**Co-terminosity**

I am not aware any relevant research, from a UK perspective the potential evidence basis would be quite small. However, I do have a few observations.

* Advantages of having coterminous UK and Welsh constituencies in terms of fostering a sense of public understanding or identity with a specific area will be undermined if the current tendency of some UK MPs to re-name their constituencies spreads further. In the last few years, there has been a trend, particularly in the English shires, for MPs to re-brand themselves as representatives of all (or at least some of) the main population centres, rather than just MP for the formal title of the seat. For example, **Totnes** becomes, Totnes, Dartmouth, Kingsbridge and Ivybridge. An AM and MP representing the same constituency might thus decide to re-brand the name in different ways to reflect partisan advantages, thus voters might perceive that they represented different areas when in fact the Westminster and Assembly seat was coterminous.
* If co-terminosity between Assembly and Westminster constituencies is abandoned, one issue might be to ensure variations in the names to remove potential public confusion that the constituencies cover the same territory. For example, in Scotland several Scottish and UK parliamentary seats have the same or very similar names despite have significantly different boundaries, for example in the cities of Edinburgh and Dundee.
* The Assembly might like to consider **not** using ward boundaries to re-draw the constituency map, especially if the UK requirements for diminished size variations apply. Crossing ward boundaries can be an important mechanism through which requirements for similar sized constituencies can be combined with generating seats reflective of a cohesive grouping of natural communities. Such an approach would have prevented many of the most controversial proposals to emerge from the UK boundary review during the 2010-15 Parliament.

**District Magnitude and Women’s Representation**

This connects with a book chapter I have just completed on the systems used for local elections around the world, which is part of the forthcoming *Routledge International Handbook on Local Government.*  From this research, my sense is that the core factors are the wider political/equality culture and mechanisms of positive discrimination rather than any specific magnitude. For example, STV, which is sometimes viewed as a good mechanism to increase women’s representation, partly because it is often associated with relatively high magnitudes (typically 4-10 representatives), has generated modest level of women’s representation in the Northern Ireland Assembly. Even after the 2017 election, women comprised just one-third of MLAs. Assumptions that higher magnitudes encourage greater representation of women, are also challenged by the practice in several countries of combining party lists with some form of positive discrimination. For example, in Italian local elections, voters are required to support a party list but can also specify preferences for up to two individuals on that list. If two candidates are preferred such support must be allocated to candidates of both genders. Thus an open list can be combined with positive discrimination in the context of a relatively high list magnitude.

**District Magnitude and Proportionality**

Assuming some form of proportional or mixed electoral system, higher magnitudes are associated with greater proportionality. Although this effect is reversed under a plurality model, especially through the block vote, in which elections occur through multi-member divisions and where voters have as many votes as seats, for example in some English and Welsh local government elections.

In Wales, the main issue has been the fact that only a third of AMs are selected through the regional lists, a model that favours Labour and an effect predictable before the first contest on the basis of pre-existing electoral data (see Cole, 2001, *Regional and Federal Studies*). So given openness to increasing the number of AMs, the most obvious approach would be to increase the magnitude of each regional list from four to eight. If STV was used then magnitudes of 4 or 5 would probably be appropriate given requirements to enhance proportionality, the size of the Assembly and desirability of representing coherent communities. Most STV contests tend to occur in seats with magnitudes of four or more, for example all local elections in the Irish Republic and elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly, although some members of the Irish Dail are elected from three member seats.