drinkers account for the largest proportion of extra spending in each scenario. The spending impact on moderate drinkers is much lower than that observed for harmful drinkers.

396. Some aggregate analyses have suggested that heavier drinkers have relatively more inelastic elasticities of demand for alcohol than moderate drinkers, meaning that an overall change in the price of alcohol will cause heavier drinkers to change their consumption behaviour by relatively less than moderate drinkers. Even if this were the case, since heavier drinkers by definition consume more in absolute terms, the absolute quantities of alcohol consumed by this group would still change more than for moderate drinkers and so they would remain the most affected.

397. However, the RAND report argues the suggestion that heavier drinkers are less responsive to price changes is not consistent with the balance of research showing the negative outcomes of alcohol misuse “are in fact sensitive to changes in the full price of alcohol; that is, studies have shown that when the price of alcohol goes up, alcohol-related harms go down and vice-versa”.\textsuperscript{273} RAND also suggests that because hazardous and harmful drinkers tend to choose cheaper drinks, they are less able to switch to lower-price drinks. Studies in Sweden show increases in the price of the cheapest alcoholic beverages lead to reductions in consumption levels as consumers have no cheaper alcoholic alternative.\textsuperscript{274} In heavy consumers, a small percentage change in purchasing can be expected to have a relatively large absolute effect on consumption. Similarly, a study of drinkers with alcohol-related illnesses in Scotland found they were already drinking as cheaply as possible – even among this group, a small percentage change in consumption is likely and this would have a relatively large absolute effect.\textsuperscript{275}


\textsuperscript{275} Black, H., Gill, J. and Chick, J. (2011). The price of a drink: levels of consumption and price paid per unit of alcohol by Edinburgh’s ill drinkers with a comparison to wider alcohol sales in Scotland. Addiction. Volume 106: 735
University of Sheffield study, which uses a complex matrix of elasticities for different alcoholic drinks, found that heavier drinkers were more responsive to price change than moderate drinkers because they purchase significantly more alcohol below the MUP threshold.276

398. Furthermore, the sensitivity analysis produced an alternative model, based on separate elasticity matrices for moderate drinkers and harmful/hazardous drinkers,277 which shows that heavy drinkers are more likely to cut their consumption in response to price rises – with consumption dropping by 6% for hazardous drinkers, 8.6% for harmful drinkers but 1.5% for moderate drinkers (compared to 2.0%, 7.2% and 2.2% in the base case model, respectively). In this scenario, harms are further reduced, with 121 fewer deaths per year compared to 53 in the base case model. Although the panel size is smaller, this does suggest that the University of Sheffield model is fairly conservative in its estimate of how targeted MUP is. The impact on competition in the market for moderate drinkers will therefore be limited.

399. The matrix of elasticities of demand above, as well as the matrices for moderate and harmful/hazardous drinkers, produced in the sensitivity analysis, have been used to produce tables to illustrate the hypothetical reduction in demand for products which have to increase their price under a 50p MUP.

400. Table sixteen illustrates the consumption response to an example 50p MUP for specific individual alcoholic beverages and brands (resulting from the price changes calculated in table thirteen). This is provided for illustrative purposes to indicate how the model anticipates an effect on specific types of alcohol in particular. It is not a prediction of the overall response to MUP, however, and there are caveats to it:

a) estimated changes in consumption are based on own-price elasticities only, that is to say the estimated change in consumption for each product considers only the impact of the change in the price of that product (assuming all other products’ prices remain the same). Substitution or complement effects, where changes in the price of one beverage affect consumption of another are excluded from this analysis (whereas these cross-price elasticities are included in the University of Sheffield model). Since this involves assuming a constant

276 Meng Y. et al. (2014); Sheffield: ScHARR, University of Sheffield. Page 21.

277 Meng Y. et al. (2013), Appendix 7.
elasticity of demand, this automatically implies that consumption will linearly decrease with a linear increase in price (to the point where it is reduced by 100%), which might be unrealistic.

b) similarly, whereas the model takes into account the proportion of each type of drink consumed, the range of products presented here is illustrative only and should not be construed as representative of the overall alcohol market. Estimated consumption changes do not represent overall changes in population drinking as, for example, wine makes up a much larger proportion of total consumption than spirits and a much greater proportion of off-trade cider is sold at below 50p than off-trade spirits.
Table sixteen: Consumption response to a 50p minimum unit price illustrated for specific alcoholic beverages and brands (based on June 2017 prices)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Change in Price (%)</th>
<th>Change in Consumption - All drinkers (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cider</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crofters Apple Cider, 2L</td>
<td>144%</td>
<td>-182%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westons Old Rosie Cloudy Scrumpy 2L</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>-58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westons Wyld Wood Organic Cider, 3L</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>-28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongbow Cider, 4x440ml</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>-13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carling Cider, 4x440ml</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>-18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magners, 8x500ml</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>-3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koppaberg Pear, 15x330ml</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Beer and Lager</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Becks 20x275ml</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>-4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mcewans Export Ale, 4x500ml</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>-15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fosters Lager 20x440ml</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>-12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carling, 18x440ml</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>-24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlsberg Lager, 4x440ml</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stella Artois, 4x440ml</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grolsh 6x330ml</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlsberg Special Brew, 4x440ml</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spirits</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windsor Castle London Dry Gin 70cl</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>-3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own brand Dry London Gin, 70cl</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>-2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gordon’s Special London Gin, 70cl</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own brand Imperial Vodka, 70cl</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>-2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nikita Imperial Vodka, 70cl</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>-3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smirnoff Red Vodka, 70cl</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scots Club Blended Scotch Whisky, 70cl</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>-2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Famous Grouse Whisky, 70cl</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jim Beam White Bourbon, 70cl</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wine</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own brand Spanish Red, 75cl</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>-7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own brand Chilean Merlot, 75cll</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>-2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own brand Pinot Grigio, 75cll</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>-1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardy's Stamp Cabernet Sauvignon Merlot, 75cll</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Echo Falls Chardonnay, 75cll</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blossom Hill Californian Red, 750ml</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own brand Chilean Merlot - Boxed, 3L</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>-5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As a further illustration of the potential effects of minimum pricing, table seventeen illustrates consumption changes based on separate elasticities for moderate drinkers and for increasing-risk/high-risk drinkers. These separate elasticities were used and reported as a sensitivity analysis only and so give slightly different results (the model results in the University of Sheffield *Model-based appraisal of minimum unit pricing for alcohol in Wales* report are based on the elasticities illustrated in table seventeen).

**Table seventeen: Consumption response to a 50p minimum unit price illustrated for specific groups of drinkers by alcoholic beverages and brands (based on June 2017 prices)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Change in Price (%)</th>
<th>Change in Consumption - Moderate drinkers (%)</th>
<th>Change in Consumption - Increasing and high-risk drinkers (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cider</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crofters Apple Cider, 2L</td>
<td>144%</td>
<td>-97%</td>
<td>-176%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westons Old Rosie Cloudy Scrumpy 2L</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>-31%</td>
<td>-56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westons Wyld Wood Organic Cider, 3L</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>-15%</td>
<td>-27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongbow Cider, 4x440ml</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>-7%</td>
<td>-12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carling Cider, 4x440ml</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>-10%</td>
<td>-17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magners, 8x500ml</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>-2%</td>
<td>-3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koppaberg Pear, 15x330ml</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Beer and Lager</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Becks 20x275ml</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>-2%</td>
<td>-4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mcewans Export Ale, 4x500ml</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>-7%</td>
<td>-16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fosters Lager 20x440ml</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>-5%</td>
<td>-14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carling, 18x440ml</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>-11%</td>
<td>-27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlsberg Lager, 4x440ml</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stella Artois, 4x440ml</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grolsh 6x330ml</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlsberg Special Brew, 4x440ml</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spirits</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windsor Castle London Dry Gin 70cl</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>-9%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own brand Dry London Gin, 70cl</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>-6%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gordon's Special London Gin, 70cl</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own brand Imperial Vodka, 70cl</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>-6%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nikita Imperial Vodka, 70cl</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>-9%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smirnoff Red Vodka, 70cl</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scots Club Blended</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>-8%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scotch Whisky, 70cl</td>
<td>Famous Grouse Whisky, 70cl</td>
<td>Jim Beam White Bourbon, 70cl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wine</td>
<td>Own brand Spanish Red, 75cl</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own brand Chilean Merlot, 75cl</td>
<td></td>
<td>Own brand Pinot Grigio, 75cl</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hardys Stamp Cabernet Sauvignon Merlot, 75cl</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Echo Falls Chardonnay, 75cl</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Blossom Hill Californian Red, 750ml</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Own brand Chilean Merlot - Boxed, 3L</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9. Post implementation review

402. The Bill provides that the majority of its provisions will come into force on a day appointed by the Welsh Ministers. The policy position is that the substantive provisions of the Bill be commenced 12 months from the date of Royal Assent. This is to allow sufficient time for those affected to prepare accordingly.

403. The Bill establishes a local authority led enforcement regime and guidance will be published for Local Authorities and retailers to support both the implementation and enforcement of the Bill – and to ensure its provisions are understood by those affected.

404. In accordance with the Bill’s provisions, the Welsh Ministers will at the end of a five year period, lay before the National Assembly a report on the operation and effect of the Bill. In preparing that report, they must consult with those persons they consider appropriate.

405. It is proposed that the effect of the Bill will be measured in a number of ways. Methods will include research and evaluation with stakeholders and enforcement officers as well as routine data collection techniques.

406. The proposed monitoring and evaluation arrangements can be grouped into two broad categories. Taken together, these will encompass a blend of monitoring of routine health data and statistics, administrative data and a formal evaluation and review.

Health data and statistics

407. Activity to monitor the implementation of the Bill will wherever possible be aligned to other relevant work. Data about alcohol-related deaths will be reviewed annually and the Welsh Government will liaise with Public Health Wales and health boards for updated information on alcohol-related hospital admissions, alcohol-related deaths, as well as data on consumption levels via the National Survey for Wales.\(^{278}\) The full set of population indicators that could be used to monitor key outcomes would need to be agreed as plans for the evaluation and review are further developed.

\(^{278}\) The Welsh Health Survey was revised in 2016-17, with data now being collected on alcohol consumption through the National Survey for Wales.
Administrative data

408. Similarly, best use will be made of the most relevant administrative information already collected. Importantly, this will include a range of data collected by local authorities such as:

- Data on inspections undertaken, where available;
- Enforcement information, including data on FPNs, prosecutions and appeals;
- Data on complaints/enquiries received by trading standards and environmental health departments.

Formal evaluation and review

409. The implementation of the Bill will be underpinned by a programme of ongoing monitoring and evaluation. The evaluation would need to focus on the extent to which the legislation has contributed to delivering change across the range of key outcomes where we expect the legislation to make a difference. As highlighted above, this includes levels of alcohol consumption, hospital admissions and alcohol related deaths.

410. The evaluation would focus on how the legislation is being implemented in Wales and the role of key partners in delivering its objectives, as well as any other consequences.

411. Further consideration will be given to the content of the evaluation and review over the coming months – with the view to drawing lessons from the evaluation and review being implemented in Scotland.
10. Additional Impact Assessments

412. A series of impact assessments or screening processes have been completed on the Bill alongside this explanatory memorandum and regulatory impact assessment. These include:

- Equalities Impact Assessment
- Children’s Rights Impact Assessment
- Welsh Language Impact Assessment
- Biodiversity Impact Assessment
- Justice Screening Tool
- Health Impact Screening Tool
- Privacy Impact Screening Tool
- Rural Proofing Tool

413. A number of these assessments have highlighted specific issues to consider and these will be kept under review as the legislation progresses through the National Assembly. Where the assessments have highlighted negative impacts, consideration has been given as to how these can be mitigated. Discussions are also ongoing with external stakeholders on the impacts of the Bill and associated mitigating actions.

Equality Impact Assessment

414. Overall, the Equalities Impact Assessment recognises the positive role that introducing a minimum price for alcohol could have on improving health outcomes and reducing those inequalities which currently exist for the population of Wales as a whole and those persons with protected characteristics.

415. In particular – and as also highlighted in the explanatory memorandum and regulatory impact assessment, it will nevertheless be important to monitor and mitigate any potential adverse impacts of MUP on households living in poverty and vulnerable groups. Overall, however, households living in poverty have the most to gain from the legislative proposal, in light of its anticipated impact on levels of consumption and harmful and hazardous drinking and associated health benefits brought by this.

Children’s Rights Impact Assessment

416. Welsh Government has given full consideration to the impact of the legislation on the rights of children and young people. In accordance with
Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the consultation on the draft Bill in 2015 was made available in two formats; the standard consultation format (which posed 16 questions around the policy and the specific provisions within the draft Bill) as well as a children and young people’s version (with 8 different questions for that particular audience).

417. Overall, it is considered that the legislation will have a positive impact in terms of supporting individual children’s rights. In particular the Bill’s provisions are considered compatible with the rights provided by the following articles of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child:

- Article 3 – All organisations concerned with children should work towards what is best for each child;
- Article 6 – All children have the right of life. Governments should ensure that children survive and develop healthily;
- Article 19 – Governments should ensure that children are properly cared for and protect them from violence, abuse and neglect by their parents or anyone who looks after them;
- Article 24 – Children should have the right to good quality healthcare.

Human Rights

418. The Welsh Government is satisfied that the provisions of the Bill are compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights (the ECHR).

419. The Bill seeks to protect public health, and, as the evidence presented elsewhere in this explanatory memorandum demonstrates, an MUP is anticipated to save lives and reduce alcohol-related harm. The Bill therefore advances social policy objectives commensurate with those protected by Article 2 of the ECHR (right to life).

420. The Welsh Government has considered whether the minimum pricing regime could be regarded as controlling the use that can be made of, or impacting upon alcohol retailers’ property, and could therefore engage Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR, which provides for the peaceful enjoyment of property. The Welsh Government notes that, if Article 1 of Protocol 1 is engaged, the rights it protects are not absolute and may be restricted if this can be justified in the public interest, is proportionate and is in accordance with the law. In relation to sections 1, 2, and 5 to 7 of the Bill the Welsh Government considers that any interference could be justified, is a proportionate measure to protect public health, and is in
accordance with the law. These provisions are, therefore either compatible with the ECHR or capable of being exercised in a manner that is so compatible.

421. In terms of the enforcement regime proposed by the Bill, the Welsh Government is also satisfied that it is also either compatible with the ECHR (specifically, Articles 6, 8 and Article 1 of Protocol 1) or is capable of being exercised in a manner that is so compatible. The Welsh Government considers that the proposed enforcement regime would achieve a fair and proportionate balance between the protection of the rights of those affected by those powers of entry, and the effectiveness of the enforcement of the proposed regime.

Welsh Language Impact Assessment

422. The proposed legislation would maintain the status quo in relation to Welsh public services. The legislation proposes negligible impacts in relation to the Welsh language. The Welsh Language Impact Assessment has been published alongside the Bill documentation.

Biodiversity Impact Assessment

423. The Welsh Government’s Nature Recovery Action Plan (NRAP) aims to reverse the decline in biodiversity and it restates a commitment to halting the loss of biodiversity by 2020. Having considered the purpose of the Bill against the objectives of the NRAP, there are no direct impacts on biodiversity from this Bill. Similarly, there will be no likely direct significant impacts on any Special Area of Conservation or Special Protection Area for Birds, and so no need to undertake a Habitats Regulations Assessment.

424. A Strategic Environmental Assessment and an Impact Assessment on Carbon Budgets are considered not to be required for the Bill.

Justice Screening Tool

425. This sets out the implications of the Bill on the justice system, recognising that the Bill creates a new offence – where alcohol cannot be supplied or sold in Wales by alcohol retailers from qualifying premises below a certain minimum price. Additionally, that the Bill also includes an offence where a person intentionally obstructs an authorised officer of a
local authority from exercising that officer’s enforcement functions under the Bill.

426. Applying previous experience from similar areas, it is envisaged that the legislation will attract generally high levels of compliance, with an anticipated minimal number of court cases. The overall impact on the courts and judicial system is therefore anticipated to be low. Where potential impacts have been identified, these have been referenced at the appropriate points within the Regulatory Impact Assessment.

Health Impact Screening Tool

427. In addition to setting out the health impacts of the legislation as part of the explanatory memorandum and regulatory impact assessments – a separate Health Impact Assessment has also been completed. This has highlighted the anticipated health gains from introducing a minimum price for alcohol, in light of the strong evidence based on the impact of price on consumption.

Privacy Impact Screening Tool Assessment

428. In order to implement and enforce the MUP system, authorised officers of a local authority will need to be able to access the register of licensed premises. These registers provide a comprehensive list of all premises which are licensed to supply alcohol within a local authority’s area, and are held by local authorities in their role as the licensing authorities in Wales.

429. Section 8(3) of the 2003 Act provides that each licensing authority must make the entries in its licensing register available for inspection by any person during office hours for free. As such, an authorised officer will not be accessing any information, which is not readily available to any member of the public. The Welsh Government is therefore content that this does not impact upon privacy.

430. There are no proposals within the Bill that alter or extend any processes or procedures that relate to the processing of personal data or impact on privacy by any other means.

Rural Proofing Tool

431. The implications of the Bill have been considered through the Welsh Government screening process. The proposed regime within the Bill will impact on both urban and rural areas and will apply equally to all parts of
Wales. The rural proofing screening assessment identified the impacts of the legislation on the specific needs of rural communities and individuals living there.

432. The enforcement regime proposed by the Bill will make use of existing local systems. This will ensure that local knowledge and expertise held by enforcement and inspection officers is harnessed, including experience of operating within a rural context.
These notes refer to the Public Health (Minimum Price for Alcohol) (Wales) Bill which was introduced into the National Assembly for Wales on 23/10/17

Annex 1

Explanatory Notes

PUBLIC HEALTH (MINIMUM PRICE FOR ALCOHOL) (WALES) BILL

________________

EXPLANATORY NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. These Explanatory Notes relate to the Public Health (Minimum Price for Alcohol) (Wales) Bill.

2. They have been prepared by the Welsh Government’s Department for Health and Social Services in order to assist the reader of the Bill and to help inform debate on it. They do not form part of the Bill and have not been endorsed by the National Assembly for Wales.

3. The Explanatory Notes should be read in conjunction with the Bill. They are not meant to be a comprehensive description of the Bill. Where an individual section of the Bill does not seem to require any explanation or comment, none is given.

POLICY BACKGROUND

4. The health and well-being of the population of Wales is continuing to improve. In general, people are living longer and enjoy better health than ever before. However, Wales still faces a number of specific and significant health challenges. There were 463 alcohol related deaths in Wales in 2015. Drinking among young people is also a concern, with 7% of males and 5% of females aged between 11-16 in Wales drinking alcohol at least once a week in 2013-14. Although decreasing, Wales has the highest alcohol consumption among 11 and 13-year-olds in the UK. Drinking among 15-year olds in Wales is higher than in England.

5. This Bill has been developed firstly following consultation on a Public Health White Paper in 2014, which included a series of legislative proposals to address a number of public health issues in Wales. One of these was a proposal to introduce a minimum unit price for alcohol. Subsequently, a
These notes refer to the Public Health (Minimum Price for Alcohol) (Wales) Bill which was introduced into the National Assembly for Wales on 23/10/17

draft Public Health (Minimum Price for Alcohol) (Wales) Bill was issued for a five month period of public consultation in July 2015.

6. The aim of the Bill is to address the Welsh Government’s concerns around the health harms that can be caused by the effects of excess alcohol consumption.

GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE BILL

7. The Bill provides for a minimum price for alcohol supplied in Wales to a person in Wales and establishes a local authority led enforcement regime.

8. The Bill is comprised of 29 sections and a Schedule.

CONTENTS

Section 1: Minimum price for alcohol

9. This section sets out a formula to calculate the minimum selling price for alcohol.

10. The formula is M x S x V (Minimum unit price x Strength x Volume).

(a) M is the minimum unit price (to be specified in regulations);
(b) S is the strength of the alcohol, expressed as a cardinal number (so for instance if the strength is 5%, the relevant cardinal number will be 5);
(c) V is the volume of alcohol in litres.

11. Subsection (2) provides that where the minimum selling price for the alcohol calculated according to this formula would not be a whole number in pennies, it is to be rounded to the nearest whole penny taking a half penny as being nearest to the whole penny above.

12. The section provides a practical example of the calculation relating to a bottle of wine and how the minimum price is rounded up to the nearest whole number in pennies. That is, where the minimum selling price for the bottle of wine is calculated according to the formula as £4.6875, this would be rounded up to £4.69.

13. To give another practical example of how the formula would work if the minimum unit price (M) was specified in regulations as being 50 pence, a 7.5% strength (S), 3 Litre (V) bottle of cider would have a minimum selling price of £11.25 (0.5 x 7.5 x 3).

14. For further practical examples of how the formula would work where the alcohol supplied is part of a special offer, please see the notes to accompany sections 5-7 of the Bill.
Section 2: Offences

15. This section makes it an offence for an alcohol retailer (defined in section 4) to supply alcohol, or to authorise the supply of alcohol, from qualifying premises in Wales, to a person in Wales, at a selling price below the minimum price for the alcohol.

16. Subsection (2) provides a defence for a person charged with a section 2 offence to show that they took reasonable steps and exercised due diligence to avoid committing it. If a person raises this defence and produces some evidence in support of it, the burden of disproving the defence beyond all reasonable doubt will fall on the prosecution (subsection (3)).

17. Subsection (4) provides that it does not matter for the purposes of the offence, whether the authorisation of the supply of alcohol takes place in Wales or elsewhere. So, for instance, if a manager in England authorises the sale of alcohol below the applicable minimum price from licensed premises in Wales, and to a person in Wales, the manager will (subject to any available defence) commit an offence.

18. This section also amends Schedule 4 to the Licensing Act 2003 to provide that an offence committed under the Bill is to be classed as a “relevant offence” in relation to personal licences.

19. A “relevant offence” is an offence which can be taken into consideration by a licensing authority when making decisions on granting/renewing personal licences.

20. A licence holder is under a duty to notify their licensing authority of convictions for relevant offences as soon as reasonably practicable (and commits an offence if they fail to do so). The court is also under a duty to notify licensing authorities of convictions for relevant offences and may also order the forfeiture of the licence or its suspension for a period not exceeding six months.

Section 3: Meaning of supply of alcohol and qualifying premises

21. This section defines the supply of alcohol as being the sale by retail to a person in Wales, or the supply by or on behalf of a club to one of its members in Wales, or to a person in Wales on behalf of a member of the club. (An example of a club for this purpose would be a rugby club.) Whether a particular supply of alcohol is a “sale by retail” will depend on the facts, but in most cases this will be straightforward.

22. “Qualifying premises” are also defined in this section.

23. Subsection (2) provides that premises are “qualifying premises” if:-
These notes refer to the Public Health (Minimum Price for Alcohol) (Wales) Bill which was introduced into the National Assembly for Wales on 23/10/17

(a) a premises licence under Part 3 of the Licensing Act 2003 authorises the premises to be used for the supply of alcohol (for instance, a pub or supermarket);
(b) a club premises certificate under Part 4 of the Licensing Act 2003 certifies that the premises may be used to supply alcohol (for instance a rugby club); or
(c) the supply of alcohol on or from the premises is a permitted temporary activity under Part 5 of the Licensing Act 2003. For instance, where alcohol is supplied and sold in a music festival or street fair.

The effect of this and section 4 is that the Bill does not regulate the sale of alcohol if the sale is, in any event, a criminal offence because the alcohol is sold otherwise than in accordance with the requirements of the Licensing Act 2003.

Section 4: Meaning of alcohol retailer

24. This section defines alcohol retailer in relation to each of the different types of qualifying premises.

25. Where alcohol is supplied from premises in respect of which a licence has been granted under Part 3 of the Licensing Act 2003 (for instance, a pub or supermarket), each of the following is an alcohol retailer for the purpose of the Bill:

(a) a personal licence holder under Part 6 of the Licensing Act 2003, if there is one (for instance a pub landlord);
(b) the designated premises supervisor for the premises, designated under the Licensing Act 2003 (for example, the manager of a supermarket).

26. In relation to clubs, the alcohol retailer is the person who holds the club premises certificate. This “person” might be the club itself or an individual (for instance a manager).

27. In relation to temporary events and premises, the alcohol retailer is the premises user for the purpose of Part 5 of the Licensing Act 2003. For instance, the person who has organised the street fair.

Sections 5 to 7: Supply of alcohol as part of a special offer

28. These three sections set out rules relevant to determining the applicable minimum price in relation to alcohol supplied through a variety of special offers.

29. The special offers captured by these sections fall into two broad categories.
Multi-buy alcohol transactions (section 5)

30. The first category is the “multi-buy alcohol transactions” defined by section 5; these are transactions which offer customers incentives to purchase higher volumes of alcohol than might otherwise be the case. These kinds of deals are commonly known as multi-buy deals, including “buy one, get one free” offers.

31. This section would apply where some of the alcohol supplied in a transaction was described as being supplied free of charge where other alcohol was supplied; and where alcohol was supplied at a discounted or fixed price when purchased with other alcohol, or where other alcohol had already been supplied. It is likely that most multi-buy alcohol transactions would involve a single exchange of cash between supplier and customer, but this won’t always be the case. For instance, the price of a subsequently purchased drink might be reduced by reference to earlier purchases of drinks. The effect of this section is that in these circumstances the subsequently purchased drink and the earlier drinks will all need to be treated as a single transaction and the applicable minimum unit price calculated as set out in the section.

32. Section 5 requires all of the alcohol supplied in a multi-buy alcohol transaction to be taken into account when determining the applicable minimum price. This requirement avoids doubt about how the offence in section 2 affects cases where a portion of the alcohol being supplied in a transaction has no identifiable selling price, or a selling price which has been distorted by the operation of a discount.

33. Where the alcohol being supplied is of different strengths, section 7(2) requires separate calculations to be made to determine the applicable minimum price in relation to the different strengths of alcohol. The aggregate of those calculations provides the applicable minimum price for the transaction.

Alcohol supplied together with other goods and services (section 6)

34. The second of the two categories of special offer involves deals where alcohol is supplied together with goods other than alcohol, or services; either where the other goods or services and the alcohol are supplied at a single, fixed, price, or where alcohol is supplied at a discounted price if other goods or services are supplied.

35. Many of the offers to which this section will apply are likely to be offers involving the supply of alcohol together with food, but it is not limited to such cases. Section 6(2) would, for example, apply where a cocktail was supplied, with mixer, for a fixed price (the non-alcoholic portion of the cocktail constituting a good other than alcohol).
36. As with multi-buy alcohol transactions, section 7(2) requires separate calculations to be conducted for the purpose of determining the applicable minimum price for alcohol of different strengths supplied alongside other goods or services.

37. Section 7(3) ensures that the requirements of section 6 apply where the alcohol supplied with other goods or services is described as supplied free of charge. For example, an offer where the purchase of a particular combination of food included a “free” bottle of wine.

Practical examples of how sections 5 and 6 apply

38. Sections 5 and 6 of the Bill include examples of how the applicable minimum price would operate in relation to special offers. But additional examples have been provided below.

39. An applicable minimum price of £0.50 is to be assumed for the purposes of what follows.

Multi-buy alcohol transactions

Example 1

In the case of a “buy one, get one free” offer where two boxes of 4% lager are described as being supplied for the price of one box, and assuming each box includes 10 cans at a volume of 330 ml for each can, the two boxes would be treated as having been supplied at the price paid for the single box.

Taking the selling price at which a single box was supplied as £14, the applicable minimum price in relation to the lager would be calculated as follows:

\[ M = £0.50; \quad S = 4 \text{(the strength by volume of the lager)}; \quad V = 6.6 \text{ litres (the total volume of the 20 cans)} \]

\[ 0.5 \times 4 \times 6.6 = £13.20 \]

In this example, the selling price of £14 for the two boxes would be above the applicable minimum price for the alcohol supplied, and no offence under section 2 would have been committed.

Example 2

Where 3 boxes of beer, lager or cider were available for purchase at a single selling price of £30, the minimum price for each box would need to be calculated in order to work out whether the selling price of £30 was lower than the applicable minimum price for the different combinations of alcohol which could be supplied.
These notes refer to the Public Health (Minimum Price for Alcohol) (Wales) Bill which was introduced into the National Assembly for Wales on 23/10/17

Assuming the box of beer comprised 10 440 ml cans of 6% strength by volume; the box of lager comprised 12 440 ml cans of 4% strength; and the box of cider comprised 12 330 ml bottles of 5% strength:

The minimum price for the box of beer would be £13.20 (£0.50 X 6 X 4.4 litres (the aggregate volume for the box).

The minimum price for the box of lager would be £10.56 (£0.50 X 4 X 5.28 litres).

The minimum price for the box of cider would be £9.90 (£0.50 X 5 X 3.96 litres).

Where a customer chooses to purchase two boxes of beer and a box of cider, the applicable minimum price for the alcohol supplied would be £36.30 (that sum being the aggregate of the £26.40 minimum price for the two boxes of beer and the £9.90 for the cider).

So, in this example, the selling price would have been £6.30 below the applicable minimum price for the alcohol being supplied, and, assuming the absence of a defence, the retailer would be liable to prosecution for committing the offence under section 2.

But the purchase of 3 boxes of cider by the same customer would not give rise to the offence under section 2, since the applicable minimum price for the alcohol being supplied would be £29.70 (the aggregate of the minimum price of £9.90 for each box of cider).

**Offers involving alcohol together with other goods or services**

**Example 1**

Where three food items and a bottle of wine are supplied at a single price of £10, the selling price for the wine would be treated as being £10.

If the volume of the wine was 0.75 litre and its strength by volume 14%, the applicable minimum price for the wine would be £5.25 (£0.50 X 14 X 0.75).

In this example, the selling price of £10 would be above the applicable minimum price for the wine, and the retailer would not have committed the offence in section 2.

**Example 2**

In a case where a wine tasting evening can be arranged by a customer at a wine shop for a price of £25, and 3 bottles of wine, described as being supplied free of charge, are supplied to the customer, the selling price for the wine supplied with the service would be treated as being £25.
If the wine comprised a 0.75 litre bottle of Pinot Grigio of 12.5% strength by volume; a bottle of 0.75 litre bottle of Merlot of 14.5% strength; and a 0.75 litre bottle of Shiraz of 13.5% strength; the applicable minimum price for the alcohol being supplied would be aggregate of the minimum price for each bottle.

For the Pinot Grigio, the minimum price would be £4.69 (£0.50 X 12.5 X 0.75).

For the Merlot, the minimum price would be £5.44 (£0.50 X 14.5 X 0.75).

For the Shiraz, the minimum price would be £5.06 (£0.50 X 13.5 X 0.75).

The applicable minimum price for the alcohol being supplied would be £15.19.

In this example, the selling price of £25 would be above the applicable minimum price for the wine being supplied, and the retailer would not have committed the offence in section 2.

Section 8: Penalties

40. This section provides that an alcohol retailer guilty of an offence under section 2 of this Bill is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale (currently £1,000). The levels on the standard scale are set out in section 37 of the Criminal Justice Act 1982.

Section 9: Fixed penalties

41. This section allows local authority authorised officers to issue fixed penalty notices (FPNs) to persons believed to have committed offences under section 2 in the local authority’s area.

42. FPNs may be issued to a person (which includes a body corporate or an unincorporated association). Payment of the FPN discharges the person believed to have committed an offence from being convicted for the offence in court. The section also introduces Schedule 1, which deals with fixed penalties (for commentary on this, see below).

Section 10: Enforcement action by local authorities

43. Subsection (1) provides that a local authority may bring prosecutions in respect of offences under the Bill in its area, may investigate complaints in respect of alleged offences in its area, and may take other steps with a view to reducing the incidence of such offences in its area.

44. Subsection (2) provides that a local authority must consider, at least once every year, the extent to which it is appropriate to carry out a programme of enforcement in its area, and to the extent that it considers appropriate, carry out such a programme.
45. Subsection (3) states that in complying with subsection (2), local authorities must have particular regard to improving public health and protecting children from harm.

Section 11: Authorised officers

46. This section explains that any reference in the Bill to an authorised officer of a local authority is to any person authorised by the local authority under the Bill.

Section 12: Power to make test purchases

47. An authorised officer may make purchases and arrangements, and secure the provision of services if the officer considers it necessary for the purpose of enforcement of the local authority’s functions, under this Bill. This permits test purchases to take place.

Section 13: Powers of entry

48. Section 13 enables an authorised officer to enter, at any reasonable time, premises (excluding premises used wholly or mainly as a dwelling) if the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that an offence under section 2 has been committed, and the officer considers it necessary to enter the premises for the purpose of finding out whether such an offence has been committed.

49. This power to enter premises does not enable the authorised officer to enter by force. If required, an authorised officer must, before entering the premises, show evidence of their authorisation.

50. Section 67(9) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 provides that, while acting in the course of their enforcement functions, authorised officers of the enforcement authority must have regard to the relevant code of practice made under that Act. Therefore, authorised officers must have regard to PACE Code of Practice B (which is a Code of Practice for searches of premises by police officers and the seizure of property found by police officers on persons or premises) in the exercise of their enforcement functions.

Section 14: Warrant to enter a dwelling

51. This section provides that a justice of the peace may issue a warrant to enable an authorised officer to enter a premises used wholly or mainly as a dwelling in certain circumstances.

52. A warrant may be issued only where the justice of the peace is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that an offence under section 2 has been committed in the area of the local authority, and that it is necessary to
These notes refer to the Public Health (Minimum Price for Alcohol) (Wales) Bill which was introduced into the National Assembly for Wales on 23/10/17

enter the premises for the purpose of establishing whether such an offence has been committed. Entry may be obtained by force if need be.

53. Any such warrant will be in force for the period of 28 days beginning with the date it was issued.

Section 15: Warrant to enter other premises

54. This section provides that a justice of the peace may issue a warrant to enable an authorised officer to enter any premises, including vehicles, in Wales, in certain circumstances. This excludes premises used wholly or mainly as dwellings which are dealt with in section 14. The section sets out the circumstances in which a warrant may be issued. Entry may be obtained by force if need be.

Section 16: Supplementary provision about powers of entry

55. This section enables authorised officers entering premises under sections 13, 14 and 15, to take with them any other persons or equipment as the officer considers appropriate. It requires that if the occupier of premises is present at the time when the authorised officer seeks to execute the warrant, the occupier must be told the officer’s name, the officer must produce documentary evidence that the officer is an authorised officer and the officer must produce the warrant and supply the occupier with a copy of it. The section also requires that if the premises are unoccupied or the occupier is temporarily absent, those authorised to enter the premises must leave them as effectively secured against unauthorised entry as the person found them.

Section 17: Powers of inspection, etc.

56. This section confers powers on authorised officers entering premises under sections 13, 14 and 15 to do various things so as to find out whether an offence under section 2 has been committed. Officers may carry out inspections and examinations of premises. Officers may also request items, inspect them, take samples from them and/or take the item(s) and/or samples from the premises. For example, officers may wish to review CCTV footage of the premises, retain alcoholic products on the premises, or take documents or copies of documents. The authorised officer may analyse any samples taken.

57. They may also require information and help from any person, but that person is not required to answer any questions or produce any document which they would be entitled to refuse to answer or produce in the course of court proceedings in England and Wales. For example, legally privileged material and information which is self-incriminating.

58. The authorised officer must leave on the premises a statement detailing any items that have been taken, and identifying the person to whom a request for the return of property may be made.
Section 18: Obstruction etc. of officers

59. This section provides that a person commits an offence if they intentionally obstruct an authorised officer from exercising their functions under sections 13 to 17.

60. A person commits an offence if, without reasonable cause, they fail to provide an authorised officer with facilities that are reasonably required under section 17(1) or they fail to comply with a requirement under section 17(1)(b) or (d) such as providing information.

61. A person found guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale (currently £1,000). The levels on the standard scale are set out in section 37 of the Criminal Justice Act 1982.

Section 19: Retained property: appeals

62. This section provides an additional safeguard relating to the powers of entry and inspection provisions. It enables a person with an interest in anything taken away from the premises by an authorised officer under section 17(1)(c) to apply to a magistrates’ court for an order requesting the release of the property. Depending on the court’s consideration of an application, it may make an order requiring the release of the retained property.

Section 20: Appropriated property: compensation

63. This section provides a right for a person affected by the taking possession of property under section 17(1)(c) to apply to a magistrates’ court for compensation. Where the circumstances set out in subsection (2) are satisfied, the court may order the local authority to pay compensation to the applicant. The circumstances are that property has been taken; that it was not necessary to take the property to discover whether an offence had been committed; that the applicant has suffered loss or damage as a result; and that the loss or damage was not due to the applicant’s own neglect or default.

Section 21: Report on operation and effect of this Act

64. This section places a duty on the Welsh Ministers, as soon as practicable after the end of 5 years beginning with the day on which the section 2 offence comes into force, to lay before the Assembly a report on the operation and effect of this Bill during that period. After the report has been laid before the Assembly, it must also be published.

65. In the preparation of their report, the Welsh Ministers must consult those persons they consider appropriate.
Section 22: Duration of minimum pricing provisions

66. This section provides for the minimum pricing regime established by the Bill to cease to have effect 6 years from the date on which the section 2 offence comes into force, unless the Welsh Ministers make regulations, before the regime ceases to have effect, providing otherwise. The Welsh Ministers cannot make regulations to this effect until at least 5 years after the section 2 offence comes into force. So in practice it is likely that the report referred to in section 21 will feed into the decision whether to make regulations.

67. If no such regulations are made by the end of 6 years, the minimum pricing provisions are repealed. If regulations are made, the minimum pricing provisions will continue indefinitely, unless repealed by a subsequent Act.

68. If the minimum pricing provisions are repealed after 6 years, subsection (3) provides that the Welsh Ministers may, by regulations, make any necessary or expedient provision as a result of that fact. This would include any transitional, transitory or saving provision. So for instance, if before the repeal of the minimum pricing provisions another Act cross-referred to them, this power could be used to remove that reference.

69. Subsection (4) defines what is meant by the minimum pricing provisions for these purposes.

Section 23: Crown application

70. This section provides that the Crown is bound by the provisions of the Bill in the same way as it bound under section 195 of the Licensing Act 2003.

71. This means that the provisions of the Bill will apply to the Crown and to Crown property. They will also apply to land of the Duchies of Lancaster and Cornwall (except to the extent that they are occupied by the Queen or the Prince of Wales).

Section 24: Offences committed by partnerships and other unincorporated associations

72. Section 24 makes provision about and in connection with bringing proceedings against partnerships or other unincorporated associations.

Section 25: Liability of senior officers etc.

73. This section makes it possible, in the circumstances described in subsection (2), for individuals holding positions of responsibility within a relevant body (the “senior officers” defined by the section) to be criminally liable for an offence committed by the body.
Section 26: Regulations

74. This section explains how powers to make regulations under this Bill are to be exercised and sets out the procedure to be followed in making regulations under different sections of the Bill.

Section 27: Interpretation

75. This section defines what is meant by alcohol, for the purposes of the Bill. It also defines other key terms used in the Bill, including local authority, premises, sale by retail and strength of alcohol.

Section 28: Coming into force

76. This section sets out the provisions that will come into effect on the day after the date of Royal Assent; and those that will come into force by a Commencement Order made by the Welsh Ministers.

Section 29: Short title

77. This provides that the short title of the Act will be the Public Health (Minimum Price for Alcohol) (Wales) Act 2018.

Schedule 1: Fixed Penalties

78. Schedule 1 to this Bill contains provisions relating to fixed penalties and FPNs. These include the contents of the penalty notice form and the periods for payment of the penalty and discounted amounts. The Schedule provides that the initial amount of a fixed penalty is £200 but this can be reduced to £150 if paid within 15 days of receipt of the FPN. It also contains provision enabling the Welsh Ministers to amend those penalty amounts by regulations.

79. Paragraphs 15 and 16 enable a person to request to be tried for the offence in court instead of paying the fixed penalty. Paragraph 17 permits authorised officers of the issuing authority to withdraw a FPN. Paragraph 18 prevents a local authority from using amounts received from fixed penalty notices otherwise than for the purpose of its enforcement functions under this Bill and any regulations made under it.
### Annex 2

**Index of Standing Order requirements**

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<td>Member's declaration</td>
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<tr>
<td>26.6(ii)</td>
<td>Set out the policy objectives of the Bill</td>
<td>Chapter 3 – Purpose and intended effect of the legislation</td>
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<tr>
<td>26.6(iii)</td>
<td>Set out whether alternative ways of achieving the policy objectives were considered and, if so, why the approach taken in the Bill was adopted</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Consideration of taxation: Pages 39-47 of the EM</td>
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<tr>
<td>26.6(iv)</td>
<td>Set out the consultation, if any, which was undertaken on: (a) the policy objectives of the Bill and the ways of meeting them; (b) the detail of the Bill, and (c) a draft Bill, either in full or in part (and if in part, which parts)</td>
<td>Chapter 4 – Consultation</td>
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<td>26.6(v)</td>
<td>Set out a summary of the outcome of that consultation, including how and why any draft Bill has been amended</td>
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<tr>
<td>26.6(vi)</td>
<td>If the bill, or part of the Bill, was not previously published as a draft, state the reasons for that decision</td>
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Please note: this document has been prepared solely to assist people in understanding the Public Health (Minimum Price for Alcohol) (Wales) Bill. It should not be relied on for any other purpose.

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<td>Summarise objectively what each of the provisions of the Bill is intended to do (to the extent that it requires explanation or comment) and give other information necessary to explain the effect of the Bill</td>
<td>Annex 1 – Explanatory Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.6(viii)</td>
<td>Set out the best estimates of:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a) the gross administrative, compliance and other costs to which the provisions of the Bill would give rise;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(b) the administrative savings arising from the Bill;</td>
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<td>(c) net administrative costs of the Bill’s provisions;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(d) the timescales over which such costs and savings would be expected to arise; and</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(e) on whom the costs would fall</td>
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<td>26.6(ix)</td>
<td>Any environmental and social benefits and dis-benefits arising from the Bill that cannot be quantified financially</td>
<td>Part 2 – impact assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All social benefits relating to health gains, crime reduction and workplace absence are all quantified.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A description of the benefits of minimum unit pricing for individuals and society is set out on pages 110 to 119.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>A description of the benefits for retailers is set out on page 116.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No unquantified environmental benefits / disbenefits have been identified (see Table 9).</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.6(x)</td>
<td>Where the Bill contains any provision conferring power to make subordinate legislation, set out, in relation to each such provision:</td>
<td>Chapter 5 – Power to make subordinate legislation</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Pages 56-61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standing order</th>
<th>Section</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) the person upon whom, or the body upon which, the power is conferred and the form in which the power is to be exercised;</td>
<td>The requirement of Standing Order 26.6(xi) does not apply to this Bill</td>
<td>Page 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) why it is considered appropriate to delegate the power; and</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(c) the Assembly procedure (if any) to which the subordinate legislation made or to be made in the exercise of the power is to be subject, and why it was considered appropriate to make it subject to that procedure (and not to make it subject to any other procedure);</td>
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<td>26.6(xi)</td>
<td>Where the Bill contains any provision charging expenditure on the Welsh Consolidated Fund, incorporate a report of the Auditor General setting out his or her views on whether the charge is appropriate</td>
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<tr>
<td>26.6B</td>
<td>Where provisions of the Bill are derived from existing primary legislation, whether for the purposes of amendment or consolidation, the Explanatory Memorandum must be accompanied by a table of derivations that explain clearly how the Bill relates to the existing legal framework.</td>
<td>The requirement in Standing Order 26.6B for a Table of Derivations is not applicable to this Bill</td>
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</table>
Please note: this document has been prepared solely to assist people in understanding the Public Health (Minimum Price for Alcohol) (Wales) Bill. It should not be relied on for any other purpose.

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<td></td>
<td>legislation for the purposes of amendment or consolidation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>26.6C</td>
<td>Where the Bill proposes to significantly amend existing primary legislation, the Explanatory Memorandum must be accompanied by a schedule setting out the wording of existing legislation amended by the Bill, and setting out clearly how that wording is amended by the Bill.</td>
<td>The requirement is Standing Order 26.6C for a Schedule of Amendments is not applicable to this Bill as the Bill does not propose to significantly amend existing primary legislation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>